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ABSTRACT 
"ANOMALIES ON THE LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE: 
The Influence of the Bid-Ask Spread and Nonsynchronous Trading" 
This thesis tests for seasonal anornalies and daily predictability on the UK stock 
market and investigates how mispricing caused by the bid-ask spread, known as the 
'touch' and nonsynchronous trading in portfolio returns may explain these anomalies. 
By using constructed portfolios within a th-ne-series regression framework, I show that 
seasonality, in the first instance, is prominent in returns around the turn of the week 
and the turn of the year. However, this seasonal returns behaviour disappears when 
the touch is accounted for. Indeed, seasonality seerns to occur in the touch rather than 
returns. Despite this touch explanation, lagged returns remain significant, suggesting 
return predictability. In fact, when using a price adjustment model returns are 
predictable across portfolios. This predictability, while to some extent dependent upon 
firm size and the touch, may be accounted for by nonsynchronous trading. First-order 
autocorrelation and cross-autocorrelation found in returns proves more indicative of 
infrequent trading than return predictability. Thus, these results confirm that 
mismeasurernent in portfolio returns caused by market microstructure and 
nonsynchronous trading can create false inferences about the extent of stock market 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Market efficiency has been one of the most widely researched areas in financial 
econornics. The debate between so-called "believers" and "non-believers" is 
important, since if markets are considered to be inefficient investors should be able 
to make consistent abnormal returns. Nevertheless, Bachelier, as long ago as 1900, 
showed that speculation in an efficient market should be a "fair garne" so that only 
zero abnormal profits would accrue to investors. However, only relatively recently 
has the efficiency debate come to the fore. 
One of the most prominent papers has been Farna (1970) who introduced the idea of 
the Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH). Here, markets are efficient if asset prices 
fully reflect all information. Jensen (1978) later categorised market efficiency in 
terms of price reflecting an information set up to the point where the marginal benefit 
of profitably utilizing information does not exceed its marginal cost. Jensen was so 
confident that securities were efficiently priced that he made the following staternent: 
"I believe there is, no other propositiolt i1i economics which has more solid 
empirical evidence supporting it than the Efficient Market Hypothesis. " 
This, as we shall investigate, may not be too bold a staternent. 
With the advent of more sophisticated data sets and econometric modelling techniques 
it was realised that many of the original studies were incorrectly testing for market 
efficiency. Subsequent studies, which have become known as the anomalies 
I () 
literatm-e', were able to refute this evidence of efficient markets. In the light of these 
mainly US studies, this thesis investigates some aspects of the anornalies question for 
the UK, while simultaneously correcting for mismeasurernent in portfolio returns. The 
results seern to refute the initial "non-believer" clairn that market efficiency is dead. 
The contribution this thesis makes to the literature is in several areas: 
1) A number of anornalies tested for in the US are examined using UK data. 
2) While most studies use indices, this thesis constructs portfolios that rnimic 
investment behaviour. By using varying sizes and classifications of portfolios, tests 
for the econornic effects of, for example, a firm size and small price effect are made. 
3) Using tirne-series analysis, tests for day of the week and monthly calendar 
anornalies, as well as return predictability on the London Stock Exchange (LSE), are 
undertaken using these portfolios and various empirical models. 
These empirical models in the first instance capture seasonal investor behaviour, and 
secondly show how efficiently investors adjust prices on the receipt of information. 
The results initially reveal a positive end of year effect which may pre-empt a January 
effect, little evidence of a tax effect and a Monday and Friday effect due to the 
influence of the settlement systern. Additionally, they show that when using a model 
that mimics investors' price adjustment behaviour, portfolio return predictability is 
' See for example French (1980) who found seasonality across days of the week, 
and Keim (1983) who showed January experiences higher returns, especially in small 
firm,,,, [Banz (19801. Shiller (1981) theorised that share prices were too volatile 
compared to underlying dividends. Later, DeBondt & Thaler (1985,1987) showed 
how shares that had recently fallen in price, overreact, especially at the turn of the 
year. Finally, Poterba & Summers (1986) showed that returns are predictable in short- 
run periods. 
prominent. 
The main innovation in this thesis is the account made for the influence that the bid- 
ask spread, known as the touch, and 'thin' or nonsynchronous trading has on UK stock 
market anornalies. The results show that daily seasonal behaviour is more prominent 
in the touch than portfolio returns. Additionally, portfolio return predictability appears 
weak when nonsynchronous trading is accounted for. This rebut of stock market 
anornalies is due to the influence of i-nisi-neasurernent in portfolio returns caused by 
both the touch and nonsynchronous trading. Consequently, returns may be over- 
estimated and so the results should coincide with the market efficiency view of 
security pricing. 
This thesis is divided into seven further chapters. Chapter 2 provides an overview of 
the literature on stock market anornalies, the bid-ask spread, nonsynchronous trading 
and the influence of market trading systerns. The overview chronologically shows 
how the finance literature, throughout the 1970's, firstly supported the hypothesis that 
stock markets efficiently price securities, and then later refutes the original claims. 
This is due to the advent of more rigorous empirical and theoretical investigations of 
the way the markets operate. Subsequent chapters test many of the issues raised in 
this literature including tests for calendar anomalies, portfolio return predictability and 
the influence mispricing caused by the touch and nonsynchronous trading has on 
market inefficiency. 
Chapter 3, examines the way portfolios are constructed using at least 5 years of daily 
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data from the LSE. These portfolios are initially classified by various econornic 
categories, including firm size, transaction price, the touch and turnover by volume 
and then sorted by size. Differing constructed portfolios rather than indices enable a 
more robust examination of the anornalies literature, as well as tests for 
im sine a surement in portfolio returns. 
In the first empirical analysis of the thesis, chapter 4 tests for monthly seasonality on 
the LSE using high frequency daily data. Using durniny variable regression analysis, 
initial tests are made for monthly and intra-monthly seasonality in portfolio returns. 
Evidence supports the existence of a positive December and January effect, as well 
as other monthly effects. However, contrary to sorne studies, a January effect appears 
more prominent in the last few days of the month. Further tests that account for the 
influence of the touch refute these anornalies and suggest that it is seasonality in the 
touch, which may reflect investors' buying and selling behaviour, that is driving 
seasonal returns. 
Chapter 5, using a similar methodology, tests for day of the week and institutional 
settlement effects on the LSE. In contradiction to US studies, day of the week effects 
are not as prominent on the LSE, except for a Monday and Friday settlement effect. 
Again, the touch is found to explain these seasonal effects. However, it is seasonality 
in the touch reflecting investors' behaviour on these Mondays and Fridays that 
predominates. In both these aforementioned empirical chapters, daily returns rather 
than being dependent on seasonal returns appear dependent upon daily lagged returns 
which is indicative of short run predictability. 
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Due to the prominence of these daily lagged returns the poi-tfolio return predictability 
question is examined more closely in chapter 6 using a partial price adjustment model 
(PAM). This model provides a frarnework that enables investors to minimise the cost 
of price adýjustrnent and so mirnic their decision making process more closely. Tests 
tor predictability using the PAM evolve frorn a restricted multi-lag linear regression 
model. Interestingly, predictability is prominent in daily, weekly and two weekly 
cycles, and rnispricing in price adjustment behaviour occurs across many of the 
portfolios. The results also indicate that portfolio returns are influenced by the touch 
and are negatively related to firm size. 
Chapter 7 examines i-nisi-neasureinent of portfolio return predictability due to 
nonsynchronous trading effects. First-order autocorrelation, a common measure of 
predictability in portfolio returns, appears prominent. This predictability is, however, 
overstated since it is synonymous with infrequent trading. Additionally, cross- 
correlations between small and large lagged sized portfolios also point to 
nonsynchronous trading. In further analysis, the models from chapter 6 are re- 
estimated using nonsynchronous trading consistent variables. The results show that 
the daily, weekly and two weekly cyclical predictability found previously, seerns 
dependent upon nonsynchronous trading in portfolio returns. 
Hence, this thesis while confirming anornalies in the first instance finds that 
mismeasurement caused by the touch and nonsynchronous trading provides 
explanations to support market efficiency. The overall conclusions and implications 
for further research are shown in chapter 8. 
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2. ANOMALIES, THE BID-ASK SPREAD AND 
NONSYNCHRONOUS TRADING FRICTIONS: 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
The efficiency debate has long been researched in the area of financial econornics. 
Equally debatable has been the definition of market efficiency, Fama being among the 
first to provide a formal definition in 1970. He theorised that an efficient market price 
always "fully reflects" all available information. Tests for market efficiency were 
undertaken with respect to three information levels: weak form, semi-strong form and 
strong form. Most of the literature at this time found support for at least weak form 
efficiency. With time this definition proved to be too general to be testable and led 
Fama, in 1976, to redefine efficient prices as reflecting all relevant information. 
Notable contributions were also made by Jensen (1978) and Grossman & Stiglitz 
(1980) who respectively incorporated transaction costs and the cost of information into 
the definition of efficiency. 
The early consensus regarding market efficiency was becorning increasingly difficult 
to support by the 1980's. Much of the 'new' literature started to refute weak form 
market efficiency in favour of evidence on so-called market anomalies. This literature 
included evidence in support of excess volatility in stock prices, portfolio return 
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predictability and calendar anornalies. 
Evidence on stock market volatility mainly centred around two path-breaking US 
papers by Shiller and LeRoy & Porter both in 198 1. They implied when using a 
v ariance -bounds methodology that stock prices were too volatile compared to sorne 
underlying value. While these studies, at the time, seemed to show that the markets 
were inefficient or at least characterised by explainable anornalies, subsequent studies 
tried to refute this evidence. Much of the criticism of Shiller's work centred upon 
statistical and econometric problerns. However, recent evidence by Campbell (1991) 
in the US and Bulkley & Tonks (1989) in the UK has supported evidence of volatile 
markets and refuted market efficiency. 
Similar studies which compared prices to sorne underlying value highlighted an 
overreaction problern in stock returns, where the path of stock returns follows a mean- 
reverting process. This meant that returns moved away frorn underlying value on a 
periodic basis. Indeed, Farna & French (1988) found that mean-reverting behaviour 
occurred over a 3-5 year period implying that returns were predictable since they 
exhibited negative autocorrelation. Predictability in stock returns clearly provides 
some evidence against market efficiency. 
Furthermore, cyclical predictability can be found in the form of calendar anomalies. 
In fact, calendar anomalies show predictable above average returns at differing times 
of the year. tndeed, Rozeff & Kinney (1976) were one of the first to show that 
returns are higher in January. Explanations for this monthly seasonality have centred 
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on many factors including a firm size effect, a tax effect, and portfolio window 
dressing. Evidence suggests that apart from yearly and monthly seasonal effects, 
shorter run calendar anornalies exist. Examples include the US studies on intra- 
monthly effects [Ariel (1987)] and day of the week effects [French (1980)]. French 
specifically found that Mondays taken as a single day have negative returns. Board 
& Sutcliffe (1988) in the UK suggest that this Monday effect occurs because of the 
influence of the settlement system on the UK stock market. 
While the above literature docurnents anornalies on the stock market, more recently 
a body of evidence has developed which casts doubt on the reliability of these results. 
More specifically, stock return mispricing due to the influence of the bid-ask spread 
seerns to account for much of the anornalies evidence. Indeed, in the US, Kaul & 
Nirnalendran (1990) have shown that part of security return overreaction can be 
explained by mismeasurernent in returns due to the bid-ask spread. For turn of the 
year effects, Keirn (1989) has shown that seasonality can be explained by movements 
between the bid and ask price. 
Despite the prominence of the spread explanation, i-nispricing errors due to 
nonsynchronous trading may also account for predictable anornalies. US evidence 
from Perry (1985) and Lo & MacKinlay (I 990a and 1990b) amongst others, suggest 
that nonsynchronous trading induces positive first-order autocorrelation in portfolio 
returns which may mistakenly be indicative of return predictability. 
The following chapter aims to overview many of these and other areas in greater 
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detail and show how the consensus regarding evidence of market efficiency has 
changed quite noticeably over the past twenty-five years. Of most interest to this 
thesis is the influence the touch and nonsynchronous trading has on predictable 
cyclical and lagged portfolio returns and hence market efficiency. 
2.2. AN OVERVIEW OF MARKET EFFICIENCY 
The critefia of what is efficient has changed with time. Economists in the 1930's 
introduced the idea of the "intrinsic'' or fundamental value of a security. This implied 
that a security was valued on information represented by the future discounted cash 
flow of its earnings. In his review study, LeRoy (1989) cited Cowles (1933), who 
showed that brokerage house recommendations based on fundamental analysis 
appeared not to out-perform the market. fn a similar analysis of efficiency in the 
capital markets, Roberts (1959), implied that information assimilated about a stock's 
earnings potential would be incorporated into its price by the market through the 
process of arbitrage. Hence, if and when this potential information becarne public the 
stocks would not exhibit abnormal returns. 
In his review study, Farna (1970) theorised that market prices "fully reflect" all 
available information - the so-called efficient markets model. Fama's work, along 
with Samuelson's in 1965, highlighted the link between the random walk model, the 
martingale model and capital market efficiency. Farna's main contribution to the 
efficiency debate was the analysis of market efficiency on three rnain information 
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levels. These levels included: weakfiorm tests where historical prices only are used, 
semi-sti, on'(1, form tests where prices reflect all publicly available information including 
historical prices and sti-ong fin-m tests where prices reflect both asymmetric (private) 
and non-asyrnmetric information. 
In his analysis of these information levels, Farna highlighted three main models that 
could be used to form a representation of weak forin efficiency (the easiest to 
in the capital markets. These were as follows: 
(i. ) Expected Returns or "Fair Game" Model. 
From Farna's definition of market efficiency, clearly establishing what constitutes the 
terin "fully reflects" is important, if efficiency tests are to be inade. Under the 
assumption of investor risk-neutrality and perfect capital markets, Fama theorised a 
model (given an information set) based on the value of an equilibrium expected return. 
He used expected returns purely as an arbitrary means of showing how prices fully 
reflect information. fn Farna's notation this is shown in (2.1) below 
E(pj,, 
-,, 
I ý, ) =[I +E(fj, t+l 
I ýt)lpjt 
where E is the expected value operator; pj, is the price of security j at tirne t; pj,,,, is 
the price in time t+l; rj,,, is the one-period percentage return; 0 represents an 
information set that is fully reflected in prices at time t. The tilde indicates that pi'tj 
and are randorn variables at time t. 
However, the principle problem when using expected returns for stating the market 
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equilibrium, is that it rules out the chance of making excess profits above equilibrium 
expected profits. Evidence in favour of the fair garne model is that of runs; successive 
price changes in the sarne direction. Farna cited Niederhoffer & Osbourne (1965) who 
confirmed the existence of this problern since they found that price reversal were up 
to three tirries more common than price continuations (runs). Patterns of this 
systematic nature are contrary to the fair gaine model which implies that the excess 
market price of a security is a fair garne with respect to an information set. In 
contradiction to this evidence, Faina showed that a more empirically useful model for 
tests of market efficiency is the submartingale model. 
(ii) The Submartingale Model. 
The subi-nartingale model implies that the expected price (given an information set) 
is equal to or greater than the current price such that 





I ýt) > () (2.3) 
When (2.2) and (2.3) are equalities the model becomes a martingale. Farna made this 
assumption about the price formation process without much explanatory foundation, 
and hence assumed that stock prices would always rise. The submartingale process 
was assumed to have one important ernpirical irnplication, that is, strategies such as 
the buy and hold strategy cannot be outperformed by the submartingale price 
sequence. Clearly, this implies that under the submartingale representation of the 
market, it is impossible to test for efficiencY. Given these shortcomings, Fama then 
proceeded to test efficiency under the randorn walk hypothesis. 
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iii) The Ramlom Walk Model. 
This model arises in the context of the fair game model but further assumes market 
equilibrium as well as being stated in terms of expected returns, can also be stated in 
terms of a stochastic process generating returns. This assurnes that prices fully reflect 
information and hence that successive price changes are independent and identically 
distributed. This formally describes a random walk with drift model (since price 
changes can be non-zero, Farna (1970), pp386). Equation (2.4) shows the random 
watk without dfift model 
f(r 
j ., I+I 
10) 
= J'(r i . ", ) 
(2.4) 
which according to Fama is "the usual staternent that the conditional and marginal 
probability distributions of an independent randorn variable are identical" [Farna 
(1970) pp386]. The advantage of this equation over the expected returns model, is 
that the random walk model says the entire returns distribution rj, t,, is independent of 
0, rather than just the rnean of the distribution. Even though this model was assumed 
to give much information about the econornic environment and details of the 
stochastic process generating returns, the random walk model is however, following 
Samuelson (1965), too restrictive because of the independence between price changes. 
Later, Fama in 1976, refined his assumption that prices fully reflect available 
information because it was realised to be too general to be testable. Instead Fama 
assumed that capital market efficiency implied that prices reflect (ill relevant 
information and that agents in the rnarket have or (act as if) they have rational 
expectations (RE), of the form theorised by Muth (196 1). This describes an 
hypothesis that implies that economic agents do not waste scarce information, that the 
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tormation of expectatIons is dependent on the structure of the relevant system 
describing the econorny and "public prediction" will not influence the operation of the 
economic systern unless there is asymmetric information. As a result, investors will 
learn frorn their mistakes. 
Jensen (1978) re-examined Farna's definitions of efficiency and concluded that by 
trading on an information set, Ot, it must be impossible to make "economic profits" if 
the market is efficient. The econornics underlying this assumption is that a market 
is efficient when a price reflects an information set up to the point where the marginal 
benefit of profitably utilizing information does not exceed its marginal costs. 
More recently, Beaver in 1981 and 1989 described market efficiency in terms of price, 
reflecting people's ability to observe an information set. One shortcoming of this 
definition is that not all economic agents observe the sarne information set, or act as 
if they do. Finally, in Farna's 1991 paper he re-iterated his original 1970 version of 
the efficient markets hypothesis. The three categories of market efficiency (weak 
form, serni-strong form, and strong form) were updated to take account of the research 
literature that proceeded 1970. Weak form tests becarne testsfi)r return predictability 
which includes tests on asset-pricing models, as well as anomalies. This in contrast 
to the tests of weak form efficiency which solely examined historical information in 
asset pricing. Serrfi-strong tests, while still examining the a4justi-nent of prices to 
publicly available information, were deerned event studies and strong form tests 
became tests fi)r private information. 
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Even under these new categories of market efficiency there still remains the problern 
of what reflects return predictability. For example, the problem of establishing 
whether predictable variance of returns are rational or irrational remains. Equally the 
problern of data-dredging and chance sample- specific conditions could explain, for 
example, calendar anornalies. These scenarios however, seern very anecdotal in the 
light of evidence on inefficiency to date. 
Grossman & Stiglitz (1980) examined the "impossibility of informationally efficient 
markets" by proposing a model that implies that arbitrageurs who spend resources to 
obtain information receive compensation for doing so. Hence, individuals who are ex- 
ante identical. are either informed or uninformed, depending if they spend money to 
obtain information. By assuming disequilibriurn in the information market, i. e. that 
informed individuals do not convey all information to uninformed individuals, 
Grossman and Stiglitz assumed that information asymmetry exists. The model they 
used to represent this observation was an extension of the Lucas noisy rational 
expectations model, a two asset model comprising of a "safe asset" providing R 
returns and a "risky asset" providing randorn returns, u, as foHows 
Ut =+ Ci (2.5) 
where Ot is observable at a cost, and F-t is the unobservable component, both being 
randorn variables. 
Informational inefficiency arises because informed traders are able to gather better 
information about the market than uninformed traders. Grossman and Stiglitz 
conclude that when the market is efficient and information is costly, competitive 
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markets break down. This implies that the variance of returns is zero, hence informed 
investors will not need to buy information iii order to earn at least as good a return 
as uninformed investors. 
In similar work, Stein (1987) exaiydnes what happens when more informed investors 
enter the market. Here more information improves risk sharing, but existing investors 
9 gain negative externalities since they have no knowledge of this new (private) 
information and consequently have misinformation. This information asymmetry can 
also occur due to the "herding" of investors over private favourable information, where 
consequently rational short-term speculators disregard other equally valuable 
information. 
In recent studies since the early 1980's, there has been strong evidence to refute 
capital market efficiency. Much research has found excess volatility in prices when 
compared to changes in dividends, in so-called variance-bounds tests, as well as 
portfolio return predictability and calendar anornalies. A review of the subsequent 
debate on whether these anornalies irnply capital market inefficiency follows. 
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1 3. EVIDENCE OF MARKET INEFFICIENCIES: 
THE ANOMALIES LITERATURE 
2.3.1. Volatiliný 
One of the first innovative papers in what has corne to be known as the anornalies 
literature was the work done by Shiller in 1981 on price volatility. Shiller assimilated 
an efficient markets hypothesis model as one where real stock prices are equal to 
rationally expected or optimally forecasted discounted dividends. The conjecture made 
was that stock prices are too volatile to be attributed to new information, so implying 
market inefficiency. 
The initial evidence cited was that a long-weighted moving average de-trended stock 
price index, p, *, fluctuates significantly more than p, pt*'s ex-post rational 
"counterpart" (the present discounted value of subsequent dividends). The model 
which shows this (assuming a fair garne) is as follows 
Pt + Xt (2.6) 
where 
ti 




(2.8) xt + P) et+,. 
Here (ý+j represents dividends, et+i is the unexpected component of the one-period 
return on the stock, xt is the difference between the ex-post rational price and the 
actual price, and p is the discount rate. By taking conditional expectations of (2.6) 
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we have the following 
pt = E(p, * ý ot) (2.9) 
This implies that p, is a forecast of p, * given an information set 0, Under the 
assumption of (2.9), we can say that (2.6) shows that p, * is the sum of the forecast p, 
and the forecast error x, Since optimal forecasting implies forecasts and their errors 
are uncorrelated, (2.9) can be expressed (in the ensuing paragraph on variance-bounds 
methodology) in terms of variance. 
Work carried out simultaneously, but independently by LeRoy & Porter in 198 1, 
examined the question of volatility from the variance-bounds perspective in a similar 
way to that of Shiller's work. Following on from (2.6) and (2.9) and using variance 
representations, optimal forecasting implies that 
V (P, *) =V (P, ) +V (2.10) 
where V is the variance. Since the variance of a forecast error is always non-negative 
the following holds 
V (P) V (p t (2.11) 
Equation (2.11) holds since the upper bound is not dependent on agents' information 
set but on dividends and the discount factor only. Rejection of (2.11) implies the 
rejection of the martingale model as a representation of agents' information set. 
Under this frarnework of the variance of forecasts, LeRoy and Porter conclude that 
(2.10) couJd imply that more informative agents induce greater price variance and 
lower discounted returns variance. However, equally the above implies that returns 
26 
are more volatile under a less informative information set than agents' actual 
information set. These two points imply that price and return variances are negatively 
related. The difference between Shiller's and LeRoy and Porter's variance-bounds 
tests is that Shiller saw violation of variance-bounds as evidence against efficiency and 
tor irrationality in the market. LeRoy and Porter thought the variance-bounds tests 
suggested explainable anornalies. 
The volatility work done by Shiller sparked a flurry of explanations for his results, as 
well as criticisms of the methodology used. Indeed, Copeland (1983) sort to explain 
Shiller's results through a dividends argument, whereby excess stock price volatility 
could depend on whether dividends are permanent, i. e. reflect fundamental changes, 
or are transitory. In addition, by analysing the rate of'growth of dividends, small 
changes in dividends can represent large percentage changes in growth rates and so 
contribute to volatility. 
Other well known criticisms of Shiller's volatility work include, Flavin (1983) who 
found st-nall-sample bias and Kleidon (1986) who found that econometric problems 
existed; dividends were non-stationary and had a unit root. Marsh & Merton (1986) 
as before, assumed that stock prices are rational but assumed that dividends follow a 
different stochastic process. Since the tests are a joint hypothesis, and rationality was 
not questioned, Marsh & Merton believed that their variance-bounds tests show that 
Shiller's tests incorrectly show excess volatility and that his tests become tests for 
efficiency. 
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The claims and counter claims sparked by Shiller and his critics (incidentally the 
criticism Of Poor dividend de-trending and econornetric bias seemed not to apply to 
the LeRoy and Porter work) were partially solved by a second round of variance- 
bounds tests which found excess volatility but to a lesser degree - see Mankiw, Romer 
& Shapiro (1985. ) and West (1988) as examples. 
More recently, Mankiw, Romer & Shapiro (1991) examined a statistical appraisal of 
the volatility question. They suggested that a "naive forecast" can be used to 
outperform the market price as a predictor of the perfect foresight price (present 
discounted value of dividends plus the discounted terminal price). Explanations for 
Shiller's observations extend to the fact that dividends may be slow to reflect new 
information about the profitability of a company. The theoretical implication of this 
is that events that are out-of-saml)le will determine fluctuations in stock prices. 
Dividends on the other hand are within sample so are an inadequate test of market 
rationality. The results of the Mankiw et al study proved inconclusive probably due 
to changing expectations about naive forecasts of dividends and, an inability to make 
inferences about whether excess volatility exists. 
Additionally in the UK, Bulkley & Tonks (1989) used the original and second 
generation variance-bounds tests to show that de-trended dividends are stationary and, 
that positive excess returns over a buy and hold strategy can be made in a market with 
excess volatility. They found that this was evidence against the joint weak form 
market efficiency/rationality hypothesis. 
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The second generation tests concentrated on return orthogonality conditions (that is Z7 
exogenous tests of parameters). Hence, by applying (2.6), (2.7) and (2.8) shown 
previously, we have the following 
t+xI 
n (2.12) 
pt ++pY el+i 
These orthogonality tests of p, and x, say that the weighted- average of p, and future 
returns must be uncorrelated. Excess volatility implies negative correlation in these 
parameters. Further evidence regarding correlations are reviewed later in this chapter. 
Some of the problerns highlighted above have been addressed from a different angle 
by Campbell (199 1). He assurned that unexpected stock returns can be attributed to 
news about future dividends and future returns. By assuming expected returns and 
dividends are constant and applying a log-linear asset pricing framework, the impact 
that a news innovation has on stock prices was shown. Another problem with the 
studies highlighted above, is that they use univariate time-series models that ignore 
information variables since they use only past retums. 
Additionally, ex-post autocorrelations are small for expected returns since innovations 
in these returns cause movements in ex-post returns in the opposite direction. The 
resulting negative serial correlation offsets positive serial correlation from persistent 
expected returns. The result of these tests can -result 
in white noise, i. e. zero 
autocorrelation. Campbell overcomes these problems by using the following 
representation of stock returns 
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h, Et h,, = (EI+ I -Et) p" 
A dt+, 
+j - 
(Et+1 -E) pj'hl+, +J, 
(2.13) 
j=() j=1 
where h,,, is the log real return on a stock held between the end of period t and t+ II 
dt+, 
-,, is the 
log real dividend paid on security j, in period t+l, Et are expectations 
ormed at the end of period t, with A, a one period backward difference operator and 
a number -< 1. 
Equation (2.13) irriplies that if unexpected stock returns are negative, expected future 
dividend growth is lower or expected future returns are higher or both. Campbell's 
analysis of stock returns focuses on a vector autoregression approach (VAR) rather 






where the numerator is the variance in news about future returns in t+l and the 
denominator is the variance in the news innovation in t+l. The results suggest using 
this analysis that only 33-5014. of the variance in unexpected stock returns is accounted 
for by a variance in news about fundamentals. News about future expected returns 
makes up the remaining variance. The lack of independence between these two news 
variables was suggested as an explanation for volatility in stock prices. 
Differences between so-called conventional efficiency tests and variance-bounds tests 
stem frorn tests of the orthogonality of returns over differing time intervals. The 
evidence to explain this phenomena centres around the observation of permanent and 
temporary components in stock prices and hence evidence of mean revef sion in stock 
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prices I. An explanation for volatility in the form of mean reversion steins froin the 
theory that price, rather than acting as a martingale model of the Fama (1970) type, 
should follow a randorn walk and a "fads" model', fads being modelled in the form 
of a slowly mean-reverting stationary series. This is the subject of the subsequent 
section. 
2.3.21. Mean Reversion 
Tests of market efficiency could be classed as tests of whether stock prices reflect 
(under the assumption of investor rationality) an underlying fundamental value. Tests 
of market efficiency seern weak as unpredictable valuation errors result. This is 
perhaps evidence against the first round of efficient market/volatility tests which used 
return forecasting regressions that disregard the unpredictable parts of returns, i. e the 
eff or termS4 . However, investor irrationality may be present because prices do not 
necessarily reflect fundamentals, since there could be volatility in prices around 
fundamental value. 
In a typical paper in this area, Farna & French (1988) show that fundamentals can be 
expressed as a permanent component of stock prices and volatility as a temporary 
component. Autocorrelation tests using a price/dividends ratio of randorn walk and 
AR(l) models were run to find whether returns are predictable over differing time 
periods. These tests were expressed as the following stock price model 
See Fama & French (1988), Poterba & Surrii-ners (1988) for example. 
I See Summers (1986). 
' See the review paper by Cochrane (1990). 
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p(t) = q(t) + Z(t) (2.15) 
where p(t) is the logged stock price p in time period t, q(t) is a randorn walk and z(t) 
a stationary component where 
Tj ( t) (2.16) 
with p being a drift factor and TI(t) white noise. The stationary component can be 
expressed as a mean-reverting or slowly decaying component expressed as an AR(l) 
process 
z(t) =ý z(t-1) +E (2.17) 
where F-(t) is white noise and 0<1. Equations (2.15) to (2.17) imply that stock prices 
follow a non-stationary process where the permanent gain from periodic price shocks 
are less than 1, and a predictable temporary component that reverts to fundamental 
value. 
Under the assumption that negative autocorrelation is consistent with a slowly mean- 
reverting component in stock prices, Fama & French (1988) found autocorrelation in 
returns of the order of -0.35 in 3-5 year periods, but not in short (less than 3 years) 
or long (10 years) periods. Hence, this negative correlation implies forecastability of 
future returns over this 3-5 year period. In an earlier study, Poterba & Summers 
(1988) while confirming that the result above may be due to the presence of fads, use 
sin-fflar tests to Fama and French, and find additionally in short horizons, non-trading 
effects i. e. positive serial correlation due to infrequent trading. This is a matter we 
will examine later. 
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Furthermore in a similar study, Lo & MacKinlay (1988) suggest that stock returns 
tollow a random wafk process rather than a mean reversion process. This is 
confirmed by the positive serial correlation for weekly and monthly returns they find 
in US securities. Finally, they cite the lack of correct statistical data as a reason for 
the invalidation of sorne mean reversion studies. 
Tests for volatility can be seen as only one part of tests for return predictability and 
hence market efficiency. There is much evidence to suggest that predictable returns, 
at differing times of the calendar year, are prominent in the US as well as in the UK. 
These issues on calendar anornalies are examined below in section 2.2.3. 
2.3.3. Calendar Anomalies 
Seasonality in stock returns is perhaps one of the best known tests for stock market 
inefficiency and implies above average or even excessive returns in specific periods 
of the year. Rozeff & Kinney (1976) is one of the best known earlier papers 
docurnenting so-called calendar anornalies. They found that when using an equal 
weighted index of NYSE monthly prices over a 70 year period, that January had 
returns 7 times higher than the average monthly return. The use of autocorrelation 
tests in the Box & Jenkins (1970) style found non-seasonality and a randorn walk in 
the first instance. However, non-pararnetric tests found seasonality and pairwise 
monthly returns. This latter finding implied that, for example, January and July had 
similar high returns, and February and August similar low returns. Additionally, 
November and December had Similar higher returns than the average month. 
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Explanations for this monthly seasonal effect have centred on many factors. Some 
studies' have c1ted larger risk premiums in January as an explanatlon for a turn of the 
year effect. Other explanations for seasonality have centred on examining the returns 
tor differint, sizes of firms. Indeed, Ritter & Chopra (1989) showed that small firms 
were found to have higher returns compared to other firms and that these returns were 
concentrated in January. Furthermore, the timing of earnings information 
announcements could contribute to calendar based seasonality, see Penman (1987). 
Further explanations for monthly seasonal behaviour has centred upon a tax-loss 
effect. In the US the financial year end is generally December. During this month 
investors may sell securities in order to realise capital tax-losses or adjust the make 
up of portfolios, so-called window dressing. Clearly investors could buy stocks in the 
New Year which are now cheap relative to the ex-ante tax-loss stock prices. 
Obviously. the implication of this could be market iff ationality, since non tax-loss 
investors may anticipate this seasonal effect and buy at the end of the previous year. 
Additionally, evidence from Cadsby & Ratner (1992) suggests that in countries such 
as Japan where there is no capital gains tax, as well as countries where the financial 
year end is not January (eg the UK which has an April financial year end), seasonality 
exists. Chan (1986) examines this hypothesis and finds that tax-loss selling in any 
time period does not shed light on the Januai-y effect and concludes therefore that 
investors are irrational tax-sellers as a result. In a similar study, Ritter & Chopra 
' See Farna & MacBeth (1973). 
' See Banz (198 1), who reviews evidence on the firm size effect. 
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(1989) refuted the seasonality anornaly using a CAPM frarnework and a value 
weighted portfolio as opposed to an equally- weighted portfolio which was common 
in previous tests. They find that tax-loss selling is not an explanation of seasonality, 
and that the CAPM positive risk-return relationship is prevalerit in small firms. Such 
tirms have positive returns in January when the market has a negative return. 
Apart from the yearly seasonal effects there is evidence to suggest that shorter run 
calendar anornalies exist including a monthly effect and a day of the week effect. 
Ariel (1987) is credited with examining intra-monthly seasonality and suggests that 
mean returns on stocks are concentrated in the first half of the calendar month for 
both equal and value weighted portfolios. Specifically, Ariel found that the last day 
of the previous month and the first 5 days of the current month account for nearly all 
the returns of that month. Interestingly, evidence is found to suggest that there exists 
a small firm effect, but only when the returns from these firms under-perform those 
of the large firms. 
One reason for a monthly effect could be the timing of information announcements 
in the first part of the month. Penman (1984) shows that reports or announcements 
made late (usually more than 4 days late) generally bring bad news and hence result 
in share price under-performance. Clearly, the near zero returns found by Ariel in 
the second half of the month could be the result of this late announcement effect 
smoothing returns. However, studies such as this could be open to data mining 
whereby data is manipulated to be conducive to the anornaly in question. The Ariel 
study could be open to such criticisms given that the last day of the previous month 
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is added to the returns of the proceeding month, simply because this day had positive 
return s. 
In even shorter time periods calendar anornalies such as the so-called day of the week 
effects or weekend effects have been documented. In an early example, French (1980) 
tested a so-called calendar time hypothesis which theorised that Monday represents a 
three calendar-day investment and hence should experience returns three times as great 
as on other days of the week. In contradiction to this hypothesis, French showed that 
stock returns seern to vary between days of the week, with Monday taken as a single 
day experiencing negative returns. This was theorised to occur due to the effects of 
the weekend - even while taking into account any so-called holiday effects. The 
implication of this seerns to be that non-trading over the two day weekend period 
causes uncertainty and that the weekend can be characterised by bad news. 
Many other factors have been docurnented to explain the weekend effect. These 
include settlement dates and ex-dividend effects on Mondays in the UK Stock Market 
[Board & Sutcliffe (1988) and Theobald & Price (1984)]. Condoynni, O'Hanlon & 
Ward (1987) test for an international weekend effect and suggest that correlations 
across world stock markets exist. In fact, they showed that the significance of a 
negative Monday effect din-ýinishes the further away from the US trading time zone 
a stock is traded. Hence, as a result of this movement of a single information set, the 
Far East, for example which opens after the US market closes, is characterised by a 
Tuesday effect. Of course this assumes that the US has a large informational 
dominance on the world's stock markets. Clearly the overlapping of market trading 
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tin-ies in the US and Europe could explain the Monday effect in the UK. 
Finally, it is important to rernernber that explanations for calendar seasonals may be 
dependent upon the reliability of asset pricing models. These, could be subject to 
errors in prices leading to biased returns and estimated coefficients. Notwithstanding 
this, many of the issues on long and short run seasonality will be examined in greater 
detail in chapters 4 and 5. 
2.3.4. Evidoice of Interdependence between, Anomalies 
In the previous section we have highlighted, arnongst other things, the link between 
seasonality and firm size. This interdependence between anomalies is not uncommon. 
Indeed, DeBondt & Thaler (1985 and 1987) showed the link between firm size and 
market overreaction. This is whereby a loser (winner) portfolio of stocks previously 
exhibiting abnormal negative (positive) returns in period t- 1, earns positive (negative) 
returns in period t due to overreaction to news events. Specifically, DeBondt and 
Thaler found that there can be over- or under-performance against the market resulting 
in loser and winner portfolios. 
Identifying a size effect where small companies [loser portfolios] outperform the 
market in subsequent periods has been assurned to be aii overreaction phenomenon. 
However, the returns pattern of small size firms in the DeBondt and Thaler studies 
proved to be consistent with seasonal effects in January. DeBondt and Thaler also 
suggest that when under-performing companies are matched with over-performing 
companies of the same size their returns are approximately equal. Clearly this seerns 
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to refute the news overreaction hypothesis in favour of a size effect. 
Further tests have shown that overreaction could not be permanent as suggested by 
DeBondt and Thaler, but mean-reverting, since consistent over-performance of this 
nature could imply irrationality in the market'. More recently, Jegadeesh (1991) 
again in the US, used equal and value weighted portfolio regression tests and 
examInes a fads model, a slow mean -reverting process. The results indicate that mean 
reversion occurs mainly in January, and that there exists negative serial correlation in 
returns when prices have a slowly decaying temporary component. 
While section 2.3. shows evidence of predictable inefficiencies in the market such as 
volatility, mean reversion, calendar anomalies and even a firm size effect, there is 
more recent evidence to refute evidence of such market inefficiencies. Much of the 
recent debate has centred on the bid-ask spread and nonsynchronous trading 
explanations for market efficiency. The influence of these two explanations on stock 
market anomalies is examined in the next two sections. 
2.4. BID-ASK SPREAD EXPLANATI(_)NS FOR MARKET INEFFICIENCY 
2.4.1. The Bid-Ask Spread and Market Overreaction 
Much of the US literature on the overreaction phenomenon fails to take account of 
some important problems that may have biased the results. Examples of these biases 
' See Lo & MacKinlay (1988) and Farna & French (1988). 
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include transaction costs (measured by the bid-ask spread, referred to as the "spread"), 
portfolio selection techniques, noise trading and illiquidity inefficiencies in the market 
(both reflected in the spread)8. 
In tests for overreaction, Atkins & Dyl (1990) found using a mean-adjusted return and 
two market models that percentage returns were less than the size of the bid-ask 
spread. The innovation in this study was that the data originated from a set of 
randomly selected security prices free from calendar anornalies. This was instead of 
the sophisticated stock selection techniques using historical data that is commonly 
used and is unavailable to investors during the period studied. Even though a 
statistically significant return-spread relationship was found, overreaction could be 
partially explained by overreaction to bad and under-reaction to good news by risk 
averse investors. 
As we have established, overreaction induces price reversals and hence negative 
autocorrelation. Many of the studies, highlighted above, on overreaction failed to take 
account of measurement errors (the bid-ask spread) in returns. Kaul & Nimalendran 
(1990) propose the following model which tries to overcome this problem. 
R =11+11 +C I! I lt t (2.18) 
This differentiates between a spread and overreaction component in the security 
returns process, where Ri, is the return on security i in period t, p is the mean of Rj, 
' See Atkin & Dyl (1990), Black (1986), Kaul & Nimalendran (1990), Harris 
(1990), Dubofsky (199 1), Roll (1984), Arnihud & Mendelson (1987), Lehmann (1990) 
for a review of this evidence. 
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Tit is the idiosyncratic white noise, where il, -N((-) , (y2) , and F, 
is the error component 
dependent on either the spread or overreaction. 
If F, is entirely due to the spread, the results should confirm Roll (1984) who observes 
the following: Cov(F-,, e, -,, 
) = -s2/4 if J=I, () otherwise; Var(c) = s2/2 and p, - -0.5, 
where s is the bid-ask spread. If the spread accounts for all the error term, then the 
covariance equation above induces negative serial autocorrelation at lag I for an 
MA(l) process. Indeed, in order to test the errors for the influence of the touch on 
the LSE we can use closing prices (R) which contain the touch and overreaction 
errors, and bid-bid prices (Rb) which are not influenced by the touch errors. 
In related work Farna & French (1988), Lo & MacKinlay (1988) and Cochrane (199 1), 
arnongst others, use the variance-ratio test to measure both variance and 
autocorrelations of returns. These measure overreaction effects and bid-ask spread 
errors respectively. Following Poterba & Summers (1988) the variance-ratio measure 
for overreaction can be defined as 
VR (k) = 
Var(R, k )1k 
Var (R , 
It )In 
(2.19) 
where Var is the variance of returns, R, in time t, over the period k, say (in this case) 
a month, and n is the total number of periods, say 12 months. Equation (2.19) 
illustrates the ratio between the variance of k period returns and n period returns i. e. 
the variance between one months returns and 12 months returns. Expressed in the 
form of (2.20) below, the variance-ratio can be shown as a function of 
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autocorrelations, which, can measure spread effects on the eff or terin'. 
11"R (k-) ; z-- I+ 
2(k -I+ 2(k -2) ^2- (2.20) P2 ++- Pk-I 
k k- k 
Results from Lo & MacKinlay (1988) for transaction-transaction returns (Rd and bid- 
bid returns 
(Rb) [i. e. returns devoid of the spread], indicate that bid-ask errors explain 
between 50% and 231/c of the variance of one day returns and 16% to 5% of one week 
returns. 
Another way of analysing return variance is in the forin of a partial adjustment model 
frorn Amihud & Mendelson (1987) - (A&M hereafter). This model implies that 
returns consist of an intrinsic value and a noise component shown in (2.21). 
Pt - Pt-I ý- g. [Vt - Pt-1] + P, (2.21) 
where Pt is the observed price in period t, Vt is the intrinsic value in period t, g is the 
adjustment coefficient and p, is a noise component, where ýý-N 
(0, (72) 
. The noise 
component can be due to two main sources: noise trading such as transitory liquidity 
needs, and errors in the analysis and interpretation of information, as well as the 
impact of the trading mechanism in which prices are set. 
In a continuous trading - dealership market, fluctuation between the bid and ask price 
are pronounced and may explain a large proportion of the return variance. Other 
trading mechanism effects include the random arrival of buy/sell orders and 
' See Lo & MacKinlay (1988) for an exposition. 
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discreteness in stock prices"'. Clearly, the value of the so-called adjustment 
coefficient, will detefinine the form of (2.21). 
When 
pt = Vt + pt (2.22) 
and 
Vt = VI-I + et +m (2.23) 
where V, follows a random walk process, given rn is the expected daily value return, 
and F-t is independent of p, with mean zero and variance v'. Using (2.21), (2.22) and 






where the first term on the right hand side is the contribution of the value return 
variance and the second term is the contribution of the noise to the observed return 
variance. 
The following conditions on g can explain the extent to which return variance is 
prevalent. When (-)<g<1, there is a partial adjustment of prices to value and greater 
noise. However, from (2.24) we can see that the variance of returns is less than the 
variance of value, implying under-reaction. For g=l, the full adjustment of value 
return variance and observed return variance, there is sorne overreaction due to noise. 
When g>l, the variance of value is greater than the variance of returns implying an 
overreaction and volatility. 
" See section 6.3.1. for a fuller description of these effects. 
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Hence, the larger the coefficient g, the larger the transmission of noise to the observed 
return variance. Consequently, there is a bias in the measured return variance which 
is dependent on the adjustment coefficient, g and noise variance, (32 . As a result the 
vo ati ity of price exceeds the volatility of value. For ()<g<l, there is downward bias 
in the measurement of value variance and upward bias frorn the noise variance. 
A&M also considered the first-order autocovariance and autocorrelation function, 
given by thei t -n in equations (2.25) and (2.26) below 
Cov(Rt, Rt_l 9[ (I _g) V2 _ (y2] 
2-g 





We can see that the noise variance autocorrelation contribution is always negative 
apart frorn when (. )<g<l, when it is positive. The sign of the autocorrelation is 
therefore dependent on the size of g and the relationship between the value and noise 
variances. Under the assumption that the variance in noise is due to fluctuations 
between bid and ask prices, hence Cý =S2, where s is the spread. Using the measure 
of the spread derived from the partial adjustment model we can show that 
2) Cov(Rt R)+(I_, ý) V2 
(2.27) 
t-I 9 
When g=], we have Roll's 1984 result, that is, s= [-Cov(R,, R, -, 
)10-'. When using 
close-to-close returns [which is consistent with a continuous trading dealership market 
such as in the London market] A&M found positive autocorrelation. This indicated 
that the adjustment factor g is between () and 1. We can clearly see from (2.27) that 
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A&M's measure of the spread is greater than that of Roll's, implying that the use of 
return covariances alone underestimates the spread. Using returns variances for the 
spread supports a positive relationship between such variances and close-to-close 
return variances. Hence, return variances are a biased estimator of the value return 
variance, the bias being the spread. 
This evidence from the US above, points to the fact that mean reversion or 
overreaction tests may have data problerns due to measurement errors in prices caused 
by the bid-ask spread. In a recent study, Kaul & Nimalendran (1990) show that short 
run price reversals may be heavily influenced by the bid-ask spread since spread errors 
in security returns are positive y autocorrelated. They found that bid-ask errors in 
prices may explain up to 50% of all dailY return variances and hence cause price 
reversals. Such evidence points against the overreaction hypothesis. 
As we have implied the spread additionally may be able to explain size effects and 
the variances in returns. Likewise, seasonal predictability may occur due to the 
influence of the spread. This is the sulýject of section 2.3.2. 
2.4.2. The Bid-Ask Spread and Calendar Anomalies 
As Kaul & Nimalendran (1990) have shown, calculating stock returns using closing 
transaction prices may introduce measurement errors represented by the bid-ask 
spread. Furthermore, Keim (1989) shows that the turn of the year is characterised 
by a shift frorn transactions at the bid to transactions at the ask. The bias in returns 
is defined as the difference between transaction and bid priced returns. The following 
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model enabled Keirn to calculate the probability of trading at the bid or ask price and 
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wherepBit is the final bid price for stock i on day t, PAit i's the final ask price for stock 
i on day t, si, is the bid-ask spread in relation to the bid price i. e. (PIiI - PAOIPM, Also 
w, t is I with probability q if the closing price is a bid at t, 0 otherwise with 
probability (I - q). xit is I with probability p if the stock trades on day t, 0 otherwise 
with probability (I - p). 
The term in the first set of square brackets shows that the transaction price depends 
on the probability of the closing price occurring at the bid or ask. The term in the 
second set of square brackets represents the possibility of non-trading and reflects a 
price mid-way between the bid and ask. When testing the model in (2.28) on US 
data, Keim shows that for small firms, with a spread of 6%, a movement from the bid 
to the ask results in a 4.9% one day return when there is no change in the bid price. 
Differing probabilities of changes in the bid or ask prices induces less, though 
significant, sized intra-spread movements. 
Keirn also showed that there is a tendency for December prices to occur at the bid 
(lower) price with a ratio of two bids to one ask price. January is characterised by a 
ratio of 0.61 implying more transactions occur at the ask (higher) price. In order to 
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calculate the within spread location of the closing transaction price the following 
tormula was used 
L. = It 
Closing, Price (Plt) - Bid Price 
(pBit) 
(2.29) 
Ask Price (P Ait) - Bid Price (P,,, t) 
where 0: ýýLjt:! ýI, and when L=(-), closing transactions occur at the bid price, and when 
L=I, the closing transaction is at the ask price. 
Keim's results indicate that on the last trading day of the year, L ranges from 46% to 
0.291/c, for the lowest to highest priced portfolios and frorn 23% to 5.5% for the same 
portfolios on the first trading day of the year. Other days of the year were found to 
have no such biases. The influence of intra-spread movements were seen as being 
consistent with the large returns that occur either side of the turn of the year, 
especially in the light of the large spreads that occur for low priced stocks. In the 
light of this, the spread bias produces a 1.1% and 211c turn of the year effect on these 
two days. Further tests using bid-bid prices find no seasonality of returns and 
substantiates the claim that the spread effect explains at least part of the turn of the 
year effect in the US. 
For all firms in the Keirn study, January returns exceed all other monthly returns. 
However, there seerns to be an inverse relationship between firm size and returns in 
January. The size of the spread suggests that investors cannot profit frorn seasonality 
in small firm returns. By cross-classifying firms by spread and firm size, excess 
January returns increase wit spread and decrease with firm size and can jointly 
explain 88% of excess January returns. Nevertheless, neither of these phenornena can 
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explain February to December returns. 
Other studies such as Lamoureux & Sanger (1989) have linked the turn of the year 
effect with firm size. Here returns on stocks are computed at the midpoint of the bid- 
ask spread so avoiding much of the measurement errors caused by movements in 
transactions between bid and ask prices. The results from this study using the US 
based NASDAQ stock market suggest that share price and firm size have a positive 
relationship, and that firm size is negatively related to the spread. 
For daily data, Keirn, again in his 1989 paper, examines returns on each day of the 
week using transaction returns and mid-spread returns in the US. The difference 
between these two return values is the bid-ask bias, which was found to be negative 
on a Monday and positive and rising throughout the rest of the week. This may 
contribute to the day-of-the-week effect. Fortin (1990) takes the seasonality issue 
further by examining the relationship between increasing returns during the week 
[starting with negative Monday returns] and the bid-ask spread in the US markets. 
His analysis suggests that during the week the spread remains constant while returns 
rise, so contradicting Keim's 1989 study. Additionally, the spread was found to be 
a linearly increasing function of returns, with the smallest stocks having the largest 
spread and returns. 
With the availability of more and more high frequency data, intra-day analysis of day 
of the week effects has become increasingly popular. Porter (1992) examining US 
stocks showed that closing prices are closer to the ask price on Friday than on other 
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days of the week. When using portfolios classified by price, the results indicate that 
higher priced portfolios have a higher probability that the closing transaction is at the 
as price regardless of the day of the week. Porter concludes that up to 20% of the 
weekend effect m the US can be explained by bid-ask price behaviour. 
While the studies above highlight sorne of the problerns associated with corroborating 
a turn of the year effect and a day of the week effect they form just part of the 
literature which shows the influence of the bid-ask spread on calendar anornalies. 
Chapters 4 and 5 examine this literature in greater detail and give empirical evidence 
on monthly calendar anornalies and the day of the week effect in the UK when 
accounting for the effects of the touch. 
The final part in this section examines evidence of the influence mismeasurement of 
the spread plays in calculating the level of return predictability. Clearly, given the 
importance of the spread in the literature, it is important to recognise that such 
mispricing should be correctly accounted for. 
2.4.3. Evidence of Mispricing in, the Bid-Ask Spread 
It is well recognised that the bid-ask spread is a cost accruing to investors who 
transact in securities. Since illiquidity in the market implies that investors generally 
have to buy securities at the ask (upper) price and sell securities at the bid (lower) 
price. This occurs because an investors sell requests of a stock requires a market 
maker to buy a stock, and vice-versa for buy requests. The spread component of a 
stock price is hence the profit that accrues to a market maker in compensation for his 
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or her agreement to make a market in a stock. 
So far we have shown evidence to suggest that anornalies depend to a great extent on 
the size of the spread. Generally it is recognised, following George, Kaul & 
Nirnalendi an (1991), that the quoted spread covers three main costs faced by dealers. 
Firstly, inventory holding costs show the risk borne by the dealer. Secondly, order- 
processing costs could be seen as the compensation market makers accrue for 
providing so-called liquidity service,,, and thirdly, adverse information or selection 
costs represent compensation from uninformed investors to market makers for losses 
caused by infonned traders. It is the identification and the magnitude of these 
components that may help to determine the size of the spread in security returns. 
Previously, measures of the spread have focused on examining transaction returns. 
Roll (1984) assurned that market makers only face order processing costs and 
measured the spread in terms of autocovariance. He finds that weekly and daily 
estimates of the spread are downward biased. In contrast to this, Stoll (1989) finds 
that an adverse selection component cost makes up 4311c of the spread, an order 
processing component 471/c. and an inventory processing component cost 10%. 
Clearly, the first two components are the two main sources of downward bias in the 
spread estimates. Revisions of bid to ask prices may be due to movements in the 
adverse selection component. This can imply that rational market makers' actions can 
be anticipated due to a change in expectations made on a buy/sell transaction. 
Models of the spread have generally implied that the only source of autocorrelation 
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in transaction returns is the order-proces sing cost component of the quoted spread. 
Measures of the spread in the Roll (1984) and Glosten (1987) tradition, imply that RiT, 
the continuously compounded returns on security i, based on transaction prices are 
Rl. Tt = El. t + 




t= Tc 1. 
(sq1 /2) [ Q, t - 
Ql., 
_, 
]+(1 -7ri) (s qi /2) Q, (2.31) 
and Tij is the unobservable proportion of the quoted spread due to order-processing 
costs and sj is the quoted spread of the market maker. Qj, is the unobservable 
indicator for the bid-ask classification of P,, and Eit is the unobservable expected return 
for the period between transactions t-I and t, based on all public information up to 
transaction t- 1. Uit is the unobservable innovation in true prices due to the arrival of 
public information between transactions t-I and t, and finally (1-Tui) is the 
unobservable proportion of the quoted spread due to adverse selection (market 
infort-nation asymmetry). Using this measure we find that the quoted spread is 
SP 2ý- [Cov(R. R. )- Cov(E, 




which Roll (1984) further assurned becornes 
SPII = 2ý-Cov(Ri Tt IR iTt-I 
) (2.32) 
under the assumption of no adverse selection effects. However Glosten (1987) has 
proved that Roll's measure will underestimate the true quoted spread if the spread 
contains this adverse selection component. 
In further work, Conrad & Kaul (1988) suggest that expected returns on portfolios 
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vary through time and induce positive autocorrelation which effects both the level and 
components of the spread. The assumption of tirne-varying returns can be represented 
by an AR(l) process as follows 
El. 
t = pl. el. t 
(2.33) 
where O<oi<l, pi is a constant and Eit is unobservable. In order to account for the 
time variation in Eit two techniques can be used. Firstly, the continuous compounded 
transaction returns RiTt can extract the expected return frorn each security as follows 
Rl. Tt ý- 7() t-+ 'Yl I- El,, + il I. t 
(2.34) 
where Ept = PV + ýpeEpt-j + F-Pt and equals the expected return of portfolio p and 11j, is 
the error term representing n-ýisrneasurernent in returns, in this case due to the spread, 
which therefore is defined as 
(2.35) SP 2 F-TovTý 21 
Equation (2.35) cornes about due to the fact that the spread errors are cross- sectionally 
uncorrelated, expected returns are positively correlated" and as a result the average 
positive covariance is measured byy1j. This will enable Ept to extract expected returns 
from a security's realised returns. When Ept = Eit, equation (2.35) will be free of all 
time-varying exPected returns. 
Secondly, by analysing the difference (RDi, ) between transaction and bid returns, 
where bid returns are given as 
" This could be due to nonsynchronous trading. 
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RI, B, = El-t +(I- 7r) (s,,, / 2) Q, + Ul, t 
(2.36) 
and the difference between RiTt and RiBI is RDj, where RDit T[i(Sqi/2)[Qit - Qjt we 
can measure the spread as 
SPII, = 2ý-Cov(RD,,, RD, -, _, 
) = Tli Sq 1 (2.37) 
The difference between Roll's measure of the spread and equation (2.37) is that RDit 
is unaffected by any positive autocovariance induced by tirne-varying expected returns, 
and if there is adverse selection in the security market [7ui < 11, Sp3iwill be downward 
biased by Tij but Roll's measure (SPI) will be downward bias by ý7rj. This implies 
that Roll's spread measure has a greater variance than this new estimator. Conrad and 
Kaul's results indicate that this measure of the spread is comprised of only a 9-13% 
adverse selection component which is positively related to the size of each trade. 
George, Kaul & Nii-nalendran (199 1) adopt a different approach and construct a spread 
measure based on the serial covariance of the difference between transaction returns 
and returns calculated using bid prices. This will mean that the spread is not affected 
by any positive autocorrelation caused by market friction and time-varying returns. 
Additionally the variance of this spread estimator is lower due to no unexpected return 
components in the difference between transaction and bid returns. 
Following Glosten & Harris (1988) only adverse selection and order processing cost 
components are used in George et al's 1991 spread measure. The latter component 
is regarded as transitory in nature and causes price changes to be negatively 
autocorrelated. Under the equal probability of a trade at the bid or ask price and unit 
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size trades, the following model is proposed where the transaction price of a stock can 
be shown as 
ptMt+ 7u (S 
qi /2) Qt (2.38) 
Mt Et + Mt_l +(1 -TU) (Sqi /2) Qt + U, 
where Pt is the price of transaction t, Mt is the unobservable "true" price reflecting all 
available public information immediately following transaction t, and the other 
variables are the sarne as given in (2.31) above. Under this frarnework George et al 
have shown that existing spread estimates have a large downward bias, and between 
77 and 971/( of this bias is due to tirne-varying expected returns. 
What section (2.4) shows is that the bid-ask spread (despite any mismeasurernent 
problerns in its components) enables full, or, at worst partial explanation of many 
aspects of the literature on anornalies including calendar anornalies, volatility and 
mean reversion studies. However, before these explanations are examined empirically 
there is the issue of the influence differing markets may have on the measure of the 
spread used. This is examined in the following section. 
2.4.4. Measures of the Spread on the US and UK Stock Markets. 
The review of the literature above, mainly documents the influence of micro structure 
on stock market anomalies in the largest of the US markets, the NYSE. At first sight 
this evidence appears to be applicable to other stock markets both in the US and 
around the world. However, the applicability of the results, using NYSE data, for 
other markets is dependant upon differences in the rules governing stock market 
trading systems. This is because differing markets operate in autonomous ways and 
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therefore the prices cluoted at the end of business each day reflect these differences. 
Hence, an overview of the main difference between the NYSE and LSE trading 
systems follows, so that the distinction can be made between the way closing prices 
and spread values are calculated. Clearly, this has important implications when testing 
tor anornalies and their micro structure explanations. 
The NYSE is characterised as what is cornrnonly termed an auction market, where 
market specialists' orders are executed immediately through what Pagano & Roell 
(1991) refer to as a central auction mechanism. Trades of differing quantities and 
prices are executed at a common market clearing price and displayed on screens so 
that the order flow of stock transactions can be seen by market participants. 
Consequently trades are executed at a transaction price by market makers who impose 
their own bid-ask spread around sorne notional mid-price. The size and direction of 
each trade will determine whether the transaction price is close to the mid-price or to 
the bid or ask price. Clearly this may explain why US studies have found that the 
bid-ask bounce may explain some anomalies, for example Keim's (1989) paper on 
calendar effects. 
The LSE however operates a different trading systern, what Hansch & Neuberger 
(1993) refer to as a quote-driven or electronic dealership market. Here market makers 
display bid and ask price schedules that they are prepared to trade on. However, as 
Naik, Neuberger & Viswanathan (1994) point out, trades are typically negotiated 
between the dealers and investors. This implies that transactions can be traded at 
prices that are inconsistent with the quoted bid-ask spread. Furthermore, due to the 
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riskier nature of larger trades, market makers are allowed a longer time before 
disclosing such transactions on the SEAQ system. Hence, end of day prices on the 
dealership systern of the LSE may not necessarily reflect closing trades. Prior to 1991 
notification of larger trades could be delayed for anything upto 24 hours, but since 
1991, generally delays have been limited to just 90 minutes. Clearly, this has 
implications for tests of market anornalies when using closing prices. 
All equity markets are subject to sorne level of illiquidity when investors trade. 
Typically, this is reflected in the spread around sorne notional transacting price. 
However, because the LSE is a quote-driven systern, closing prices reflect market 
makers quoted prices. This quoted price is usually the inid-price half way between 
the upper (ask) and lower (bid) prices. In the US, the closing or transaction price can 
occur at either the bid or the ask price or somewhere in between. Whereas, at the 
close on the LSE, prices can only reflect a price near the mid value of the quoted 
touch, the UK equivalent of the spread and not at sorne bid or ask price. The LSE is 
hence, not characterised by any US style bid-ask bounce in equity prices that may 
move trading prices away frorn transaction prices 12 , or by movements between the 
bid and ask price at calendar turning points. 
The illiquidity costs faced by investors means that they trade at the bid or ask price 
and not at the quoted closing price. This implies that closing prices used in tests for 
market anomalies may overstate true stock market returns. This over-estirnation is 
equivalent to the value of the touch. Hence this thesis tries to rectify this problern for 
" See Amihud & Mendelson (1987). 
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tests using LSE data. Despite differences between end of day prices and spreads on 
the LSE and NYSE, anornalies can be explained by other mi s- specific A ons in 
portfolio returns, including the effects of infrequent or nonsynchronous trading. An 
overview of this literature follows. 
2.5. NONSYNCHRONOUS TRADING EXPLANATIONS FOR MARKET 
INEFFICIENCY 
Fisher gave the theory of nonsynchronous trading most prominence in his 1966 paper. 
He showed that infrequent trading by some of the constituent companies of a portfolio 
may cause these prices to lag behind more frequently traded stocks and hence 
experience so-called "thinness" in trading. The following example may explain this 
phenomenon. Firstly, let us assume that stock A trades frequently and at the close of 
business each day and that stock B trades only once during the day - in the morning, 
say. Secondly, assurne that there is a relevant news event that effects both stock A 
and B in the market, and which occurs after stock B has traded for the day. The 
result of this scenario will be that stock A reacts immediately, on day t, and its closing 
price reflects the news event that has come to the market. However, stock B will 
react with a lag to the news event the next morning, on day t+l. Only at the close 
of business on day t+ I will stock B reflect yesterday's news event. Hence A appears 
to lead B, but solely because of non-trading. 
When such infrequent trading transpires within a portfolio of securities, this induces 
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positive first-order autocorrelation into the returns process and therefore perhaps 
mistakenly implies predictability in portfolio returns. Indeed much of the most recent 
evidence cites high autocorrelation and high cross-autocorrelation in short-horizon 
portfolio returns as evidence of predictability. In the light of the nonsynchronous 
trading problern, attaching meaning to these predictable portfolio correlations perhaps 
remains an obstacle. 
However, following Boudoukh, Richardson & Whitelaw (1993) the strength of any 
correlation and hence predictability in portfolio returns has been reconciled through 
thiee schools of thought: the loyalist, revisionist and heteric schools. The loyalist 
school believes that correlations are econornically spurious and occur for the following 
reasons: measurement error (for example nonsynchronous trading or the bid-ask 
spread); institutional structures (for example trading mechanisms); or microstructure 
effects (for example systematic changes in information flows). The revisionist school 
believes that correlation is consistent with time-varying short interval econon-iic risk 
premiums. They believe that these risk premiums can be explained by variations in 
risk factors such as past returns. Therefore they believe that markets are efficient. 
Finally, the heterics believe in inrationality in the market and that coiTelations can be 
explained by, say, investor overreaction or partial adjustment to information flows. 
This comp artmen tali sing of the literature on short-horizon correlations is a useful 
exercise, since it enables us to judge the strength of any inferences we make about the 
level of portfolio return predictability. This literature is highlighted in chapter 7 and 
is mainly related to the loyalist school. Initially however, the nonsynchronous trading 
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literature examined the biases infiequent trading imposed on asset pricing models and 
therefore in sorne ways follows the evidence from the revisionist school. 
While the effects of nonsynchronous trading on asset pricing models is important, it 
is of secondary interest to this research. This chapter in keeping with evidence of 
stock market anornalies, is more concerned with the influence of nonsynchronous 
trading on the predictability of short run portfolio returns. As we have indicated, 
predictability can be measured as the level of autocorrelation and cross-autocorrelation 
in portfolio returns. However, these correlations can also corne about due to the 
effects of nonsynchronous trading. These seerningly contradictory statements are the 
subject of a brief overview in this section. 
2.6.1. Nonsynchronicity, Autocorrelation and Predictable Poqfolio Returns 
Evidence of the loyalist. v belief that short run predictability measured by 
autocorrelation and/or cross-correlation is econornically spurious is supported by many 
studies. Some of the earlier ones examine nonsynchronous trading from the 
correlation perspective and found some interesting digressions in their results. 
One of the first studies in this area was Perry (1985), who examined explanations for 
serial correlation in portfolio returns and found correlation levels to be larger for a 
portfolio of large sized firms than for the sum of the correlations of the individual 
firms that made up the portfolio. This seerns to contradict the theory on 
nonsynchronicity i. e. that infrequent trading occurs only in smaller firm portfolios. 
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Additionally, Atchinson, Butler & Sirnonds (1987) used the Schwartz & Whitcomb 
(SW hereafter) (1977) model of nonsynchronous trading in order to compare the 
irnplied theoretical portfolio autocorrelation with the observed market autocorrelation 
of US equally and value weighted portfolios. They find that the equally weighted 
portfolios have a correlation approximately twice as high as for the value weighted 
portfolios. This difference in correlation would be expected given that smaller sized 
securities (which generally experience higher autocorrelation due to infrequent trading) 
in the portfolio have the sarne weighting as larger, more frequently traded securities. 
Additionally, Atchinson et al's results indicate that measures of observed 
autocorrelation rise to much higher levels than is predicted by SW's theoretical model, 
as the number of firms in the portfolio rises. Even after using the nonsynchronous 
consistent SW model of transaction returns, autocorrelation of the order of 15% 
remains, again implying that other factors are contributing to autocorrelation. 
Similar tests for index correlation were estimated by Berglund & LiIjeblorn (1988) 
who compared the serial correlation of the market index and individual securities on 
the Helsinki Stock Exchange. Their results dernonstrate that the reported first-order 
market index autocorrelation is greater than the average first-order serial correlation 
across the individual stocks in the market. Suggested explanations for this additional 
market correlation centred upon institutional structures specifically, the procedure of 
4 calling out' security transaction prices during the first half of the day, one by one 
from a list operating in the Helsinki market. 
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In ýt US study, Lo & MacKinlay (1988) test for the random walk hypothesis with 
weekly data using variance ratio analysis. Consistent with previous studies they find 
that portfolio returns are characterised by significant positive serial correlation and 
individual stocks experience insignificant negative serial correlation - the opposite 
effect. This supports the hypothesis that the procurability of company specific 
information on individual securities makes it difficult to forecast returns. However, 
the foirnation of portfolios tends to diminish this 'idiosyncratic' noise and therefore 
make returns more predictable. For smaller sized portfolios they find serial correlation 
up to 49'Xc, and for larger sized portfolios as low as 9%, implying that such high 
levels of predictability may be induced by biases associated with nonsynchronous 
trading. 
In a later paper, Lo & MacKinlay (1990a) refined their nonsynchronous trading 
explanation of return predictability by examining the overreaction problem in terms 
of contrarian investment strategies. Most of the literature on portfolio overreaction 
had documented negative autocorrelation as evidence for some form of mean-reverting 
behaviour in stock return S13 . Lo and MacKinlay approach this 
issue from another 
angle. By examining cross-autocorrelation effects in portfolios they docurnent positive 
autocorrelation due to these cross-effects. What is equally as interesting frorn this 
study is that these cross-effects generally always occur when large firms lead smaller 
sized firms. This is the requirement for portfolios to be non synchronously traded. 
Therefore, Lo and MacKinlay's conclusion is that it is the lead-lag behaviour (i. e. 
" See Poterba & Summers (1988) and Farna & French (1988) for two of the best 
known examples. 
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nonsynchronous trading) between differing sized portfolios that seems to determine 
contrarian investment strategies. 
In further work, Conrad, Kaul & Nirnalendran (1991) refute Lo & MacKinlay's (1988 
& 1990a) results. They show that securities can be made up of a positively 
autocorrelated common component as well as a negatively autocorrelated idiosyncratic 
component related to the bid-ask spread, and a white noise component. Under this 
framework Conrad et al (1991) show that for NASDAQ weekly returns that the 
expected common component reflects asymmetric lagged cross-correlations between 
large and small firms. In addition the bid-ask spread can explain the individual 
negative autocorrelation in security returns. This suggests that evidence of 
nonsynchxonous trading is prominent after taking account of the effects of the bid-ask 
spread in returns, a result which is consistent with Roll's (1984) finding that the 
effective bid-ask spread can be measured by 2ý-cov, where -cov is the negative first- 
order autocorrelation in price changes. 
In a more recent study, Sentana & Wadhwani (1992) examine the link between return 
autocorrelation and share price volatility. Their results suggest that when stock price 
volatility is low, short run stock returns exhibit positive serial correlation. However, 
when volatility is high, returns exhibit negative autocorrelation, due to the influence 
of positive feedback trading on prices. This positive feedback trading is also greater 
following price declines, rather than price rises. 
In their review study, Boudoukh et al (1993) question the strength of any cross- 
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autocorrelation between portfolios. They suggest that the strength of any cross-effects 
perhaps is deteriydned by the level of contemporaneous correlation between sinall and 
large sized portfolios. Clearly, under this scenario lagged large firms portfolios may 
be just proxying for small firm portfolio's returns if this correlation is high. 
What the evidence in section (2.5) shows is that from the loyalist perspective, short 
run predictability measured by portfolio autocorrelation or cross-correlation can be 
seen as evidence of nonsynchronous trading rather than evidence of inefficiency such 
as overreaction or portfolio returns predictability, in the market. This is consistent 
with the evidence on the influence of the bid-ask spread, since it also shows that 
anornalies can be explained by mismeasurement in returns. The final section, that 
follows. concludes and surnmaries this overview of the literature. 
2.6. CONCLUSIONS 
This overview examines whether anornalies, in contradiction to evidence presented on 
the so-called Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH), are present in the stock market. 
To this end, this chapter examines evidence, mainly from the US, where much of the 
research has been undertaken, predictable anornalies, including mean reversion, 
volatility, portfolio return predictability, calendar effects and even a firm size effect. 
Furthermore, the more recent US evidence on market anornalies cites rnispricing in the 
form of the bid-ask spread and nonsynchronous trading as a full, or at worst, partial 
explanation for this market inefficiency. 
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What is evident frorn the finance literature published over the past twenty-five years, 
is that there has been numerous definitions of what constitutes market efficiency. One 
of the first versions was Farna's pýath-breaking 1970 paper, in which he theorised that 
efficient market prices fully reflect all available information. Despite the importance 
of this work the definition of what constitutes market efficiency has changed with time 
due to continuing attempts to make the original 'strict' theory, due to Fama, more 
testable. While many of the earlier studies during the 1970's supported market 
efficiency. much of the subsequent evidence in the 1980's refuted Fama's original 
conclusions. 
Due to the availability of higher frequency data, much improved statistical and 
econometric techniques, as well many studies into this area of financial economics, 
more recent work has highlighted varying degrees of market inefficiency. Indeed 
many showed the ostensible empirical regularity of stock prices and/or returns being 
too volatile compared to sorne underlying fundamental value, 
Many of the studies such as Farna & French (1988) and Poterba & Summers (1988) 
highlighted predictable overreaction in stock returns where stock prices followed a 
slowly mean-reverting process (in the rnediurn terrn) represented by a negative 
correlation. This correlation implies predictability of future returns and hence perhaps 
evidence of inefficiency. 
Tests for volatility can be seen as only one part of the anornalies literature. There is 
much evidence to suggest that predictable, above average returns, at differing times 
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of the calendar year, are prominent in the US as well as in the UK. Explanations for 
a so-called seasonal effect have centred on many factors including a firm size effect. 
Many studies including Ritter & Chopra (1989), for example, showed that small US 
firms, especially in January were found to have higher returns compared to other 
firms. Additionally, there is evidence to suggest that tax-loss selling and portfolio 
window dressing account for this seasonal behaviour. In the UK superior stock 
returns have been found to sorne extent in April as a result of the tax-loss 
phenomenon. 
Apart from the yearly seasonal effects, evidence suggests that shorter run calendar 
anornaties exist including a monthly and so-called day of the week effect. Indeed, 
Ariel (1987) found intra-i-nonthly seasonality possibly due to the timing of good and 
bad information releases to the market. In even shorter time series, day of the week 
effects or weekend effects have been found by French (1980), amongst others. Here 
Monday taken as a single day had negative returns due to the effects of the non- 
trading weekend period. In addition, many other factors have been docurnented to 
explain the weekend effect. These, in the UK, include account settlement dates and 
ex-dividend effects on Mondays. 
Despite this seemingly overwhelming evidence in support of the existence of 
anomalies in the market, much of the literature has refuted many of the previous tests 
for market inefficiency. Indeed, stock mispricing exemplified by the bid-ask spread, 
measured by the touch in the UK, as well as nonsynchronous trading, seems to 
espouse market efficiency. For example studies such as Atkins & Dyl (1990) and 
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Kaul & Nimalendran (1990) in the US have shown that security return overreaction 
rnay occur because of mismeasurement due to the bid-ask spread. Furthermore, Keirn 
(1989) in the US advocates turn of the year seasonality as a shift from transactions at 
the bid price to transactions at the ask price. Other studies such as Lamoureux & 
Sam ger (1989) have linked such seasonality with a negative firm size effect. 
Despite the prominence of spread explanations, anomalies can be explained by other 
mispricing errors including nonsynchronous trading. Weed, as Perry (1985) and Lo 
& MacKinlay (1988) have shown, infrequent trading can induce positive first-order 
autocorrelation and therefore perhaps mistakenly imply predictability in the portfolio 
returns process. In the light of the nonsYnchronous trading problern, attaching 
rneanhig to these predictable portfolio correlations perhaps remains an obstacle. 
As we have already seen from the so-called loyalist perspective, short run 
predictability measured by portfolio correlations supports a nonsynchronous trading 
explanation of market inefficiency. Clearly, this and the impact of the bid-ask spread 
has influenced the market efficiency debate. The work that follows hopes to add to 
this debate by examining short- and long run calendar anomalies as well as portfolio 
return predictability in the UK stock market. The results will show, in an innovative 
way, that UK market anomalies perhaps can be accounted for by the touch (reflecting 
market maker behaviour) as well as nonsynchronous trading within portfolio returns. 
The following chapter describes the means by which, the data used in this thesis is 
sorted into varying classifications and sizes of portfolios. Clearly, portfolios 
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constructed by firm size or even price level for example, may have differing 
influences on tests for stock market anornalies. Additionally, simple descriptive 
statistics try to show the influence these classifications and sizes may have on 
portfolio returns. 
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3. THE EFFECTS OF PORTFOLIO CONSTRUCTION: 
SOME DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides a preliminary analysis of the seasonal anomalies highlighted in 
the literature of the previous chapter. Clearly, the evidence in this literature supports 
the likelihood that rational investors will diversify away their firm specific risk using 
portfolios. Many of the tests for market efficiency explicitly use portfolios because 
they are more representative of investor behaviour; the work presented here is no 
different. 
Generatly, in this thesis the emphasis of the empirical research is to test for anornalies 
on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) including, for example, monthly seasonality, 
day of the week effects and daily predictability in portfolio returns. In order to test 
for the robustness of these anomalies, varying classifications of portfolios calculated 
using daily data supplied by DATASTREAM NTERNATIONAL afe used. This data 
was sorted into varying classifications, including market value, closing price, the touch 
and turnover by volurne. It was then ranked by size to form portfolios using a 
FORTRAN program. The use of differing classifications enables us to test whether 
portfolio construction influences the empirical results. The table below shows the 
econornic implications of each portfolio classification used. 
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Portfolio Weighting Classifications and the Likely Economic Effects From Their Use 
Owssification Economic Effect 14 
1. M,,. ffket V. -duc Enables the examination of a firin size effect 
2. Closing Price Tests for a low-price effect 
3. Touch Me,, isure of risk or illiquidity 
4. Volume A ineasure of inforination flows 
To avoid bias associated with co-i-novernent between stock prices and the portfolio 
classification of variable of interest, the portfolios are re-ordered periodically". The 
method by which a portfolio is classified is important since the type of classification 
will effect each portfolios returns series. The most commonly used weight is market 
value. So, for example, sorting portfolios based on a market value classification 
enables us to document the influence of the so-called firm size effect on portfolio 
returns. The results from this analysis, and analysis of the other sizes and 
classifications of portfolios are shown in the descriptive statistics. These statistics 
show differing returns behaviour across days of the week and throughout the days of 
each month. 
Finally, this chapter is organised as follows: Section 3.1 examines why investors use 
portfolios, section 3.2 shows the influence of, and link between, portfolios of differing 
classifications, with section 3.3 showing descriptive statistics for each of the portfolios. 
" Evidence supporting these economic effects is widespread and includes Banz 
(1981) who showed an inverse relationship between firi-n size and average returns. 
Bhardwaj & Brooks (1992) used price-sorted portfolios to test for US turn of the year 
effects. Roll (1984) implied that the bid-ask spread (touch) is a measure of 
illiquidity 
and Merton (1987) theorised volume as a measure of information flow. 
'5 This is in light of evidence on so-called data-snooping biases characterised by 
Lo & NlacKinlay (1990c). 
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3.2. WHY USE PoRTF(--)Ll(-)S? 
The desire of all rational investors is to maximise their wealth, i. e. earn the highest 
return aval a le for a given level of risk. The optimal way to achieve this is to invest 
in portfolios. Portfolios are constructed from a number of securities and following 
Markowitz (199 1), represent.. "a balanced whole, providing investors with protections 
and opportunities with respect of a wide range of contingencies". This implies that 
generally investors require a well diversified portfolio of securities. 
The total risk an investor encounters can usually be measured by the variance of a 
portfolio's return. This risk comprises two components: systematic and unsystematic 
risk. Systematic risk is the part of an asset's total risk that cannot be eliminated by 
forming a diversified portfolio of all assets in the market. However, investors by 
forrning portfolios are able to diversify away their unsystematic risk; the proportion 
of total risk which is firm specific. 
Many studies have been undertaken to establish what the optimum risk - return trade- 
off is. Fama (1976) in the US, and Poon, Taylor & Ward (1992) in the UK, suggest 
that diversifying beyond 15 stocks will not reduce risk significantly, and any abnormal 
returns will be offset by transaction costs and portfolio management problerns. Given 
this evidence, portfolios for the purpose of this research have been constructed in a 
similar fashion. As has been implied, this thesis is not primarily interested in the risk- 
return trade-off when using portfolios with a different number of constituent securities, 
but with the influence each of the four classification types have on portfolio returns. 
69 
The next section describes sorne of the empirical and theoretical relationships that 
might occur when using these differing portfolio classifications, while the penultirnate 
section presents evidence on how the type of portfolio classification can influence 
seasonal returns. 
3.3. THE INFLUENCE OF PORTFOLIO CLASSIFICATION 
3.3.1. PorýfWios Classified by Market Value 
Market value, being a measure of security size, enables the examination of the so- 
called small firm effect found by Banz (198 1) and Reinganum (198 1), amongst others. 
Initially, Banz (1981) found a negative relationship between average risk adjusted 
stock returns and market value. This initial evidence perpetuated many studies which 
tried to explain the likely causes and consequences of the firm size effect. 
Roll (198 1) found smaller firms are less frequently traded than larger firms implying 
that systematic risk estimates frorn daily stock returns will be biased estimates of 
abnormal returns. More recent studies on the size effect by Chan, Chen & Hsieh 
(1985) found that the bottom 5% of the NYSE companies (i. e. the smallest firms) had 
returns 12% higher than the top 5% of firms (i. e the largest firms), but when these 
returns are risk-adjusted, the difference in returns narrowed to 2%. This implies that 
the size effect is consistent with the risk-return trade-off and is therefore not an 
anomaly. Later, seemingly contradictory evidence by Jegadeesh (1992), again in the 
US, found that even with a beta risk adjustment the size effect remained, but deemed 
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other risk factors as a Hkely cause of this effect. 
Even though firm size may in effect be risk related, there have been many other 
factors cited that may explain this phenomenon. In tests for the influence of firm size 
on calendar seasonals, both Roll (1983) and Reinganurn (1983) tried to explain if the 
so-called 'January size effect' could be explained by tax-loss selling. Clearly, equities 
that are sold to minimise tax-losses must be those that have fallen in price and so are 
smaller in value. Under the US scenario of a December tax and calendar year end, 
such 'cheap' equities may subsequently be bought in the next month, resulting in 
positive returns in January. These results are sii-nilar to other studies 16, most 
noticeably Keirn (1983), who found that for small firms the first five days in January 
had large risk adjusted returns, and that about half of the annual firm size effect 
occurred in January. 
Clearly, the tax-loss selling hypothesis and firm size effect seern connected due to the 
behaviour of investors, who close their account books at the year end. However, the 
assumption that the January seasonal, or for that matter the March/April tax year end 
in the UK, are small firm effects, opens up the possibility that seasonals could be 
, eqArt ok (is t., Dr 
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affected by the touch. Indeed, US evidence frorn Stoll & Whaley (1983) suggests that 
a size effect can be at least partially explained by the negative relationship between 
firm size and the bid-ask spread. This relationship for the UK is reviewed in section 
3.3.3. 
16 See Leong & Zaima (1991) and Lamoureux & Sanger (1989) who also implied 
that the size effect was a calendar anomaly. 
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3.3-2. Porl I, , 
tWim, Classitied by Clos'iig Price 
Intuitively, sn-iall firms are assurned to have lower relative share prices compared to 
their larger counterparts. The bid-ask spread, as its narne suggests, is calculated using 
bid and ask prices. Its size therefore is dependent more upon the level of share price 
than of firm size, due to problerns of price discreteness. Small priced shares in the 
UK therefore, are more likely to experience greater mispricing due to the influence of 
the touch on prices. 
Following Dernsetz (1968), who suggested that lower priced stocks exhibit a departure 
from proportionality due to the higher commission charges on such stocks, we can 
16 
imply that lower priced stocks must have larger spreads. Furthermore, Porter (1992) 
shows that the turn of the year effect is dependent upon a small price effect rather 
than a firm size effect. Despite this evidence it is clear that closing price classified 
portfolios may proxy for a small firm effect, since market value is directly dependent 
upon share price". Perhaps the effects of classifying by turnover by volume and the 
touch, described below, may be of more interest. 
3.3.3. Poqfolios Classified by the Percentage Touch. 
The LSE operates on a dealership basis with market makers and dealers offering 
quotations of price and volume in stocks. Market makers are stock dealers who agree 
to make a market in a stock at any price and for any volume of transaction, and in 
return are guaranteed first right of access to public buy and sell orders. Market 
17 In fact, market value equals transaction price times the number of shares in 
circulation. 
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makers earn their profit from the commission they charge investors for transacting in 
the market, and from the profit they earn from buying securities at a lower price than 
they sell at. The difference between this buy and sell price is known as the market 
makers touch, defined as 
(P - P, ) 
[ (). 5 (P, + Pl, ) ]/ 100 
(3.1) 
The denominator in (3.1) is assurned to be the closing (or equilibrium) price - the 
price quoted on the market, which should lie sornewhere between the bid price, Pb, 
and ask price, P,. 
Furthermore, Garbade (1982) implied that transactions in securities are executed by 
a market maker immediately when both buy and sell orders from investors coincide. 
This will be at a known equilibrium price. Market makers will probably be only 
willing to wait for, say a public sale order, if they can purchase a security, and hence 
complete the transaction at a price lower than equilibrium, i. e. at the bid price. The 
ask price (a price above equilibrium) arises when there is an arrival of a unilateral 
purchase order. The longer the market maker has to wait to complete a transaction 
the more divergent the price will be from equilibrium i. e. there will be a larger touch. 
This is the cost paid by investors in exchange for the liquidity provided by market 
makers in security prices and reflects price risk associated with holding an equity over 
a period of time. 
In terms of classifying portfolio return series, using the touch enables exarnination of 
many empirical relationships. Following the US evidence from Arnibud & Mendelson 
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(1986) who found that the spread is positively related to security returns, since due to 
illiquidity (the spread clientele effect) a larger spread implies a longer holding period 
of securities by market makers and so higher returns. Hence, UK portfolios 
characterised by the touch should exhibit differing returns behaviour". 
Demsetz (1968) in the US suggested that lower priced stocks are small in firm size 
and must have larger spreads because they are more infrequently trading. However, 
under the hypothesis of at least moderately efficiently traded securities, the value of 
the spread may adjust more rapidly and more frequently on the receipt of a public 
transaction order than price. This is because market makers can adjust the spread, so 
changing the level of risk of a security without adjusting its price. Consequently, 
using a touch classification for UK data may introduce more variance in the weighted 
returns series especially in the larger sized portfolios which are less frequently traded. 
Trading frequency, more commonly referred to as turnover by volume, is however the 
subject of the next section. 
3.3.4. Porýfolios Classified by Turnover by Volume 
Every security in a portfolio has its own unique percentage touch and since each 
security has different trading patterns, the touch, as we have already inferred, is 
therefore inversely related to a market makers holding period. Low levels of 
" Clearly, illiquidity in security prices has as much to do with the touch as it has 
to do with the efficiency of the trading system by which securities are transacted. On 
the LSE, normal sized transactions have to be logged onto the SEAQ information 
system within 3 minutes of execution. In addition the use of 'alpha' stocks has 
traditionally implied since 'Big Bang' in 1986 that 2 market makers must provide 
immediate transacting information on price and volume. This provides a high degree 
of liquidity and hence a continuous market in a security. 
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transactions in the market may mean that there are fewer buYers and sellers. As we 
have seen, this makes it more expensive for market makers to provide liquidity 
services, due to the risk of holding an equity in an incomplete transaction. 
Transactions provide information on the size (value) (ind direction of a share price 
movement and therefore provide vital information on its trading pattern. Volume 
hence provides information to market makers. The smaller (larger) the volurne the 
less (rnore) information there is about investors' supply and demand functions. 
Market makers are unable to estimate the current equilibrium price accurately due to 
the lack of infori-nation'9, and so widen the touch. Infrequently traded stocks are 
hence characterised by more uncertainty, have a larger touch, and by implication may 
experience large price adjustments on the arrival of transaction orders. 
Such low volurne and low information securities therefore have specific characteristics. 
Merton (1987) in the US implies that the spread relates to the number of shares in 
circulation which in turn reflects the availability of information about the firm. 
Demsetz (1968) showed that the spread is inversely related to the number of 
shareholders and that shareholder numbers are directly related to the turnover or 
volume of shares in the market. Conversely, smaller sized securities will have fewer 
issued shares, and so less shareholders who are able to transact. 
Con-unission charges and the touch will also discourage investors from periodically 
'turning over' their portfolios. So portfolios characterised by volume size should have 
See Garbade (1982) for an overview of this area. 
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a relationship with the touch and subsequently security returns. This is because 
portfolios classified by different volurnes are classified on an information level, where 
securities in portfolios with the highest informational levels will be less susceptible 
to mispricing, and inefficiency. 
, '5 1 Equalýj verses Value Weighted PortfWios 
The method by which a portfolio is weighted is important since the type of weighting 
will affect each portfolio's returns series. Since a portfolio consists of a number of 
securities, say 15, then intuitively one could imply that the returns on that portfolio 
are the summation of all 15 security returns. This implies that the securities carry an 
equal weighting within the portfolio, defined as (I/N), where N is the number of 
securities in a portfolio. In terms of calculating an index, this weighting has Iii-nited 
econornic usefulness, since differing sized firms have differing risk and return levels 
which should be reflected in the index. 
The way the financial markets determine the performance of a security is through its 
price activity. The change in price (plus dividends) equals returns which, as we have 
shown, is empirically related to the market value of a company's equity. Portfolios 
can reflect this characteristic by being formulated using a value weighting for each 
security's return. Value weighting in portfolios takes into account the relative 
economic significance of each constituent security. The value weighting (such as 
market value) is constructed as follows: Pj/YPj, where Pi is the i securities 
classification value, and YP, is the surn of the market's classification value. 
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Even though value weighting is nearly always used in the construction of indices, it 
is rarely used to construct investor portfolios. This is because calculating a value 
weighted portfolio is time consurning and complicated. The following section 
describes the data used in this thesis and shows the influence of portfolio classification 
on seasonal returns. 
3.4. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
3.4.1. Data Description for Testing Monthly Effects 
In order to test for January and monthly effects on the LSE, 6 years of daily data was 
collected over the period I September, 1987 until 23 August 1993 from 
DATASTREAM. Data on bid and ask prices, as well as turnover by volume was not 
available before this period from the LSE. Given the need for this specific data in the 
construction of portfolios, six years represents the total period for which data could 
be used. The data, which represents 1512 observations, was divided into 6 equal years 
of data, each year having 252 observations. Eighty five of a possible ninety 
companies (shown in Appendix 1) from the old style 'alpha stocks 21 were available 
for use in these tests, and were sorted into 5 equally sized portfolios of 18 stocks 
each 21 . Portfolios were constructed on an equally weighted 
basiS22 where returns 
20 The SEAQ (Stock Exchange Automated Quotations) information system now 
classifies stocks as a 'normal market size' (NMS) banding system for 12 differing 
turnover by volume categories. 
" This follows Fama (1976) and Poon, Taylor & Ward (1990) who found that 
diversifying beyond around 15 stocks per portfolio does not reduce risk significantly, 
and would incur additional transaction costs and portfolio management problems. 
77 
were calculated as follows 
Rt = InPt + [In(DY, * PI_1)11()()] - InP, _, 
(3.2) 
where P, is the daily closing price of each security in the portfolio in time t, DYt is 
the dividend yield2' in time t from which dividends are calculated. Closing prices 
reflected the mid-market price frorn the best market maker's bid and offer quotations 
on the LSE SEAQ trading systern. All prices are adjusted for scrip and rights issues 
under the assumption that capital structure changes do not alter company value. 
Four classifications [market value, closing price, touch, and turnover by volume] were 
used to sort portfolios into differing sizes in order to test for the robustness of monthly 
effects across differing sizes and classifications of portfolios. Following the portfolio 
construction methodology used by Farna & MacBeth (1973), the first Year of 252 
observations were used to form the portfolio weightings and the last 5 years were used 
to construct returns24. The first year of portfolio classifications are therefore paired 
off, on a yearly basis, with each of the following 5 years return series. Portfolio re- 
ordering avoids the problems of so-called 'data-snooping biases' examined by Lo & 
MacKinlay (1990c). Such biases occur when different sized portfolios are classified 
and weighted by a value, in the same tirne period that is directly related to a variable 
22 See Jegadeesh (1991) and Ritter & Chopra (1989) who use these indices to test 
for turn of the year effects. 
DATASTREAM does not carry daily company dividend data only dividend 
yield. 
' Clearly, even though generally the out of sample period should be the same 
length as the in sample period, data requirements for tests of yearly and monthly 
effects mean that 5 years of returns data is needed in the in sample period. 
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of interest. such as closing returns. Convention dictates that portfolios are normally 
classified by a market value weighting`ý. Since market value is the number of shares 
in issue multiplied by the price per share, market value is therefore related to returns. 
Hence, using the example of a falling market value implies that either the number of 
shares in circulation has decreased", or more plausibly that the closing price is 
lower. Accordingly, there is an intuitive and statistical relationship between firm size 
and the stochastic behaviour of closing returns. Portfolio re-ordering clearly avoids 
these problerns and should increase the power of any tests using portfolios constructed 
in such a manner. Hence in order to make the portfolio construction more realistic, 
and so mirnic the actions of investors more closely, each year is divided into 6 sub- 
periods of 42 days each, since investors on the whole periodically buy and sell 
equities (in this case every 5-6 weeks during the year) and so alter the constituents of 
their portfolios. The portfolios are numbered 1-6 and are classified in ascending 
order. 
3.4.2. Data Description fbr Testing Day oj'the Week Effects 
To test for day of the week effect and daily return predictability, the following data 
set was used. Again daily closing security market data on the LSE was collected from 
25 See Fama & MacBeth (1973), Reinganurn (1990), and Lo & MacKinlay (I 990b) 
for example. 
26 This is probably unrealistic given that Mayer (1988) documents the fact that 
only 6% of the gross source of UK corporate capital financing cornes from share 
issues. This suggests that the volume of shares in circulation for each company 
remains fairly constant. 
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DATASTREAM, this time over a 5-year period between I August 1987 and 23 July 
1992, which provides 1260 observations. For this period 90 alpha stocks [shown in 
Appendix II were available with the relevant data over the entire period, and these 
formed the basis for portfolio construction 
27 
. 
Again portfolio weights are calculated frorn a period before the returns period. In this 
case the data sample was split equully into a period taken from I August 1987 until 
26 January 1990 which fon-ned the basis for the portfolio weighting classifications. 
The returns data was taken from the period 27 January 1990 to 23 July 1992. Hence, 
there is a 21/2 year lag between returns and their weighting value. Portfolio 
construction in this case, hence involved forming 6 portfolios of 15 stocks each, which 
were equally weighted by the four classifications highlighted previously. Following 
Kaul & Nii-nalendran (1990), the weightings and hence constituent companies, are re- 
sorted every 70 days (approximately 3 months). The following sections show 
descriptive statistics for tests of seasonality 
3.4.3. Testing the Eftý, cts of Poiffi)lio Construction on, Seasonal Returns 
(a) Monthly Seasonality 
In Figure 3.1 we show the influence that portfolio classification size has on seasonal 
returns. The results suggest that portfolio size causes the previous robust seasonal 
results across portfolio classifications to breakdown. For example, we can see that 
December returns now seem comparable to January returns, in all the smaller sized 
" At the time of portfolio construction this represented the maximum time period 
and number of companies available. 
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portfolios apart frorn those classified by closing price. Intuitively, this may show that 
investors are buying si-nallei- sized securities at the end of December in anticipation 
of higher returns in the new calendar year. 
In contradiction to sorne of the seasonality studies in the US, January returns do not 
appear to be a function of firm size, but rather, following Bhardwaj & Brooks (1992) 
and Porter (1992), a function of closing price, even though the results suggest that 
investors buy small firms in December. Also, the seerningly spuriously large May 
returns appear consistent across all classifications of portfolios. 
With regard to any tax-i-notivated trading by investors, on average the results show 
that March is characterised by returns at least half the level of April, across all 
classifications and sizes of portfolio S21. The implication here is that investors may 
be more willing to buy at the start of a new UK tax year in April, than in March, the 
end of the previous tax year. This, fotlowing Ritter & Chopra (1989), is perhaps 
because investors re-balance their portfolios around the turn of the tax year by trading 
equities so as to minimise any tax liability. 
" Here however, both small market value and small priced portfolios experience 
higher returns than their larger counterparts. 
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Figure 3.1: Graphs of Monthly Returns Calculated using Daily Data Across the 
Differing Portfolio Sizes and Classifications 
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(b) Dav o _ 
f'tll(,, Week Seasonality 
The four graphs in Figure 3.2 below, show the average daily actual return for each of 
the six differing sizes of portfolios classified by market value, closing price, touch and 
turnover by volurne. What is immediately obvious is that Monday returns are negative 
as evidence froin French (1980) would suggest. Generally, returns are more negative 
in smaller sized and higher priced portfolios, as well as portfolio classified by large 
measures of the touch and smaller levels of volurne. Tuesday and Thursday returns 
are predominantly positive, with returns across the remaining days of the week 
predominantly negative. This pattern appears consistent across differing portfolio 
classifications and the size of each portfolio classification does not seem to influence 
the results. 
Tables 3.1 - 3.4 show more detailed statistics on each day of the week for the 
different sizes and classifications of portfolios. The mean return is represented in the 
graphs in Figure 3.2 below. The tables show that Monday's are characterised by 
statistically significant negative returns, the more so for smaller market value sized 
portfolios. This again confirms the results of French (1980) for the US market. 
Additionally, Tuesday's are characterised by generally statistically significant positive 
returns across most of the portfolios. With regard to the normality of returns, 
skewness in the distribution of returns across the portfolio classifications is generally 
close to zero on Mondays through to Thursdays, indicating an equal proportion of 
returns around the mean. However, Fridays are characterised by a large positive 
skewness to the right indicating that there are more returns below the rnean value than 
would be expected if returns were distributed normally. Kurtosis measures whether 
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F, ý,, gure 3.2: Graphs of Daily Returns Across Portfolio Sizes and Classifications 
Graph of Daily Returns for 6 Sizes of 
Market Value Classified Portfolios 
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Graph of Daily Returns for 6 Sizes of 
Bid-Ask Spread Classified Portfolios 
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Daily Descriptive Statistics of Market Value Classified Portfolio Returns 
Monday 
Size SmAest 1 3 4 5 Largest 
Mean -0.0012 -0.0018 _0.0009 -0.0008 -0.0002 -0.0001 T-stat. -2.5424 -4.5000 -1.8907 -1.6667 -0.4854 -0.2404 Skew. -0.1ý56 0.0021 0.0786 0.1789 0.1201 0.0008 
Kurt. 1.5211 1.8367 1.5209 0.8510 1.2571 -0.1840 
Tuesday 
Size Simillest 3 4 5 Largest 
Mean 0.0012 0.0004 0.0Oil 0.0006 0.0010 0.0016 
T t, - i t. 2.6315 1.0000 2.7500 1.4113 2.7777 4.2105 
Skew. -0.4961 -0.7866 -0.2896 -0.0105 -0.3193 -0.2398 
Kurt. 2.0504 2.8774 0.9858 1.7029 1.6466 2.0026 
Wednesday 
Size SITIAest 2 3 4 5 Uargest 
Mean -0.0008 0.0004 -0.0008 -0.0007 0.0001 -0.0002 
T-stat. -10618 1.0416 -2.2222 -1.7676 0.2907 -0.5814 
Skew. -0.0651 0.4785 0.2359 0.2309 0.6240 0.7295 
Kurt. 2.0504 ". 8774 0.9858 1.7029 1.6466 2.0026 
Thursday 
Size Sim-dlest 2 3 4 5 Largest 
Mean -0.0002 -0.0000 -0.000 1 -0.0002 0.0007 0.0004 
T-sm. -0.4717 -0.1739 -0.2427 -0.4237 1.8041 1.1111 
Skew. -0.1078 -0.9785 0.0972 0.1144 0.1927 0.5489 
Kurt. 1.1797 6.5689 0.4168 1.2722 1.1403 0.5722 
Friday 
Size Smallest 2 3 4 5 Largest 
Meam -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0003 
0.0008 -0.0004 
T-stit. -0.0232 -0.1937 -0.0855 -0.5395 
1.8340 -1.0526 
Skew. 1.2438 2.2010 1.2237 2.1412 2.1079 1.2387 
Kurt. 7.2549 11.647 7.0203 11.309 11.334 4.7467 
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Table 3.2 
Daily Descriptive Statistics of Closing Price Classified portfolio Returns 
Monday 
S lze Smallest 2345 Largest 
Mem -0.0009 -0.0008 1 -(-). ()()()2 -0.0008 -0.0012 T-stat. -1-7578 -1.7094 -2.5229 -0.4504 -2.0618 -3.0000 Skew. -0.0678 0.2295 0.1261 0.4928 -0.3696 -0.1851 Kurt. 0.5693 1.3462 0.7198 2.7999 0.6018 2.3102 
Tuesday 
Size Smallest 3 4 5 Largest 
Mean 0.0013 0.00 11 0.0012 0.0011 0.0009 0.0003 
T-stat. 2.9279 2.6190 3.0000 2.7227 2.4456 0.8064 
Skew. -0.4050 -0.4849 -0.1209 -0.2156 -0.9254 -0.4192 
Kurt. 2.4550 1.4718 1.0684 1.9768 3.4204 1.1222 
Wednesday 
Size Smallest 3 4 5 Largest 
Mean -0.0004 -0.0000 -(). ()()()9 -0.0002 0.0005 0.0000 
T-stat. -0-9345 -0.0206 -2.1844 -0.5813 1.7233 0.2616 
Skew. -0.0120 0.4406 0.5867 0.4149 0.4664 0.4757 
Kurt. -0.2836 -0.0388 0.7685 0.2514 -0.3029 0.6076 
Thursday 
Size S inal I est 2 3 4 5 Largest 
Mean 0.0006 0.0001 0.0005 -0.0003 0.0003 -0.0007 
T-stat. 1.3761 0.2315 1.1161 -0.7575 0.7812 1.7500 
Skew. 0.1428 0.1912 -0.0393 -0.2450 0.0428 -0.0148 
Kurt. 1.1919 0.3149 2.7724 1.5760 0.7696 0.7409 
Friday 
Size Sm,, dlest 2 3 4 5 Largest 
Mean 0.0005 -0.0006 0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0006 
T-stat. 1.0000 1.2000 0.6944 -0.2101 -0.2577 -1.5306 
Skew. 1.7026 1.4232 2.7329 1.8011 1.4972 0.9439 
Kurt. 9.6152 5.4923 15.112 9.6189 8.3667 4.7359 
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Table 3.3 
Daily Descriptive Statistics for Touch Classified Portfolio Returns 
Monday 
Size SmIdlest 2345 Largest 
Mem -0.0005 -0.0008 -(). ()()()9 1 -0.0003 -0.0016 T-stitt. -13.889 -1.9608 -2.1028 -2.5700 -0.6410 -3.1008 Skew. -0.2806 -0.2381 -0.2011 -0.0279 0.2741 0.1066 
Kurt. 0.6644 0.3417 1.5307 1.7525 1.2988 1.5288 
Tuesday 
Size Srmdlest 3 4 5 Largest 
Mean 0.0014 0.0010 0.0005 0.00 1 0.0007 0.0009 
T-st. at. 3.6842 2.4752 1.3889 2.6042 1.6509 1.9396 
Skew. -0.4875 -0.9225 -0.2002 -0.2788 -0.0146 -0.5009 
Kurt. 2.9165 3.0718 1.0378 1.4430 0.8620 1.8385 
Wednesday 
Size Simillest 3 4 5 Largest 
Meam -0.0007 -0.0005 0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0005 -0.0007 
T-stat. -2.0833 -1.5243 0.3086 -0.2343 -1.3298 -1.4831 
Skew. 0.6984 0.5487 0.3792 0.1544 0.5151 0.0028 
Kurt. -0-1816 -0.3384 -0.1139 0.1421 0.4194 0.0064 
Thursday 
Size Simallest 2 3 4 5 Largest 
Mean 0.0004 0.0002 -0.0003 0.0001 -0.0006 0.0004 
T-sm. 0.9856 2.4562 -3.7500 2.4781 -2.3221 2.2116 
Skew. -0.5660 -0.2920 0.0889 -0.0054 0.1049 0.3228 
Kurt. 4.2529 1.7678 0.6879 0.5473 1.5011 1.4473 
Friday 
Size Simallest 2 3 4 5 Largest 
Mean -0-0000 0. ()()(. )0 -0.0007 -0.0001 -0.0005 0.0002 
T-stit. -0.1667 0.0786 -1.5625 -0.2137 -0.9469 0.3846 
Skew. 1.2087 1.4577 1.8054 1.7408 1.8439 1.0889 
Kurt. 4.9404 8.1932 10.872 9.4146 4.9374 4.7359 
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Table 3.4 
Daily Descriptive Statistics of Turnover by Volume Classified Portfolio Returns 
Monday 
Size Smallest 2 3 4 5 Largest 
Mewi -0.0011 -0.00 1 -0. (-)()()3 1 -0.0010 -0.0002 
T-s, tat. -2.7227 -3.9603 -0.6410 -2.2177 -2.1367 -0.4762 Skew. -0.3824 -0.1417 0.1652 0.2587 -0.0409 -0.0791 
Kurt. -1.7821 1.8493 1.0581 1.2955 0.4919 0.1782 
Tuesday 
Size Si nal I es t 3 4 5 Largest 
Mean 0.0004 0.0008 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009 0.0014 
T-stat. 1.1364 2.0833 2.2058 2.0454 2.0270 3.6458 
Skew. -0.3945 -0.6859 -0.4159 -0.4817 -0.1666 -0.3008 
Kurt. 1.2932 2.3417 2.3064 1.5351 0.8718 3.4326 
Wednesday 
Size Smallest 3 4 5 Largest 
Mean -0.0008 -0.0001 0.0002 -0.0000 -0.0004 
T-stat. -2.6315 -0.3012 0.4987 -2.5510 -0.2250 -1.0869 
Skew. 0.3436 0.5304 0.4202 -0.0488 0.4076 0.3770 
Kurt. 0.1935 0.5562 0.0531 0.3178 0.0669 -0.3278 
Thursday 
Size Smallest 2 3 4 5 Largest 
Mean -0.0009 0.0004 -0.000 1 0.0000 0.0003 0.0004 
T-stat. -2.3438 1.0416 -0.2137 0.1939 0.6756 1.0989 
Skew. -0.2018 0.0165 -0.3311 -0.2474 -0.0692 0.5758 
Kurt. 1.2434 0.2032 4.0052 0.9544 2.1482 0.9385 
Friday 
Size Smallest 2 3 4 5 Largest 
Mean -0.0008 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0001 
T-stat. -2.0833 0.6637 0.5633 
0.3731 -0.6048 -0.2427 
Skew. 0.5721 1.8221 1.9947 1.9589 1.6219 1.0727 
Kurt. 3.6219 10.485 10.227 10.917 6.8619 5.2861 
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the returns distribution has fat tails i. e. returns are not distributed with highest 
frequency around the inean. The results for all the portfolios show that kurtosis is 
quite high especially on Fridays. Overall, these results indicate that seasonal effects 
occur specifically on Mondays and Tuesdays in portfolio returns despite the influence 
of portfolio classification. 
3.5. CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter describes how portfolios are constructed with at least 5 years of daily 
data that are re-ordered periodically in order to avoid data-snooping biases highlighted 
recently by Lo & MacKinlay (1990c). By using four differing classifications we are 
able to examine the likely economic effects that each will impose on portfolio returns. 
The market value classification enables the examination of a firm size effect [see Banz 
(198 1) who found that smaller firm sized portfolios experienced higher than average 
risk adjusted returns] and closing price tests for a low-price effect [see BhardwaJ 
Brooks (1992) who use price-sorted portfolios to test for US turn of the year effects]. 
The touch perhaps measures risk or illiquidity and may be inversely related to returns 
and turnover by volume measures information flows [see Merton (1987)]. 
The above descriptive statistics show the extent to which size and classification of a 
portfolio influences seasonal returns. Indeed, in support of much of the calendar 
anomalies literature, negative Monday effects are more prominent across small firm 
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sized portfolios and small volurne classified portfolios, as well as large touch sized 
portfolios. 
Additionally, the results show that portfolio classification type does not influence day 
of the week return patterns per se. However, high returns are found in January, more 
for low priced portfolios and for the larger market value, touch and volurne 
classifications. In subsequent chapters, we airn to use these portfolios to test for 
robustness in stock market anornalles on the LSE, in the light of evidence on security 
mispricing due to the touch and nonsynchronous trading. 
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4. TURN OF THE YEAR AND MONTHLY EFFECTS: 
THE INFLUENCE OF THE BID-ASK SPREAD 
4.1. INTRO DUCT ION 
The previous chapter described how portfolios were constructed and showed that 
generally, when using seasonal descriptive statistics, only portfolio size and not 
c assi ication in uences returns. This chapter uses these portfolios to examine, in the 
first instance. monthly and intra-i-nonthly seasonal returns on the LSE. However, 
because investors' seasonal buying and selling behaviour is reflected in the touch, tests 
are also undertaken to see whether the touch can explain this seasonal behaviour in 
portfolio returns. 
One prominent seasonal is the so-called January effect, which has been extensively 
researched in the US. Rozeff & Kinney (1976) were one of the first to find evidence 
of this monthly share price seasonality on the NYSE between 1904-1974. Some 
studies, especially in the 
US29 
, argue that this calendar anornaly 
is attributed to 
investors' portfolio 'window dressing' involving portfolio re-balancing. This involves 
the selling of stocks before the calendar year end, which under the tax-selling 
hypothesis may be to limit any tax liability, and the subsequent buying back of 
C cheap' stocks in the New Year. 
29 See for example Ritter & Chopra (1989). 
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Investor behaviour hence may be consistent with a tax-loss selling hypothesis. The 
UK however, has a different tax and calendar year end, and as a result both a 'true' 
January t: alendar anornaly as well as a tax effect in April may exist. Therefore, due 
to the nature of the UK tax systern, with its April 5th tax year end, analysis is 
undertaken to establish the prominence of a tax and/or January seasonality. 
Since the evidence above implies that investors buy and sell around calendar turning 
points, more recent evidence has centred on a bid-ask spread explanation for 
seasonality - see for example, Keirn (1989), Clark, McConnell & Singh (1992) and 
Bhardwaj & Brooks (1992) in the US. In order to test for the robustness of 
seasonality in the UK, the influence of the touch is considered. Equally weighted 
portfolios, re-ordered periodically, are used using 5 years of daily data. Daily dummy 
variable regression models were estimated using five different sizes of four 
classifications of portfolios in order to investigate a January effect, a tax-loss effect 
in March and April and the existence of other monthly seasonal patterns. In light of 
the evidence by Ariel (1987) highlighting differing investor buying and selling 
behaviour around the turn of the month, intra-i-nonthly seasonality is investigated using 
the first, raiddle and last 5 days of each month. 
The results establish the existence of a positive December effect (probably due to 
investors pre-empting positive January returns) as well as a January effect in the UK, 
but no tax effect. Furthermore, removing the effects of the touch, a measure of 
illiquidity causes these seasonal returns to disappear. Indeed, in further tests I 
investigate whether seasonal returns are driven by seasonality in the touch or whether 
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the touch is determined by seasonal returns. 
seasonal rather than portfolio returns. 
The results show that the touch is 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: section 4.2 examines the 
theoretical and empirical explanations for January seasonality, including the small 
firm, risk, tax and spread effects. Section 4.3 describes the data used in this chapter, 
wit sect on 4.4 reviewing the methodological issues used to establish seasonality and 
its explanations. Section 4.5 shows the empirical results with section 4.6 concluding. 
4.2. TURN OF THE YEAR AND MONTHLY EFFECTS: 
THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL EXPLANATIONS 
Tests for seasonality in stock returns were brought to the fore in 1976 by Rozeff and 
Kinney. They exan-ýined monthly rates of return on the NYSE over a 70 year period 
and found that average monthly returns in January were seven times higher than the 
average return in other months. Rozeff and Kinney also found that risk premiums 
estimated from a two parameter capital asset pricing model (CAPM), were higher in 
January compared to the other months. 
Although Rozeff and Kinney did not try to explain seasonality, there are a number of 
hypotheses that may do so. One obvious one, cited above, is that seasonality may be 
a function of risk. In other words, high risk premiums in January are compensated 
for by high seasonal returns. Also, because December coincides with the end of the 
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US tax year, there may be a tax-selling explanation for seasonal returns around the 
turn of the year. However, of more immediate interest is Keirn's (1983) finding that 
the average risk-adjusted return is large for small firms in January, when compared 
to the rest of the year. 
4.2.1. Small Firm Eftý, ct 
Earlier literature in the US on the firm size effect, reviewed by Schwert (1983), 
hypothesised various explanations for such a phenomenon. Banz (1981) suggests a 
negative association between firm size and stock returns even when controlling for 
risk using CAPM. Reinganum (1981) found a size effect after controlling for a 
price/earnings (P/E) effect. Later, Chan, Chen & Hsieh (1985) suggest that the bottorn 
511c of the NYSE companies (i. e. the smallest firms) had returns 12% higher than the 
top 511c, of firms (i. e the largest firms). By risk adjusting these security returns using 
a multi-factor pricing equation, similar in concept to the arbitrage pricing theory 
(APT), the difference in returns narrowed to 2%. This latter result implies that the 
size effect is consistent with the risk-return trade-off and is therefore not an anomaly. 
In a similar study, Jegadeesh (1992) in the US found that even with a beta risk 
adjustment the size effect remained, but deemed other risk factors as a likely cause 
of this effect. 
However, it was Keim's (1983) observation of seasonality in small firms that invoked 
a plethora of hypotheses as to why seasonality only seerned to occur in such firms. 
Keirn found that a large part of risk adjusted returns of small firms occurred in the 
first week of January. More recently, Leong & Zaima (1991) using NYSE-AMEX 
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stocks found evidence of a small firm effect. However, when Over- the- Counter 
(I OTC) stocks are included in the analysis, this effect disappears. Nevertheless, 
examination of returns in January for small firms, reveals that they are large and 
positive in all the US markets considered, more so for the OTC stocks. Reinganum 
(1983) also confirmed that small firms exhibit large returns at the beginning of 
January. but showed that such seasonal returns were determined by investors' tax-loss 
selling. When these small firms were previous 'winners', i. e. in the previous year had 
experienced high price gains, their returns were lower on the first few days in January. 
The "winner" and "loser" hypothesis was given most prominence by DeBondt & 
Thaler (1985,1987) who analysed overreaction in the US markets. Their initial 
results suggest that firms that recently had a poor share performance and were prior 
losers, had a larger overreaction effect, when compared to prior winners. Most of this 
overreaction effect however, was realized in January. Overreaction of this nature 
seerns much larger than the selling pressure exerted at the end of the previous year 
and so weakens any tax-loss selling explanation for such seasonality. 
Later, DeBondt and Thaler in their 1987 study examined the seasonality question more 
closely. However, by their own admission they seemed unable to explain the January 
effect, indeed they cotyu-nented on page 579: "Many puzzles remain, especially 
regarding the seasonality in excess returns. We have no satisfactory explanation for 
the January effect, rational or otherwise. " 
Despite this, DeBondt and Thaler's analysis of the winner and loser portfolio problern 
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did reveal some interesting results. Losei-s' excess returns, especially in January, were 
negatively related to long- and short term past performance. Winner portfolios' excess 
returns in January were negatively related to excess returns frorn the prior December, 
perhaps due to tax effects. Additionally, they showed that the loser-winner effect is 
not related to CAPM beta risk measurements or a small firm effect, but rather to 
overreaction. 
Zarowin (1990), using 50+ years of US data, replicated DeBondt and Thaler's work 
and found that neither risk nor seasonality alone can account for the results. In fact, 
losers outperform winners on a risk-adjusted basis over all months. When size is 
controlled for, losers outperform winners only in January. The paper shows that the 
tendency for losers to outperform winners is not due entirely to investor overreaction, 
but that losers are smaller sized firms than winners. When losers are compared to 
winners of equal size, returns are constant, and in periods when winners are smaller 
than losers, winners outperform losers. 
Despite this attempt to show that an overreaction hypothesis explains January 
seasonality, especially for small firms, there is other evidence to explain seasonality. 
As we have already implied, the small firm effect theorised by Banz (1981) may 
coincide with some form of risk compensation. Indeed as is shown below, there is 
evidence to suggest that seasonality can also be explained by such a risk premium. 
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4.2.2. Risk Premium Explaliatioms, ftw Seasonality 
So far the evidence suggests that small firms have higher risk-adjusted returns than 
larger firms, but not necessarily in January. In contradiction to this, Tinic & West 
(1984) show that the risk premiums using CAPM appeared very large in January when 
compared to other months. January seemed to be the only month that had a 
statistically significant positive risk-return relationship. 
However, Rogalski & Tinic (1986) show that when using a CAPM frarnework that 
systernatic and residual risk is higher in January for small firms. Rogalski and Tinic 
imply that returns need to be eight to nine tirnes higher in January if they are to 
compensate for this increased risk. Clearly, there is a risk-return trade-off explanation 
for the Jaiiuary effect. Further work by Gultekin & Gultekin (1987), using a factor 
analysis approach in an APT framework, suggests that seasonality occurs in the risk 
prernia. Also, the results suggest that the APT model can explain the risk premia of 
stock returns only in January, since when January is excluded from the data, the risk- 
return relationship breaks down. 
Overall, this US evidence seems to support the hypothesis that January returns 
seasonality can be explained by seasonality in the risk premium. In recent studies 
however, more sophisticated tests have been undertaken to examine this relationship. 
Seyhun (1993) in the US, tests the hypothesis that January seasonality can be 
explained by omitted risk factors. To this end they use a stochastic dorninance 
approach to test for this seasonal behaviour. Using stochastic dominance (SD) theory 
enables a test for the hypothesis that expected utility rnaxin-ýisers prefer small stocks 
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in January. The SD approach has the advantage over asset pricing models in that it 
makes no assumption about the model of expected security returns, and has fewer 
assumptions about investors' utility functions. 
Seyhun however, cites problerns with the SD approach when used empirically. Here, 
realised returns rnight rnis-estirnate the dorninance results since they do not provide 
consistent estimates of negative outliers in the population distribution of stock returns. 
Despite these problerns, tests for SD in small firms on the NYSE suggest that SD is 
prominent in the first-order and so implies that ornitted risk factors are not likely to 
explain the January seasonal. 
In the UK, Dernos, Sentana & Shah (1993) examine the risk-return structure on the 
LSE. Using a dynamic APT model they examine the conditional factor structure in 
January. By estimating all months of the year simultaneously, they ensure that the 
market factor is constant year round. Their results suggest, in contradiction to US 
evidence, that while January has a unique risk-return relationship, there is a positive 
and statistically significant relationship between systematic risk and returns in other 
months. Additionally, the APT shows that this January effect is not consistent across 
all assets. 
Similarly, Clare, Psaradakis & Thomas (1994), examine the risk-return relationship for 
the UK stock market. In the first instance they find that the FTA All Share Index, 
which includes small as well as larger stocks, displays a significant deterministic 
pattern corresponding to seasonal behaviour in January. Additionally using five 
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classifications of market value sorted portfolios, they confirm a small firin effect in 
January. Tests of the risk-return relationship using a generalised autoregressive 
heteroscedasticity in mean (GARCH-M) model, which measures volatility in the 
market. confirms that this proxy for risk does not provide a full explanation for 
seasonal returns. 
While the results on risk explanations for January seasonal effects are mixed, 
especially in the UK, there are further non-asset pricing model explanations for 
seasonality in the market. Clearly, the establishment of the link between the small 
firrn effect and seasonality opens up the possibility that selling by investors before 
calendar turning points, causing stock price falls could for example be due to tax-loss 
selling. Additionally, seasonality may coincide with the portfolio re-balancing 
hypothesis or even so-called portfolio 'window dressing, ' all of which are explained 
below. 
4.2.3. The Tax-loss Selling Hypothesis 
Much of the evidence for the January seasonal anomaly has originated from the US 
where the tax year end coincides with the end of the calendar year. This evidence 
suggests that investors who are rational will, in order to maxii-nise annual profits (or 
iyiinirnise losses), sell sorne of the constituent shares of their portfolios. This trading 
will occur in December for stocks that have had the greatest capital losses over the 
year and so are smaller in size. The result of this selling causes price falls in the first 
instance, however subsequently investors buy back these now smaller stocks in 
January (when prices generally look cheap). One can therefore hypothesise in the 
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light of this evidence, that on average, returns will be lower in December and higher 
at the beginning of January"'. 
One of the first to suggest that a tax-selling influence may contribute to seasonality 
was Givoly & Ovadia (1983), who examined NYSE monthly data. They found lower 
prices in December due to tax-loss selling, but found that returns rose in January 
especially in smaller firms. They perceived that the more precise the identification 
of tax-loss sellers, the stronger would be the tax explanation for US January 
seasonality. 
Furthermore, Reinganurn (1983) analysed the NYSE and AMEX markets over the 
period 1962-1980, and found a January effect with abnormally high returns especially 
in the first few trading days of the month. This appeared consistent with a tax-loss 
selling hypothesis. However, as we have said, tax-loss selling cannot explain the 
entire January seasonal since prior winners (i. e. small firms), are least likely to be sold 
for tax-loss purposes, as well as exhibit high January average returns. 
In their international study of stock market seasonality, Gultekin & Gultekin (1983) 
find that the UK experiences a large April tax effect in addition to large returns in 
January. For all the other countries considered, apart from Australia, the tax year end 
coincides with the calendar year end. January returns are subsequently higher than for 
other months, but are not firm size dependent. 
" This seasonal behaviour may occur since investors might re-balance their 
portfolios in order to give the impression of good investment performance. 
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In contradiction to the all the studies mentioned above, Chan (1986), using CRSP file 
data between 1962-1983, suggested that optimal tax-loss selling does not predict that 
price pressure is associated with long-term losses. The January effect was found for 
both long and short-term losses and did not confirm or reject the existence of tax- 
motivated trading at the end of the year. 
While a tax-loss hypothesis may be conducive with seasonality, in their recent study, 
Ritter & Chopra (1989) showed that, when using NYSE monthly returns between 1935 
and 1986, January had negative market returns and small firm returns were positive, 
more so the higher the beta. This is consistent with a portfolio re-balancing 
hypothesis that implies investors sell stocks at the end of the year and buy back riskier 
stocks in January. -nay be consistent with investors clearing their This behaviour i 
books in order to give an indication of their yearly investment performance, rather 
than with any tax motivated selling. Also as we have shown the tax-loss selling 
hypothesis and firm size effect appear to be connected to the extent that seasonals 
could be affected by the bid-ask spread. 
4.2.4. The January Seasonal - Bid-Ask Spread Explanations 
In accordance with the hypothesis above, Stoll & Whaley (1983) suggest that a firm 
size effect can be at least partially explained by the bid-ask spread in the US. This 
relationship however, may be more fundamental than that. Firstly, we can hypothesise 
that because smaller sized securities have a fewer number of shares in circulation they 
have less volurne of trade in the market, and following Garbade (1982) and Demsetz 
(1968), there is therefore less public information about them. In the UK the touch 
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may influence calendar anornalies as a result of rnis-calculated returns caused by this 
buying and selling behaviour. 
By assurning such an explanation, much of the evidence for seasonals may therefore 
be explainable through the microstructure in prices. For example, Bhardwaj & Brooks 
(1 1992), show that the January effect is primarily a low-share price effect and less so 
a market value effect-". Indeed, in the 1977-1986 period on the AMEX and NYSE 
markets, excess January returns were lower on low-price stocks than on high-price 
stocks. Since sorne informed traders have large before transaction costs, excess 
January returns on low-price stocks may be explained by higher transaction costs and 
the touch. This implies that the January anornaly is not likely to be exploitable by 
investors. 
Contradictory evidence to these two studies is provided by Lamoureux & Sanger 
(1989). They found using the US NASDAQ index over the 1973-1985 period that 
quoted spreads are highly negatively correlated with firm size, but are not seasonal. 
Additionally, evidence against this seasonality- spread hypothesis has also centred on 
noise and tax-induced trading explanations. Firstly, Clark, McConnell & Singh (1992) 
using end of month bid-ask spread for 540 NYSE stocks in a cross-section over the 
period 1982-1987, refute the significance of a correlation between changes in spreads, 
at the turn of the year, and January stock returns; this seasonal anornaly may be due 
to "noise" in prices. In their recent US and Canadian study, Griffith & White (1993), 
3' This conjecture is examined later in this chapter when we use transaction price 
classified portfolios in tests for monthly and intra-monthly seasonality. 
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use intra-day data to examine tax-induced trading. While sell and buy trades occur 
at the bid in December and at the ask in January, respectively, this transaction 
behaviour is associated with a taxation hypothesis rather than any turn of the year 
e ects. 
4.2.5. The Hypothesis of'Monthly Seasonality on the LSE: An Overview 
What is evident from the conjecture and evidence above, despite the influence of bid- 
ask spread in the US and the touch in the UK, is that monthly seasonality on the LSE 
may be quite probable. Investors' actions at the turn of the calendar year and other 
monthly periods may mean that returns follow systernatic trading patterns. Such 
actions may result in two scenarios. Firstly, turn of the year effects may occur 
because investors open a new 'investment book' and hence 'window dress' portfolios, 
especially at the start of a calendar year, in January and the tax year, in April. 
Secondly, as a consequence of these actions security prices and returns will fall due 
to selling before calendar turning points, and rise, due to the subsequent buying back 
of these (now small sized) stocks after the turning point. 
In a further, more detailed analysis of returns, this tirne in intra-i-nonthly periods, Ariel 
(1987) examined inean returns for US portfolios. Returns appeared seasonal only for 
days immediately before and during the first half of calendar months, and 
indistinguishable from zero for days during the last half of the month. This "intra- 
monthly effect" appeared independent of the January effect. In the UK, Cadsby & 
Ratner (1992) suggest that a turn of the month effect occurs on the last and first three 
days of the month. Such results justify a further intra-monthly investigation in UK. 
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Such seasonal behaviour may be more prevalent in smaller firms which at the end of 
the previous calendar period are more likely to have been over sold. However, due 
to the higher level risk and hence larger touch associated with smaller companies, 
investors who purchase sinall sized equities may appear to achieve higher than average 
returns. However, true abnormal returns may be much lower due to the influence of 
the touch. 
This chapter airns to test the hypothesis that January and other monthly calendar 
effects do occur, but that their occurrence is explainable by the touch in security 
returns. Such returns may be overstated compared to actual returns especially on the 
days surround a calendar turning point. Therefore, a further hypothesis in the light 
of a partial n-krostructure explanation for longer run calendar seasonals, is that 
seasonal trading patterns, shown by movements in the touch may explain portfolio 
returns rather than seasonal returns explaining the touch. 
4.3. METH(-)D(-)L(-)(-I'rICAL ISSUES IN TESTINGr FOR 
DETERMINISTIC SEASONALITY 
4.3.1. Modelling Monthly and Intra-Monthly Seasonal Returns 
The descriptive statistics of portfolio returns shown in chapter 3, as well as the 
evidence above, point to the fact that monthly seasonality may be prominent on the 
LSE. However, a more formal method of examining seasonality is to fit a regression 
equation to the data described in section 3.3.1. Estimated coefficients under an OLS 
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trarnework will show the influence seasonality has on returns, relative to the average 
return. Following the literature on daily and weekly calendar anornalie S12 durnmy 
variable regression analysis may be more appropriate than standard OLS, since 
seasona ity in the data may cause the assumptions underlying OLS" to be biased. 
Durru-ny variable analysis enables the effects of seasonality to be captured by the 
coefficients of the explanatory variables. The use of durnmy variables, shown in (4.1), 
allows the intercept parameter to change through the year and enable us to distinguish 
between differing daily returns across the month. 
Di. 0 if'l* = 1,..., Tl 
1 if' i=T, + 1,..., T 
Here i is the number of daily returns and Di is a durnmy variable that varies across 
the month. 
Given this, the following durnmy variable regression in equation (4.2) can be used to 
model the effects of monthly seasonality on portfolio returns 
12 
Rpt = 60RP,, _, 
+ oc, D, + et (4.2) 
where RP, are the returns on portfolio p in time t and RP't-, are lagged portfolio returns. 
Di is the dummy variable which takes the value of I in month i and zero otherwise. 
See Board & Sutcliffe (1988) as an example. 
" These are the assumptions we make about the residuals or measurement errors 
estimated from the least-squares estimators. The desirable properties of the residuals 
include mean zero; p=O, common variance; Var(")=cy', independence; Pi and Rj are 
independent and independence of xj the independent variable; that is xj and Pi are 
independent. Also, the errors are assumed to be normally distributed. See Maddala 
(1977), pp 74-103. Also, even with the use of dummy variable analysis these 
assumptions may still be violated. 
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When i=l it is a January, and when i=2 it is a February and so on until 1=12, when 
it is a December. A constant term is not needed since the monthly durniny variables 
already impose an intercept term. c, is the error or residual term where et -N 
((), (y2). 
Under the assumption that monthly seasonality is prevalent on the LSE and following 
the observations of Ariel (1987) in the US, and Cadsby & Ratner (1992) in the UK, 
turther investigation can be undertaken to determine what is driving monthly 
seasonality. Consequently, in order to test these observations, a dummy variable 
regression sirnilar to the one in (4.2) can be estimated where each month is divided 
into intra-i-nonthly periods, in this case into three 5 day periods. The first period is 
at the beginning of each month, the second is in the middle of each month and the 
third is at the end of each month. By examining intra-month seasonality, evidence 
may be gained as to whether returns fluctuate or are constant throughout the month. 
Intra-i-nonthly effects can be modelled in the form of (4.3) below 





I,. + a,. D21. + al D31. + et (4.3) 
where DI is a dummy variable that takes the value I on the first 5 days of month i 
and zero otherwise. D2 is a durrimy variable that takes the value I on the middle 5 
days of month i, zero otherwise and D3 is a durnmy variable that takes the value I on 
the last 5 days of month i and zero otherwise. a, is a constant variable. Again when 
i=I it is a January, and when i=2a February and so on until i= 12, when it is a 
December. The other variables are as given previously. Specifying an intra-monthly 
model enables investors' specific buying and selling patterns in the few days around 
the turn of calendar periods to be more readily investigated. 
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4.3.2. The Inf7uence oj'the Touch on Monthly (vid Ii i tra -Monthly Seasonals 
As we have already suggested, explanations for calendar anornalies include the 
influence of the touch. Seasonality hence may occur due to mispricing in returns 
around calendar turning points. This may be because periodic buying and selling of 
portfolios, for example at the end of a month, may cause the touch to widen and may 
explain seasonal returns. 
As has been indicated, touch explanations for seasonal returns may be more prominent 
in smaller sized portfolios which are subject to more mispricing and inefficiency. 
Following US evidence on the spread frorn Roll (1984), mispricing in UK portfolios 
returns may increase the larger the touch. This implies that the touch may influence 
returns, especially in small firms at calendar turning points. Hence, because of the 
nature of the relationship between returns and the touch these parameters may 
'interact' ý4 . 
In order to account for this likely interaction, a durnmy variable representing the touch 
on each day of the month can be included into the regression equation. This is the 
method used to test for the influence of the microstfuctufe in monthly returns and is 
shown in (4.4) as follows 
12 12 
RlIt - 60RP, t_l + 
D, + P, SP17 D, + et (4.4) 
where SPP is the daily touch for portfolio p and the other variables are as given 
" Judge, Hill, Griffiths, Lutkepohl & Lee (1988) show on page 426, that two 
variables interact when regressed together if their relationship causes the slope 
parameter of the model, as well as the intercept term, to change. 
III 
previously. 
Intra-monthly seasonality can also be estimated in a similar way. The investment 
behaviour of investors will perhaps be more prominent in intra-monthly periods and 
therefore so will movements in the touch. Therefore, regressing interactive spread 
durnmy variables simultaneously with their corresponding return durntnies, initiates 
a test for a touch explanation of intra-monthly seasonality shown in (4.5). 
12 
RI, (x-D I B-SP D 1. 
12 12 
+ al. D21. + SPIP 21 
12 12 
oci D 31 + Pl. SP, 7 D3 
(4.5) 
Here the variable SPPD Ii represents the touch for portfolio p times a dummy variable 
that takes the value I on the first 5 days of month i and zero otherwise, SPPD2j is the 
touch for portfolio p times a dummy variable that takes the value I on the middle 5 
days of month i and zero otherwise, SPPD3j is the touch for portfolio p times a durnmy 
variable that takes the value I on the last 5 days of month i and zero otherwise. The 
other variables are given as previously. 
The preceding section hypothesises the touch as a possible cause of monthly and intra- 
monthly seasonality in returns. However, the question rernains as to what causes these 
seasonal effects. For example, does the level of the seasonal touch determine the size 
of portfolio returns or vice versa. This is the subject of the next section. 
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4.3.3. Se(isonal Touch Beluiviour (vid Mmithly mid A tra -Monthly Returns 
Due to the nature of the relationship between the rrficro structure and returns, again the 
question of what causes these touch and return seasonal effects can be posed. One 
explanation is that the touch can be hypothesised as a possible cause of monthly and 
intra-i-nonthly seasonality in returns. While the interaction between the touch and 
portfolio returns may show whether the touch influences seasonal return behaviour on 
the LSE, it does not give an explanation for this seasonality. 
Since investors transacting behaviour is reflected in the touch, there is a possibility 
that portfolio returns could be driven by seasonality in the touch. For monthly 






SPPD, + et (4.6) 
and for intra-monthly seasonality 
12 12 12 
R17t = 60 Rp't-l + aj SPII D11. + SP pD21. + oc,. 
SPP D 31 +et (4.7) 
Additionally, there is a likelihood that the seasonal behaviour of investors is reflected 
in the returns rather than the touch. This is because buy and sell orders may 
determine the magnitude of seasonal returns. Therefore the following equation can 




E (x, RI) D, 
i=I 
(4.8) 
where SPP, is the daily touch of portfolio p in time t, RP are returns on portfolio p. 
The other variables are given as previously. 
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For intra-monthly seasonal the following equation can be tested 
12 12 12 
SPI, 
t= (X() + al. R 1) 
DI+ oc,, R 1) 





Ii represents a durnmy variable times the returns on portfolio p in the first 
5 days of month 1. RPD2j is a dummy variable times the returns on portfolio p in the 
middle 5 days of month i. RPtD3j is a durnmy variable times the returns on portfolio 
p in the last 5 days of month i. The results from testing for monthly and intra- 
monthly seasonality as well as any seasonal spread explanations are shown below. 
4.4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.4.1. Monthly Seasonality Results 
Table 4.1 below shows the monthly durnmy variable regression results for portfolio 
returns estimated using the regression in equation (4.2). Firstly, lagged returns for 
each portfolio are highly significant (at the I% level) and determine between 2.76% 
and 17.991/, -. of current daily returns. Also lagged returns appear negatively related 
with firm size and turnover by volume classified portfolios. Also, all the portfolio 
classifications are charactensed by occasionally significant (at the 10% level) January 
dummy variable coefficient labelled D, and December durnmy variable labelled D, 2. 
The largest market value portfolio, has a significant May (DO and September (Dq) 
dunuiiy variable. The latter variable is significant across the other classifications of 
portfolios apart from the volume classification which has a significant October (DIO) 
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durrimy variable, in the largest portfolio. Due to the volatile nature of daily data and 
the effects of investors periodically reappraising the constituents of their portfolios, 
a dummy variable, DUM is used to counter the effects of non-normality in the data 
caused by return outliers. The variable DUM corresponds to observation numbers 
286,288,489,532,534,598. The dates and effects that caused these outliers are 
explained below. 
Observation numbers 286 and 288 correspond to October 17th and 19th 1989 
respectively. These dates correspond to volatility in the market but no specific events. 
Observation number 489 corresponds to 7th August 1990 which marks the start of the 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and volatility and uncertainty in the world's financial and 
commodity markets. The observation numbers 532 and 534 correspond to the 5th and 
9th October 1990. At this time rurnours regarding the intentions of the Iraqis in the 
Gulf caused volatility in the market. Observation number 598 occurred on the 15th 
of January 1991 and coincided with the start of the air attack on Kuwait by the Allied 
forces. The markets reacted quite appreciably to this since the air strikes signalled the 
start of the war in the Gulf. 
What is immediately obvious frorn the seasonal variables is that their coefficients are 
small (around 0.00 15), if fairly significant across portfolios. These variables are quite 
constant across firm and portfolio -size, as well as throughout the year. Overall, 
seasonality appears to be quite inconsistent across differing sizes of portfolios and 
therefore any conclusions about the strength of turn of the year seasonality appear 
weak. Additionally, there is no tax-selling seasonality at the end of March or stock 
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Table 4.1 
Monthly Durnmy Variable OLS Regression Model Results of Daily Returns 
Dependent upon Lagged Returns and Seasonal Durnmy Variables for Equally 
Weighted Portfolios. 
Market Value Portfolio Classification 
size Smallest 234 Largest 
plpýt-l 0.1719*** (). 1129*** 0.0876"* (). (-)964*** 0. (-)369*** 
(0.0248) (0.0240) (0.0243) (0.0255) (0.0266) 
DI) 0.00 14* 
D5 0.0017** 
((). 00()9) 
D12 0.00 16* 0.0015* 
DUM 0.1016*** 0.0978*** 0.1007*** 0. ()998*** 
(0.0057) (0.0047) (0.0048) (0.0062) (0.0078) 
R2 
= 0.227 
R2= (). -) 8 -) R' = 0.255 R' = 0.178 R2=0.116 
ill(1,1255) 1.330 il, (1,1255) 6.153 TI, (1,1256) 2.755 TI, (1,1255) 0. -524 TI, (1,1253) 
0.412 
TI2(I J 2ý5 ()-()()l T12(1,1255) 0.009 1120,1256) 1.519 1120,1255) 0.026 1120,12-53) 0.187 
t , (2) = 8.609 E, (2 3.224 a, (2) = 3.479 ý3(2) = 0.593 
ý3(2) = 3.642 
_ 11, (1,1257) = 3.985 T14(I, 1257) = 4.689 1140,1257) = 3.950 1140,1257) = 2.605 il, (1,12-57) = 3. -578 
Closing Price Portfolio Classification 
Size Simdlest 234 Largest 
Rp't-I 0.0825*** 0.0683*** 0. ()846*** (). 1160*** 0.1578*** 
(0.0243) (0.0258) (0.0243) (0.0257) (0.0247) 
D, 0.0()13* (). 0017* 0.00 14* 
«). 0()()9) «. )ý()()()9) «, ). ()0(-)8) 
Dg -0.0015* -(). 0()18** 
«). 00()9) (0.0009) 
D12 0.0015* 
(0.0008) 
DUM 0.10 14*** 0.1016*** (). 1()19*** 0.1020*** C). 1009*** 
«ý). ()()49) (0.0066) (0.0049) (0.0066) (0.0054) 
R2= 0.258 R2= 0.162 R' = 0.261 R' = 0.177 
2 R=0.231 
11 , (1,1255) = 
0.006 ill(1,12-5-5) = 0.259 yl, (1,1254) = 2.239 q, (1,1254) = 1.457 il, (1,12, ý6) = O. (IX) 
112(1,1255) = 0.074 1120,1255) = 0.031 1120,1254) = 0.077 T12(1,1254) = 0.002 1120,12,56) = 0.067 
Z3(2) = 0.957 U2) = 9.071 ý3(2) = 9.318 ý3(2) = 9.981 ý3(2) = 16.27 
'q4( 1,1257) = 10.36 il, (1,1257) = 2.656 il, (1,1257) = 3.835 -q, (1,1257) = 2.393 il, (1,12,57) = 3.868 
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Table 4.1 cont. 
Touch Portfolio Classification 
size SmAest 234 Largest 
0.0475* 0.1289*** (-). 1()21*** (). 1246*** 0.1097*** 
(0.0252) (0.0249) (0.0250) (0.0239) (0.0254) 







DUNI 0.1017*** 0.10 11 *** (). 1()19*** 0.1067*** 0.1097*** 
(0.0057) (0.0055) (0.0057) (0.0047) (0-0062) 
R2=0.204 R2 = 0.217 R' = 0.214 R' = 0.275 R2=0.184 
11,0,1254) = 0.292 il, (1,1256) = 0. ()()() T1,0,1254) = 0.265 111 ý=0.006 (1,12-6) il, (1,12,56) = 0.414 
1120,12 ý4) --z 0-021 il, (1,1256) 0.010 (). 181 1120,1256) = 0.001 1120,12,56) = 0.014 (2) ý 4.931 ý3(2) = 2.64 ý, (2) = 3.617 ýý, (2) = 8.242 ý3(2) ý 2.197 
il, (1,1257) = 4,737 Tl, (1,1257) = 3.386 T14(1,1257) = 3.755 1140,1257) = 5.420 %(1,1157) = 4.641 
Turnover by Volume Portfolio Classification 
Size S rnallest 23 4 Uargest 












D12 0.0013* 0.0015* 
(0.0008) ((). 0()()8) 
DUM (). 1()11*** (-). 1013*** (). 1()12*** 0.0961*** 
(0.0048) (0.0051) (0.0045) (0.0249) 
0.1021*** 
(0.0060) 
R' = 0.281 R2=0.247 R' = 0.292 R2=0.216 R2= (). 181 
TIJI, 1255) 0.002 TI, (1,1254) 0.183 q, (1,1256) 0,051 TIJ1,1255) 0.262 il, (1,12,55) = 0.023 
T12(1,1255) 0.076 T120,1254) 0.029 1120,1256) 0.010 1120,1255) 0.014 T12(1,12,55) = OAQ 1 ;3 (2) = 8.3 19 U2) = 0.446 E, (2) = 0.937 Eý(2) = 0.021 ý3(2) = 1.437 
Tl, (1,1257) = 3.9-51 il, (1,1257) = 5.498 Tl, (1,1257) = 7.098 Tl, (1,1257) = 4.8322 t1fl, 12,57) = 7.013 
Notes: Figures in parentheses are standard errors. R' is the adjusted R 2. t-statistic significant at 1% 5% and 10% level , 
il, is an F(,., ) distril)uted test for n" order senial correlation under the null of no selial correlation. 
. 
ri D 112 is a RESET test, F(,., ) dist ibuted for functional forrn under the null of correct functional fort 
sa X2(n) distributed test for non -nality of the re. siduals under the null of non-nally distributed residuals. q3 i 
T14 1S an F(,., ) distfibuted test for heteFoscedastlCity under the null of homosced, st c aiI ty. ' 
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purchases at the beginning of April. Hence, returns are more readily explained by 
lagged returns than by monthly seasonal factors in the market. Finally, the diagnostic 
tests overall confirm that the seasonal models are well specified. 
As mentioned previously, monthly seasonality in returns may be at least partially 
explained by the percentage touch. Therefore, following our hypothesis of an 
'interaction' between the touch and seasonal returns, the results in Table 4.2 are re- 
estimated with the effects of the touch removed. What is immediately striking about 
these results is that nearly all the previously significant seasonal dummy variables 
g 
become insignificant when the effects of the touch are accounted for. In fact, after 
the effects of the touch have been removed, monthly seasonals remain on only seven 
occasions, and even then they are not highly significant. 
Therefore, overall the results point to a rnicro structure explanation of monthly 
seasonality in the portfolio returns series across portfolio size and classification. 
Additionally lagged returns are still highly significant and explain the same proportion 
of daily returns. The diagnostic tests are again passed. The results that follow adopt 
a similar approach for tests of intra-i-nonthly portfolio returns. 
4.4.2. Intra-Monthly Seasonality Results 
While the results in section 4.4.1 above show that monthly seasonality may be a 
function of the microstructure in prices, analysis of intra-monthly returns may reveal 
more about investor behaviour. In order to test this intra-monthly hypothesis of 
investor transacting behaviour the regressions in (4.3) and (4.4) are estimated. 
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Table 4.2 
Monthly Dummy Variable OLS Regression Models Results of Returns Dependent 
upon Lagged Returns and Seasonal Durm-ny Variables for Equally Weighted 
Portfolios with Touch Effects Removed. 
Market Value Classification 







(). 0876*** (). 0964*** 0.0363 
(0.0243) (0.0255) (0.0266) 




D12 0.0024 (). ()052* 
(0.0021) (0.0027) 
DUM 0.1011*** (). 1016*-** (). 0978*** 1007*** (). ()998*** 
(0.0057) (0.0047) ((). (. )(. )48) (0.0062) (0.0078) 
2=0.,, -, () R R2 = 0.281 2= R 0.255 2 R=0.178 2= R 0.116 
Tl, (1,1254) = 1.263 Tl, (1,1254) = 5.826 TI, (1,1256) = 2.755 il, (1,1254) = 0.632 q, (1,1250) = 0.382 
T12(1,1254) = 0.001 112(1,1254) = 0.010 T120,1256) = 1.519 T120,1254) = 0.025 11201115()) = 0.184 
1 ý-, (2) = 8.532 ý3(2) = 3.488 ý3(2) = 3.479 ý3(2) = 0.543 ý3(2) = 3.669 
il, (1,1257) = 3.984 T140,1257) = 4.677 1140,1257) = 3.950 T14(,, 12-57) = 2.605 Tl, (I, 1157) = 3.549 
Clos ing Price Portfolio Classification 
Size Sm"allest 2 3 4 Largest 
(). 0813*** 0.0692*** 0. ()839*** 0.1154*** 0.1579*** 
(0.0243) (0.0258) (0.0243) (0.0257) (0.0247) 
D, 0.0044** 0.0014 0.0033 
(0.0022) (0.0025) (0.0024) 




DUM 0.1017*** 0.1006*** 0.1025*** 0.1020*** 0.10()9*** 
(0.0049) (0.0066) (0.0050) (0.0066) (0.0054) 
R2=0.258 R2=0.162 R2=0.260 R2=0.176 R2=0.211 
-q, (1,1254) = 0.014 TI, (1,1254) 0.289 ill(1,1252) 2.116 il, (1,1252) 1.445 TII(I, 12,56) O. (X)2 
112, (1,1254) = 0.081 1120,1254) 0.016 112(1,1252) 0A39 TI2(1,1252) 0.029 TI2(I, 1156) 0.067 
ý3(2) = 0.914 ý3(2) = 8.675 e, (2) = 8.922 U2) = 10.61 ý j(2) = 16.26 
, rl, (1,1257) = 10.23 il, (1,1257) = 2.706 TI, (1,1257) = 3.683 il, (1,1257) = 2.383 
_ il, (1,1257) = 3.868 
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Table 4.2 cont. 
Touch Portfolio Classification 
SI/C slmdlest 234 Largest 
0.0473* 0.1289-1-** (). 1(-)(. )2*** (). 1245*** (). 1097*1-* 
(om-)ý-)) (0.0249) (0.0250) (0.0239) (0.0254) 
D, 0.00126 (). 0()53** 





DUM 0.1017*** 0.1011*** (). 1()19*** (). 1(-)()7*** (). 1011*** 
(0.0057) (0.0055) (0.0057) (0.0047) (0.0062) 
2 R=0.203 R2 = 0.217 R2 = 0.215 R2 = 0.275 
2 R=0.184 
111(1,1252) = 0.296 il, (1,1256) = 0.002 ill(l, 1252) = 0.123 ill(l, 1256) = 0.006 Tl, (1,1256) = 0.414 
ij, (1,1252) T120,1256) = 0.010 T12(1,1252) = 0.191 T120,1256) = 0.001 %(1,1256) = 0.014 
,: j(2) = 5.369 U2) = 2.644 U2) = 4.274 U2) = 8.242 U2) = 2.197 
il, (1,12-57) = 4.716 Tjfl, 1257) = 3.386 T140,12157) = 3.696 1140,1257) == 5.420 il4(11125)7) = 4.641 
Turnover by Volume Portfolio Classification 
Size Sm. -dlest 34 Largest 
(-). 1799*** (). (-)977*** (). 1()82*** (. ). ()957*** 0.0276 
(0.0239) (0.0245) (0.0237) (0.0249) (0.0255) 
D, 0.0041* (). ()015* 
(0.0024) (0.0009) 
DIO 




DUM 0.1011*** (). 1()13*** (). 1()12*** 0.0957*** (). 10 19*** 
(0.0048) (0.0051) ((). (-)(-)45) (0.0249) (0.0060) 
R2=0.280 R2=0.247 R2=0.292 R2=0.215 R2=0.181 
Tj (1,1254) 0.039 Tl, (1,1252) 0.099 il, (1,1256) 0.051 Tl, (1,1254) 0.189 Tl, (1,12-54) 0.083 
T12( 1,1254) 0.076 T120,1252) 0.032 T120,1256) 0.010 il2(1,1254) 0.016 T12(1,12-54) 0.014 
U2) = 8.387 U2) = 0.576 U2) = 0.937 U2) = 0.036 U2) = 1.580 
Tl, (1,1257) = 3.947 Tl, (1,1257) = 5.442 Tl, (1,1257) = 7.098 1140,1257) = 4.809 il, (1,12-57) = 6.976 
Notes: Figures in parentheses are standard errors. R2 is the adjusted R 2. t-statistic significant at 1%, 5% and 10'/c level. 
11, is an F(,., ) distributed t, ýst for nh order serial correlation under the null of no senial correlation. 
T12 is a RESET test, F(,., ) distributed for functional forn, under the null of correct functional forni. 
ý3 is a X2(n) distributed test for norniality of the residuals under the null of normally distributed residuals. 
TI, i's an distributed test for hete roscedasti city under the null of hornoscedasticity. 
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Table 4.3 below shows intra-monthly portfolio durnmy variable regressions returns. 
Lagged returns (as consistent with the previous monthly regression results) are again 
highly significant (except for the largest market value and closing price classified 
portfolios). Again this implies that today's returns are dependent upon a proportion 
of yesterday's returns, in this case the proportion is between 1.67% and 17.25%. 
Interestingly the results show the increased prominence of a statistically significant (at 
the 117c level) January durnmy variable. The theory of seasonal investor behaviour 
implies that on average investors sell at the end of the previous calendar year and buy 
back cheap stock at the beginning of the new calendar year. However, the results 
indicate that the significant January dummy variable is D31, the variable representing 
the last 5 days of January. This suggests that investor buying in January occurs at the 
end of the month rather than at the beginning of the month. 
Another prominent seasonal variable is D312which is positive and corresponds to the 
last 5 days in December. However, even though this variable occurs frequently, it is 
only statistically significant at the 51/(, and 10%. levels. An explanation for this 
significant positive seasonal variable is perhaps due to investors buying before the 
beginning of the new calendar year. Since investors may be rational, they could be 
anticipating the likely seasonal buying and selling behaviour in the market and clearly 
they would like to usurp any turn of the year effects. 
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Table 4.3 
Intra-Monthly Dummy Variable OLS Regression Model Results of Daily Computed 
Returns Dependent upon Lagged Returns and Seasonal Durnmy Variables for 
Differing Classifications of Equally Weighted Portfolios 
Market Value Portfolio Classification 
Size SmAest 134 Largest 
R1, t-, 0.1575*** 0.1064*** 0.0841*** 0.0865*** 0.0272 
(0.0248) (0.0239) (0.0243) (0.0255) (0.0265) 
D3, 0.005 1 *** 0. ()042*** (). 0042** 0.0064*** 
(0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0017) 
D1 0.0044*** 
(0.0017) 
DI5 (-). 0034** 0.0037** 0.0037** 





D3,2 0.0034** 0.0038** 0.0034** 
(0.0017) (0. ()()18) (0.0017) 
CONSTANT -0-0001 0.0003 0.0001 0.0004 0.0004 
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) 
DUM 0.1021*** 0.1016' (-). 0978*** 0.1052*** 0.0996*** 
(0.0057) (0.0047) (0.0048) (0.0062) (0.0077) 
R2 = 0.239 R'= 0.287 R' = 0.258 R2=0.186 R' = 0.128 
-q1(1,125(» = 2.091 il, (1,1252) = 4.609 -q, (1,1253) = 1.981 il, (1,1252) = 0.332 TI, (1,1r, ý2) = 0.063 
TI2(I, 125(» = 0.002 1120,1252) = 0.0(X) il, (1,1253) = 1.494 T120,1252) = 0.012 112(1,12-52) = 0. l(9 
ý, (2) = 8.794 ý, (2) = 1.841 ý3(2) = 2.938 ý3(2) = 0.690 ý, (2) = 3.297 
il, (1,1257) = 4.149 11, (1,1257) = 4.857 11-1(1,1257) = 4.033 -q, (1,1257) = 2.627 ýq, (1,12-57) = 3.693 
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Table 4.3 cont. 
Closing Price Portfolio Classification 
size Sun, dlest ?34 Largest 
0.0781*** 0.0615*** 0. ()787*** (). 1125 * ** 0.1481 
(0.0243) (0.0258) (0.0243) (0.0257) (0.0247) 
D31 0.004 1 0.005 1* ** (). ()(, )42*** (-). 0045*** 
19) (0.0017) (0.0016) 
DIj (). (-)037** 
(0.0016) 
D31, 0.0041** (). (. )(. )35* (). 0032* 
(o. oo 19) 
CONSTANT 0.0004 0.0002 0.000 1 0.0003 0.0003 
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
DUM 0.1012*** 0.1006*** (). 1009*** 0.1005*** (). 10()9*** 
(0.0049) (0.0066) (0.0049) (0.0050) (0.0054) 
R 0.26'ý R'= 0.167 R2 = 0.264 R' = 0.184 
2 R=0.239 
TI, (1,1254) = 0.001 11, (1,1253, ) = 0.174 il, (1,1253) = 2229 -q, (1,1253) = 1.067 TI, (1,1253) = 0-065 
T12(I, 1254) = 0.008 112(1"25'ý) = ()'()()5 q2(I, 1253) = 0.0(X) T12(I, 1253) = 0.002 y120,1253) = 0.009 
c-, (2) = LON2 U2) -= 6.282 3(2) = 10.73 ý3(2) = 10.37 ý3(2) = 12.16 
il, (1,1257) = 10.47 TI, (1,1257) = 2.671 il, (1,1257) = 3.838 q, (1,1257) = 2.406 TI, (1,12-57) = 3.962 
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Table 4.3 cont. 
Touch Portfolio Classification 
Size Snitdlest 134 Largest 
0.0379 0.1211 *** (). ()9(ý9*** 0.1189*** 0.1(-)()8*** 
(0.0252» (0.0249) (0.0251) (0.0239) (0.0254) 
D3,0.0055*** (). 0()5()*** (). ()()39** (). ()()53*** (-). 00396** 
(0-0017) (0.0018) (o. oo 18) (0-0017) «-). ()0 19) 
D 15 0.0045*** 0.0(-)4(-)** 
(0-0017) «). ()(. )18) 
D31, 0.0038** 
CONSTANT 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002 0.0005 
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
DUM 0.1012*** 0.101()*** (). 10()9*** 0.1006*** 0.1012*** 
(0.0049) (0.0055) (0.0057) (0.0047) (0.0061) 
R2=0.212 R2= (). 22ý R2 = 0.217 R2=0.280 R2=0.191 
TII(1,1253) 0.072 Til(l, 125, ) 0.069 TII(1,1253) 0.303 il, (1,1254) 0.007 Tl, (1,12-53) = 0.644 
T120,1253) 0.024 T]2(1,125ý) 0.005 ij, (1,125'ý) 0.068 T12(1,1254) 0.019 T12(1,12-53) = 0J)6 
, ý, (2) = 
5.111 E, (2) = 1.293 4, (2) = 4.416 ý3(2) = 6. X28 E3(2) = 1.734 
Tj, (1,1257) = 4.702 Tl, (1,1257) = 3.506 Tj, (1,12ý7) = 3.681 Tl, (1,1257) = 5.409 Tl, (1,12-57) = 4.644 
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Table 4.3 cont. 
Turnover by Volume Portfolio Classification 
size Sin,, dlest 14 Largest 
0.1725*** 0.0962*** (). 1()42*** (-). 0917*** 0.0167* 
(0.0239) (0.0245) (0.0237) (0.0249) (0.0253) 
D31 0.0032** 0.0044*** 004 3*** 0.0048*** 0.0056*** 
(0.0016) (0.00 17) 18) ((-). ()()19) (0.0016) 
D1 0.0036** 
(0-0016) 
D212 (). 0034** 
(0.0016) 
CONSTANT 0.0002 0.0004 0.0000 0.0004 0.0004 
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) 
DUM 0.1008*** 0.1013*** 0.1012*** 0.1006*** 0.1012*** 
(0.0048) (0. ()051) (0.0045) (0.0055) (0.0060) 
R' = 0.286 R'= 0.241) 
R2 
= 0.293 R- = 0.219 
2 R=0.192 
TI, (1,1252) = 0.001 TJ, (1,1254) = 0.102 ýq, (1,1254) (). 085 ill(1,1254) 0.184 TI, (1,1253) = ()-()29 
-n2(I, 12ý2) = 0. Olý 1120,1254) = 0.000 1120,1254) 0.007 1120,1254) 0.002 T12(I, 1253) = 0.019 
z , (2) = 8.463 U2) = 0.381 E3(2) = 0.930 ý3(2) ý 0.002 E', (2) = 1.911 - TI, (1,1257) = 4.090 il, (1,1-. 157) = 5.427 TI, (1,1257) = 7.131 11, (1,1257) = 4.823 TI, (1,1157) = 6.465 
Notes: 
Figure,, in parentheses are standard errors. 
R' is the adjusted R2. 
*** t-statistic significant at the F7, level 
** t-statistic significant at the ý'/, level 
* t-statistic significant at the 1()/, level 
TI, is an F(,., ) distributed test for nt" order serial correlation under the null of no serial correlation. 
112 is a RESET test, F(,., ) distributed for functional form under the null Of COITeCt functional forni. 
2 is a (n) distributed test for nonnality of the residuals under the null of nonnally distributed residuals. 
TI, is an F(,., ) distributed test for lieteroscedasticity under the null of homoscedasticity. 
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Additionally, the results show that there are other significant variables common to the 
portfolio return series including significant intra-monthly September, December, 
March. May and June seasonals. These variables appear infrequently and so carry 
little econoiyýc meaning. Again DUM corrects for the outliers described above in 
section 4.4.1. As the previous results for monthly effects imply, an explanation for 
the intra-monthly seasonality documented in Table 4.3 may lie with the influence the 
irdcrostructure. Hence, in order to test this proposition a regression of the form in 
equation (4.4) is estimated to investigate whether intra-monthly seasonality can be 
explained by the micro structure in securities. 
Table 4.4 shows the results of estimating intra-i-nonthly dummy variable with the 
effects of the touch are removed. The results indicate that lagged returns are again 
highly significant and are very similar in values to those documented previously. 
Only market value, touch and volurne classified portfolios of size 5, and the size I 
portfolio classified by the touch have insignificant RP't-, variables, implying that stale 
prices are common to portfolios even with the effects of the microstructure are 
removed. 
Even though analysis on an intra-monthly basis reveals more significant seasonal 
variables, again (as is consistent with the monthly results in Table 4.2) most of these 
variables become insignificant when the effects of the touch are removed. This 
suggests that intra-monthly seasonality can be on the whole explained by the 
raicrostructure in returns. The question therefore remains as to what is driving 
portfolio return seasonality: seasonality in returns or seasonality in the touch'! 
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Table 4.4 
Intra-Monthly Dummy Variable OLS Regression Model Results of Daily Computed 
Returns Dependent upon Lagged Returns and Seasonal Dummy Variables for 
Equally Weighted Portfolios with Touch Effects Removed 
Market Value Portfolio Classification 
Size SmAest 134 Largest 
(). 15(-18*** 0.1(-)26*1-* (, ). (-)812*** (). 0859*** 0.0259 
(0.024 9) (0.0239) (0.0243) (0.0255) (0.0265) 
D31 (). 0()49* 0.0032 0.0017 (-). ()061** 
(0.0027) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0028) 
DI, 0.0026 0.000 1 
(0.0028) (0.0031) 
D15 0.0025 0.0031 0.0025 
(0.0028) (0.0029) (0.0028) 




D21, 0. ()064*** 
((-). ()()27) 
D3 0.0010 0.0001 -0.0017 0.0020 
(0.0027) (0.0029) (0.0031) (0.0028) 
CONSTANT -0.0002 0.0003 0.0005 0.0004 0.0004 
(0.0003) ((-). ()0(-)3) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
DUM (). 1()12*** (). 10 16*** (, ). ()979*** (). ()996*** 
(0.0056) (0.0046) (0.0047) (0.0062) (0.0077) 
R2 = 0.237 
R2 
= 0.290 R' = 0.261 
2 R=0.186 R2 = 0.127 
ill(1,1245) = 2.213 TII(I, 1249) 4.716 11, (1,1251) 2.192 il, (1,1249) = 0.641 TII(I, 1249) = 0.152 
112(1,1245) = 0.002 1120,1249) 0.00-5 1120,1251) 1.549 112(1,1249) = 0.012 1120,1249) = 0.111 
Z3(2) = 9.464 ý, (2) = 1.859 ý3(2) = 2.968 ý3(2) = 0.653 ý, (2) = 3.231 
il, (1,1257) = 4.098 il, (1,1257) = 4.865 il, (1,1257) = 3.9,4,4 1140,1257) = 2.625 11J1,1257) = 3.671 
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Table 4.4 cont. 
Closing Price Portfolio Classification 
size Simillest 134 Largest 
1ý1't-l 0.0782*** 0.0586** (). (-)796*** (). 1137*** 0.1465*** 
(0.0243) (0.0259) (0.0243) (0.0258) (0.0254) 
D31 (). 0044* 0.0034 (). (-)()55* 0.0037 0.0041 
(0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0029) (0.0029) 






CONSTANT 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002 0.0005 
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
DUM 0.1016*** (). 1010*** (-). 1009*** 0.1006*** 0.1012*** 
(0.0057) (0.0055) (0.0057) (0.0047) (0.0061) 
R2 = 0.211 R2 = 0.225 R2 = 0.216 R' = 0.280 
R2=0.190 
il, (1,1251) = 0.168 TII(1,1251) = 0.017 ll, (1,1253) = 0.243 Tl, (1,1253) = 0.000 Tl, (1,12-51) = 0.702 
T12(1'12ý1) = 0.003 T120,1251) = 0.004 il2(1,1253) = 0.064 T120,1253) = 0.019 T12(1,115 1) = 0J)6 
U2) = 4.991 E, Q) = 1.041 U2) = 4.458 E, Q) = 6.562 U2) = 1.777 
T14(1,1257) = 4.689 ll, (I, 1257) = 3.488 ll, (1,12-57) = 3.672 Tl, (1,1257) = 5.411 il, (I, 12-57) = 4.63ý 
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Table 4.4 cont. 
Touch Portfolio Classification 
Slzcl Sinidlest 3 4 Largest 
pli"t-I 0.0371 (). 1188*** (). ()996-1** 0.1179*** 0.0992*** 
(0.0252) (0.0249) (0.0251) (0.0239) (0.0247) 
D3, 0.0053* 0.0055* 0. (-)()49* 0.0034 0.0025 





CONSTANT 0.0004 0.0002 ý0.0002 0.0004 0.0002 
(0.0003) (0.0003) ((-). ()0()3) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
DUM 0.1014*** 0.1007*** (). 1()()8*** 0.1018*** (). 1()()9*** 
(0.0049) (0.0065) (0.0049) (0.0066) (0.0054) 
R2 = 0.261 
2 R=0.168 R2 = 0.263 R' = 0.178 R2 = 0.239 
il, (1,1253) 0.003 lj, (1,1251) 0.136 il, (1,1253) 2.697 Tl, (1,1253) 1.501 Tl, (1,12-51) = 0.001 
T12(1,1253) 0.008 T120,1251) 0.006 T12(1,125'1) 0.008 1120,1253) 0.004 T12(1,1251) = O. W9 
c'-, (2) = 1.080 E, (2) = 5.998 I (2) = 11.47 U2) = 10.85 E, (2) = 12.01 
114(1,1257) = 10.42 T14(1,1257) = 2.604 Tl, (1,1257) = 3.824 Tl, (1,1257) = 2.379 T14(1,12,57) = 'ý. 92X 
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Table 4.4 cont. 
Turnover by Volume Portfolio Classification 
size simillest 3 4 Largest 
0.1733*** (, ). 0962*** (). 1(-)42*** (). ()916*-'* 0.0162 
(0.0239) (0.0245) (0.0237) (0.0249) (0.0255) 
D-i 0.0022 0.0039 (). ()()49* 0.0039 (-). ()()52* 
(0.00-14) (0.0027) (0.0029) (0.0031) (0.0027) 
D15 0.0026 
(0.0026) 
D212 (). 0()59** 
(0.0026) 
CONSTANT 0.0002 0.0004 0.0007 0.0004 0.0004 
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) 
DUM (-). 1()08*** (-). 1(-)13*** 0.1()12*** 1007*** 0.1012*** 
(0.0048) ((). ()()51) (0.0046) ((). ()()55) (0.0060) 
R' = 0.285 R'= 0.241) R' = 0.293 R2 = 0.219 R' = 0.191 
, q, (1,1249) 0.004 Tl, (1,1253) 0.131 T110,1253) 0.106 il, (1,1253) 0.255 il, (1,1251) = 0.014 
1120.1249) 0.015 7120,1253) 0,000 T12(1,1253) 0.007 T12(1,1253) 0.002 T12(1,12-5 1) = 0.022 
, ý, (2) = 
8.879 E, (2) = 0.365 ;, (2) = 0.922 U2) = 0.004 E, (2) = 1.919 
T14(1,1257) = 4.082 Tl, (1,1257) = 5.436 Tl, (1,1257) = 7.114 Tl, (1,1257) = 4.832 T4(1,1257) = 6.392 
Note,,: 
Figures in parentheses are standard errors. R' Is the adjusted R'. 
*** t-statistic significant at the 117, level 
** t-statistic significant at the 517, level 
* t-statistic significant at the 101k level 
III is an F(,., ) distributed test for n"' order serial correlation under the iiufl of no serial correlation. 
TI, is a RESET test, F(,., ) distributed for functional forni under the null Of Correct functional forin. 
is a /'(n) distributed test for non-nality of the residuals under the null of nomially distributed residuals. 
11, is an F(,., ) distributed test for heteroscedasticity under the null of holu os cedast] city 
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Due to the prominence of intra-monthly seasonality shown in the Table 4.3, we test 
this cluestion by exarrdning hotli intra-monthly touch and returns behaviour. 
4.4.3. Test Results of'Seasomil Touch Behaviour and flitra-Monthly Returns 
Table 4.5 shows the results of tests for intra-monthly touch seasonality examined using 
equation (4.7) for the seasonal variables that are significant in Table 4.3. Again, 
DUM corrects for outliers in the data caused by the events highlighted in section 
4.4.1. The results indicate that lagged returns are statistically significant for all but 
the largest portfolios, and are similar in value to previous results". Additionally, 
intra-monthly variables corresponding to the touch are prominent for the last 5 days 
in January across most of the portfolios (SPPD31). The last 5 days of December 
(SPf)D3,, ) experience touch seasonality, but mainly in the smallest sized portfolios (1,2 
and 3), and for all types of portfolio apart frorn the volume classifications. Other 
seasonal variables occur infrequently across the portfolios. 
So far these results suggest that it is seasonality in the microstructure that is driving 
returns seasonality at the end of the calendar month in December and 
January. However, from the results in Table 4.6 when the independent variable 
becomes the touch and the dependent variables are seasonal return variables, portfolio 
return seasonality disappears. Therefore seasonality reflects investors transacting 
behaviour at the end of December and January which is reflected directly in the touch 
rather than in portfolio returns, which are hence not seasonal. 
" However, due to the inverse relationship between the 'touch' and firm size, it 




Intra-Monthly Durni-ny Variable OLS Regression Model Results of Daily Computed 
Returns Dependent upon Lagged Returns and Seasonal Touch Durnmy Variables 
for Differing Classifications of Equally Weighted Portfolios 
Market Value Portfolio Classification 
size Smallest 234 Largest 
R1, t-, 0.1 -579*** 0.1()74*** 0.0875*** 0.0264 
(0.0249) 39) (0.0243) (0.0255) (0.0266) 
SPPD3, (). 2218*-* 0.3136*-ý- 0.4714*** 0.7781*** 
(0.0960) (0.1480) (0.1907) (0.2584) 
SPpD1-, 0.2882** 
(0.1188) 
SPpD15 0.22 13 3 0.3629 0.5467** 
(0.2062) (0.2688) 
SPI, D2, -0.2936*** 
(0.1892) 
SPI, D-l 12 0.1448 
(0.0965) 
SPpD3,, 0.2068** 0.3642*** 0.4687 
(0.0933) (0.1339) (0.2348) 
CONSTANT 0.0002 0.0004 0.0004 
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) 
DUM (). 1(-)16*** (-). ()978*** 0.0996*** 
(0.0057) ((-). (-)()47) (0.0048) (0.0062) (0.0077) 
R2= 0.234 R'= 0.287 2= R 0.258 R2 = 0.185 
2= R 0.125 
-q, (1,1250) = 1.572 Tj, (1,1252) = 5.398 ill(l, 1253) = 1.981 111(1,1252) = 0.641 Tl, (1,1252) = 0.385 
T12(1,1250) = 0.000 1120,1252) = OAK) T12(1,1253) = 1.494 T120,1252) = 0.055 Tl, (1,1252) = 0.093 
ý, (2) = 9.459 ý3(2) = 2.435 U2) = 2.938 t: ý, (2) = 
0.756 U2) = 3.090 
il, (1,1257) = 3.999 Tl, (1,1257) ý 4.767 Tl, (1,1257) ý 4.033 Tl, (1,1257) = 2.603 Tl, (I, 1157) = 3.611 
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Table 4.5 cont. 
Closing Price Portfolio Classification 
Size Srwdlest 2 3 4 Largest 
0.0796*** 0.06()2** (). ()785*** (). 1116*** 0.1468 
(0.0243) (0.0258) (0.0243) (0.0257) (0.0247) 
SPI)D3, 0.1706 (). 3328** (, ). 4666*** (). 3475** (. ). 3942*** 
(0.1220) (0.1717) (0.1719) (0.1614) (0.1404) 
SPPD 15 0.3593** 
(0.1655) 
SPPD312 0.4526*** (). 3468* (). 3544** 
(0.1597) (0.1513) (0.1542) 
CONSTANT 0.0005 0.0002 0.000 1 0.0003 0.0003 
((-). ()0()3) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
DUM 0.1()()9*** 0.1007*** (). 1009*** (). 1()19*** (). 10()9*** 
(0.0049) (0.0066) (0.0049) (0.0066) (0.0054) 
R2 = 0.259 R2 = 0.168 R' = 0.264 R' = 0.181 R' = 0.239 
TI, (1,1254) 0.019 ill(1,1253) 0.358 ill(1,1253) 2.411 ill(1,1253) 1.617 rl, (1,12ý3) = 0. (1)5 
1120,12ý4) 0.003 112(1,1253) 0.005 112(1,1253) 0.000 TI2(I, 1253) 0.002 1120,12-53) = 0. (1)6 
c3(2) = 0.981 ý3(2) = 6.168 ý, (2) = 10.79 U2) = 10.42 U2) = 12.75 
il, (1,1257) = 10.43 TI, (1,1257) = 2.602 1140,1257) = 3.836 il, (1,1257) = 2.400 TI, (1,12-57) = 3.869 
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Table 4.5 cont. 
Touch Portfolio Classification 
S ize Sm,, dlest 3 4 Largest 
Rr't-l 0.0386 (). 1189*** (-). 0979*** 0.1183*** (). 1009*** 
(0.0252) (0.0249) (0.0251) (0.0240) (0.0254) 
SPpD3, 0.6266*** 0.4549*** 0.1840 (). 3767*** 0.1884 
(0.2 166) (0.1768) (0.1551) (0.1388) (0.1160) 






CONSTANT 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002 0.0005 
(0.0002) (0.0003) ((-). ()()()3) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
DUM 0.1(-)16*** (). 1()(. )9*** 0.1()()6*** (). 1()12*** 
(0.0057) (0.0055) (0.0057) (0.0047) (0.0061) 
R' = 0.210 
2= R 0.225 2 =: R 0.214 R2 = 0.279 
2= (). Igl R 
= 0.358 TI, (1,1253) 0.001 il, (1,1253) = 0.471 TI, (1,1254) = 0.007 ill(1,1253) = 0.498 
T12(1,1253) = 0.001 T)2(1,1253) 0.001 112(1,1253) = 0.057 y120,1254) = 0.023 1120,129) = O. (ü8 
ýI 
--, 
(2) = E, (2) = 1.198 ýI ý, (2) = 
4.809 ý3(2) = 5.379 U2) = 1.681 
1140,1257) = 4.638 TI, (1,1257) = 3.475 il, (1,1257) = 3.660 1140,1257) = 5.409 T14(I, 1257) = 4.621 
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Table 4.5 cont. 
Turnover by Volume Portfolio Classification 
size Sin,, dlest 1) 3 4 L, -u-gest 
0.1726*** 0.0975*"* 1()55*** (). ()927*** 0.0152 
(0.0240) (0.0245) (0.0237) (0.0249) (0.0255) 
SPPD31 0.2238 0.2921*** 0.2912*** 0.2806** 0.6015*** 
(0.1238) (0.1345) (0.1759) (0.1325) (0.2201) 
SPPD 15 0.2817** 
(0.1400) 
SPI, D212 0.0922 
(0.1159) 
CONSTANT 0.0002 0.0004 0.0001 0.0004 0.0005 
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) 
DW 41009*** 0.1013*** 0.1012*** 0.1006*** 0.1010*** 
(0.0048) ((: ). (: )(-)45) ((-)J)055) (OJ)060) 
R2=0.283 R2 = 0.249 R2=0.292 R' = 0.219 R2=0,189 
TJI(1,1252) 0.003 TII(1,1254) 0.258 Tl, (1,1254) 0.043 Tl, (1,1254) 0.413 il, (1,12-53) = 0-()% 
1120,1252) 0.0 11 1120,1254) 0.000 1120,1254) 0.005 T12(1,1254) 0.001 T120,1253) = 0.020 
ý., (2) = 8.395 Cý3(2) = 0.394 ,, 
(2) = 1.062 E, (2) = 0.001 U2) = 1.962 
1140,1257) = 4.034 Tl, (1,1257) = 5.418 T140,1257) = 7.101 il, (1,1257) = 4.815 T14(1,1257) = 6.490 
Notes: 
Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
2 R'- is the adjusted R. 
*** t-statIst1c significant at the VX level 
** t-statistic significant at the 51ý, level 
* t-statistic significant at the 1017, level 
TI, is an F(,., ) distributed test for nh order serial correlation under the null of no senial correlatiol). 
T12 is a RESET test, F(,., ) distributed for functional form under the null of correct functional fon-n. 
E3 is a /'(n) distributed test for norniality of the residuals under the null of nornially distributed residuals. 
TI, is an F(,., ) distributed test for h ete rosce-dast] city under the null of hornoscedasticity. 
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Table 4.6 
Intra-Monthly Durnmy Variable OLS Regression Model Results of the Daily Computed Touch Dependent upon Seasonal Return Durniny Variables for Differing 
Classifications of Equally Weighted Portfolios 
Market Value Portfolio Classification 
Size Smallest 23 4 Largest 
1ý, Wj 0.0084 -0.0578 0.0025 0.0004 
(0.0856) (0.0579) (0.0277) (0.0201) 
1ý, D'3 -0.1157 
(0.0966) 
1ý)D'5 0.0181 -0.0142 -0.0011 
(0.1029) (0.0327) (0.0248) 
1ý, D29 0.0288 
(0.0194) 
RPD212 (). 2138** 
(o. IoI ()) 
RPD312 0.0695 0.0255 0.0235 
(0.1061) (0.0559) (0.0221) 
CONSTANT 0.0155*** 0.0128*** 0.0116*** 0.0092*** 0.0065*** 
(0.0002) ((-). 00(-) 1) (0. ()()Ol) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
Closing Price Portfolio Classification 
Size Smallest 23 
R-PD3, -0.0228 -0.0279 -0.0058 

















(). ()()98*** (). ()()99*** 
«). 0()() 1) 
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Table 4.6 cont. 
Touch Portfolio Classification 
size S indlest 1) 3 4 Largest 
RI, D 3, -0.0174 -0.0165 -0.0346 -0.0299 -0.0159 (0.0319) (0.0517) (0.0519) (0.0558) 
0.0319 -0.0018 
(0.0376) (0.0675) 




CONSTANT (). ()()77*** 0. ()109*** 0.0 122*** 0.0148*** 
«). ()()0 1) (0. ()()() 1) «). ()()() 1) (0.0001) «). 0()() 1) 
Turnover by Volume Portfolio Classification 
Size Smallest 2 3 4 Largest 
1ý, Wj 0.0002 0.0069 -0.0649 0.0249 -0.0271 
(0.0007) (0.0464) (0. ()555) (0.0553) (0.0247) 




CONSTANT (). 0123*** 0.0112*** 0.0117*** 0.0126*** 0.0077*** 
Notes: 
Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
*** t-statistic significant at the 1% level 
** t-statistic significant at the 5% level 
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4.6. CONCLUSIONS 
Evidence from the US suggests that seasonality in the form of the so-called January 
e-I ect is prorninent in securities and index returns series. Explanations for this 
predictable effect have centred on a firm size effect [Keirn (19831, risk prernium 
explanations [Rogalski & Tinic (1986)], a tax-effect [Givoly & Ovadia (1983)], a so- 
called portfolio re-balancing hypothesis [Ritter & Chopra (1989)], and the influence 
of the bid-ask spread in returns [Keirn (1989) and Bhardwaj & Brooks (1992)]. 
Consequently, the US January effect may be determined by investors' buying and 
selling behaviour around the turn of the calendar year. Investors may be adjusting 
portfolios, cashing in profits and closing investment books at this time. AdditionallY, 
they also may simultaneously be transacting in securities in order to minimise their 
tax liability. 
While this evidence exan-dnes seasonality in the US, calendar anomalies in the UK 
may occur in a slightly different fashion. Whereas in the US, the tax and calendar 
year end coincide, the UK has its tax year end at the beginning of April. However, 
because of this differing tax year end, a UK tax-effect may occur separately frorn a 
January effect. In order to test these two specific effects as well as monthly effects 
in general, differing sizes and periodically re-ordered classifications of portfolios were 
constructed using 6 years of daily data. 
To examine the seasonality question, dummy variable regressions were estimated. The 
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results indicate that monthly seasonality in January and December is present, though 
not prominent in portfolio returns. These positive significant seasonals occur 
irregularly across differing sizes and classifications of portfolios. Despite this, in 
January investors on average buy securities. Significant positive December seasonals 
imply that investors are trying to usurp any US led tax-loss selling or portfolio re- 
balancimg at the end of the calendar year by buying securities in December. This 
contradicts the hypothesis of investors selling securities at the end of the calendar year 
in order to close investment books and then buy back cheap, small sized securities in 
January, thereby inducing positive returns in the New Year. 
Due to the far from conclusive monthly seasonal effects, further analysis of the 
seasonality question was undertaken by exan-ýining investors' buying and selling 
behaviour in greater detail around calendar turning points. Following the observations 
of Ariel (1987) shorter frequency intra-monthly seasonality was examined. The results 
suggest that seasonality is fairly prominent at the end of December, and in 
contradiction to much of the evidence, very prominent at the end of January. This 
seems to verify investor behaviour found for the monthly data. However, in January 
investors seem to buy at the end of the month rather than just after the turn of the 
year. 
In addition, there seem to be no significant variable corresponding to a tax effect 
around the end of March or the beginning of April. This suggests that the January 
effect is a true calendar anomaly rather than a UK tax motivated seasonal. However, 
due to the international nature of the UK stock market, and because it operates for part 
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of the day in the sarne time zone as the US markets, the January effect may occur as 
a i'esult of a US led January effect, even though the intra-monthly anomaly seerns to 
occur at the end of January. 
The results highlighted thus far, and to a greater extent in the earlier financial 
literature on seasonality, fails to recognise the influence that the inicrostructure has on 
returns. The iydcrostructure in prices may intuitively help to explain calendar 
anornaties since the touch more readily reflects investors' transaction behaviour in the 
market around calendar turning points. The results confirm this hypothesis, since 
when the effects of the touch are removed, monthly and intra-monthly seasonality is 
no longer prevalent on the UK stock exchange. 
Furthennore, seasonality in the market appears to be explained by seasonality in the 
touch rather than seasonality in portfolio returns. This implies that calendar anomalies 
occur due to rnispricing in securities. Buying and selling by investors, while causing 
movements in returns, may also cause changes in the size of the touch. This 
microstructure explanation may be the cause of monthly as well as intra-i-nonthly 
seasonality on the UK stock market. 
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5. DAY OF THE WEEK AND SETTLEMENT EFFECTS ON 
THE LSE: THE INFLUENCE OF THE BID-ASK SPREAD 
5.1. INTRODUCrji ION 
Similar to the longer run seasonalities examined in the previous chapter, short run 
calendar anornalies in security returns have attracted the increasing attention of 
researchers in financial economics. One such anornaly is the so-called weekend effect. 
French (1980) and Rogalski (1984) in the US, arnongst others, found positive security 
returns on a Friday and negative returns on a Monday. Furthermore, Keim 
Stambaugh (1984) found that the weekend effect exists across differing sized 
portfolios on the two main US stock markets. Also, they found that returns rise 
during the week and that Friday returns are strongly correlated with firm size". 
Much of the evidence above suggests that the weekend is characterised by a non- 
trading effect which may occur due to investors closing their books on a Friday, and 
selling securities to avoid any risk associated with the non-trading period of the 
weekend. This effect may occur due to the inability of investors to act upon the 
release of information until the start of business on a Monday. 
" This weekend effect occurs even when using prices devoid of biases associated 
with the bid-ask spread which could be as large as any daily return. 
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For the UK, Jaffe & Westerfield (1985), Board & Sutcliffe (1988) and Condoyanni, 
O'Hanlon & Ward (1987) found that the weekend effect may be influenced by the 
settlement System or two-week 'account' systern operating in the LSE". Under the 
settlement systern rules, investors buying on the first day of the account (a Monday), 
pay for their securities on the iyýddle Monday of the subsequent settlement period 
exactly 21 days later". However, transactions made on the last day of the account 
period (a Friday), again will settle on the middle Monday of the subsequent settlement 
period, in this case only 10 days later. 
Therefore, returns may be higher, on average, on the first Monday of each account 
period since investors will enjoy an extra 11 -day 'interest free holiday' when 
compared to investors transacting at the end of the settlement period. '9 Similarly, 
one would expect that the account settling up day (the middle Monday) will be 
characterised by negative returns due to investors settling up their previous account 
by selfing in the market in order to pay for their transactions. 
Additionally, due to the ensuing non-trading weekend period returns at the end of a 
week may be characterised by uncertainty and so subject to more noise [see Black 
(1986)]. Such mispricing in security returns (due to noise) may be dependent on the 
37 Additionally, Choy & O'Hanlon (1989) and Theobald & Price (1984) attribute 
a settlement effect to institutional influences operating in the market where larger 
traded securities are more likely to experience this type of calendar anornaly. 
"' The system is generally characterised by 24 dealing periods per year of which 
20 are two weeks long and 4 are three weeks long. 
Theobald & Price (1984) were one of the first to docurnent this hypothesis. 
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influence of rnicrostfucture on prices since the bid-ask spread may be more volatile 
than underlying prices. Indeed, more recent evidence from Keirn (1989) and Porter 
(1992) in the US suggests that the weekend effect may be a function of the magnitude 
of the bid-ask spread. Therefore, short run calendar anornalies like longer run 
calendar anornalies in the UK may be explained by the touch in returns. 
Using different sized equally weighted portfolios constructed from 5 years of daily 
data, a test for the existence of short run calendar anornalies on the LSE is undertaken. 
In contradiction to many US studies, the results suggest when using OLS dummy 
variable analysis, that a day of the week effect is not prominent on the LSE. Tests 
for a settlement effect additionally analyse returns on the Fridays before settlement 
Mondays and the Fridays before 'account' Mondays. Interestingly, the results confirm 
a settlement effect, as well as a seasonal Friday effect. " 
Consistent with the investigation into monthly and turn of the year seasonality, day 
of the week and settlernent effects are examined when the effects of the n-ýicrostructure 
are removed. Returns devoid of the influence of the touch do not experience any 
significant daily or settlement seasonality. As shown previously, in order to determine 
what is driving the seasonal returns process, seasonality is estimated in both the touch 
and returns. The results suggest that seasonality is prominent in the touch rather than 
portfolio returns. The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: section 5.2 
reviews issues on day of the week and settlement effects, section 5.3 examines models 
of daily seasonality and section 5.4 describes the data. Section 5.5 reviews the 
This is on the last Friday of the settlement period. 
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empirical results with section 5.6 concluding. 
5.2. ISSUES ON DAY OF THE WEEK AND SETTLEMENT EFFECTS 
. 2.1. Davo 51f the Week and Settlemew Eftýýct Explanations of PorýWio Returns 
The day of the week effect has been a well docurnented area in tests for predictable 
security returns. French (1980) was one of the first to examine the weekend effect by 
examining Standard and Poor's composite portfolios between 1953 and 1977 in the 
US. The criteria here was to judge whether stocks are traded continuously, in calendar 
time, when Monday returns will be different from Friday, or alternatively whether 
returns are generated in trading time (i. e. between opening time on Monday and 
closing time on Friday). The former scenario implies that the mean Monday return 
(comprising Saturday, Sunday and Monday returns) will be three times the mean 
return of other days, and the latter that the daily returns distribution will be constant. 
The results from the French study were inconsistent with both these hypotheses in that 
Monday returns were negative and lower than the average return for the other days 
of the week. Interestingly, transaction costs eliminated any profitable opportunities 
if investors bought on a Monday and sold on a Friday. Further investigations by 
Keirn & Stambaugh (1984) found negative Monday returns across differing sized 
portfolios on the NYSE and AMEX markets. The results suggested that returns also 
rise during the week and across portfolios, with smaller portfolios having higher 
returns. Friday returns are therefore strongly correlated with firm size. Keirn and 
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Stambaugh confirm the weekend effect even when using prices devoid of the biases Cý 
associated with the micro structure which could be as large as any daily return. 
Intra-day analysis by Rogalski (1984), using the Dow Jones Industrial Average Index 
between 1974 and 1984, indicates that returns are negative from the close on Friday 
to the opening on Monday, suggesting a non-trading weekend effect. Monday open 
to close returns seern similar to returns on other days of the week, and close to close 
returns over the weekend are still consistent with French (1980), in that the negative 
returns due to the weekend effect outweigh the positive Monday returns. 
Much of the evidence above suggests that the weekend is characterised by a non- 
trading effect. Typically one could hypothesise that investors close their books on a 
Friday by selling securities to avoid any risk associated with a non-trading period. 
This is due to the inability of being able to act upon the release of information until 
the Monday opening. One explanation for a negative weekend effect may reflect the 
greater likelihood of companies releasing 'bad' news during this time. Penman (1987) 
supports such a hypothesis in his analysis of the timing of fundamental (earnings) 
news and seasonalities. 
In the UK, the issue of the weekend effect and daily seasonality is further complicated 
by the fixed trading systern used by the Stock Exchange until very recently. Indeed, 
the LSE is characterised by a unique two week 41 'account' system so that the 
weekend effect documented above may be influenced by a so-called settlement effect. 
Additionally, there are four account periods per year that are 3 weeks long. 
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Jaffe & Westerfield (1985) analysing the LSE, confirm previous weekend effects of 
high average Friday returns and negative average Monday returns. However, they also 
confirm the settlement hypothesis by showing that returns on account Mondays are 
positive while returns on non-account Mondays are negative. The difference between 
these returns of about 0.51/c is, clairn the authors, justified by the interest rates or 
opportunity cost of delayed pay-off from buying an equity at the end of an account 
42 
period . 
Under the settlernent system rules, investors buying on the first day of the account (a 
Monday), will pay for their securities on the middle Monday of the subsequent 
settlement period exactly 21 days later. However, transactions made on the last day 
of the settlement period (a Friday), will have to be settled on the next but one 
Monday, 10 days later. Therefore, returns may be higher (on average) on the first 
Monday of each account period since investors will enjoy an extra II day interest free 
holiday when compared to investors transacting at the end of the settlement period. 
Similarly, one would expect that the account settling up day (the middle Monday) will 
be characterised by negative returns due to investors settling up their previous 
accounts by sefling in the market. Condoyanni, O'Hanlon & Ward (1987) and Choy 
O'Hanlon (1989) confirm this settlement hypothesis by finding that the first day of 
the LSE settlement period, is characterised by positive returns where as the middle 
42 This confirms Theobald & Price (1984), who docurnent positive 'account' 
Monday returns corresponding to an 'interest effect' and additionally an ex-dividend 
effect which typically occurs on this day. The ex-dividend effect however, will be 
negative and therefore reduce these positive returns. Such settlement effects were 
stronger for larger traded stocks than thinly traded ones, pointing to a positive size 
effect in settlement period returns. 
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Monday of the two week period (the settlement date of the previous account) has 
negative returns. Indeed Board & Sutcliffe (1988) suggest the settlement effect as an 
explanation of a UK day of the week effect. 
However, in contradiction to Keirn and Stambaugh's 1984 US observations, Choy & 
O'Hanlon (1989) in the UK, find that the day of the week effect is stronger in larger 
traded securities. They suggest that such a size effect can be explained by institutional 
inve Sting4l in the market. This is whereby large traded securities which are members 
of narrow indices such as the FT-30 and FT-SE 100 index are more likely to 
experience a stronger day of the week effect due to systematic computerised trading. 
Such periodic trading may, as we shall see influence the size of the touch. 
5.2.2. Bid-Ask- Spread Explanations ft)r Daily Seasonality 
The evidence above suggests that a day of the week is prorninent in both the UK and 
US stock markets. It is these systernatic trading patterns around calendar turning 
points that has encouraged the search for other explanations of daily seasonality. 
Again consistent with the turn of the year literature examining the influence of 
microstructure on prices has recently become popular. 
One typical study is by Keirn (1989) who examines returns on each day of the week 
using transaction returns and mid-spread returns in the US. The difference between 
these two return values is the bid-ask bias, which was found to be negative on a 
Monday and positive and rising throughout the rest of the week. Clearly, this may 
43 See Theobald & Price (1984). 
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contribute to the day of the week effect in returns. Fortin (1990) takes the seasonality 
issue further by examining the relationship between increasing returns during the week 
[starting with negative Monday returns] and the bid-ask spread in the US markets. Cý 
The analysis suggests that during the week the spread remains constant while returns 
rise, contradicting Keirn's (1989) study. Additionally, the spread was found to be a 
linearly increasing function of returns, with the smallest stocks having the largest 
spread and returns. 
With the availability of more and more high frequency data, intra-day analysis of day 
of the week effects has become increasingly popular. Porter (1992), examining US 
stocks, showed that closing prices are closer to the ask price on Friday than on other 
days of the weeks. When using portfolios classified by price, the results indicate that 
higher priced portfolios have a higher probability that the closing transaction is at the 
ask price regardless of the day of the week. Porter concludes that up to 20% of the 
weekend effect in the US can be explained by bid-ask price behaviour. 
Further explanations for a so-called day of the week effect have centred on the effects 
of security size (ineasured by market value) on returns. Differing sized portfolios 
should, due to the influence of differing spread sizes and perhaps more price volatility, 
exhibit differing seasonal returns behaviour. Clearly, the influence of the 
microstructure, as well as firm size on day of the week effects should hence be 
investigated. 
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5.3. MODELLINCF DAILY SEASONALITY 
5.3.1. Day ofthe Week Eftcts 
Differing returns behaviour across the week may occur due to the perceived change 
in risk and investor behaviour. In addition, the influence of the institutionalised 
settlement system on the LSE may help to explain this behaviour. In the first 
instance, this returns behaviour across the week on the LSE can be investigated using 
regression analysis. Following the literature on daily calendar anornalies44 as well 
the methodology used to test for monthly effects in chapter 4, dummy variable 
regression analysis seerns more appropriate since it enables the effects of daily 
seasonality to be captured more readily by the explanatory variables. Using 5 durnmy 
variables corresponding to each day of the week, OLS regression can capture the day 
of the week effects as shown below 
5 
Rp't = aoRl, -, 
+ P, D, + et (5.1) 
where RP,, is the total return of the sample period on portfolio p, and RP,, j are lagged 
portfolio returns. Di is a dummy variable which takes the value I on a Monday (i=l), 
Tuesday (i-2), Wednesday (i=3), Thursday (i=4) and Friday (i=5), or zero otherwise. 
is a white noise error term. A constant term is not needed since the daily durru-ny 
variables already impose an intercept term. 
One problem with this specification of the model is that it may mask the effects of 
other market seasonal influences, such as the LSE institutionalised settlement effects. 
44 See Board & Sutcliffe (1988) as an example. 
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While the influence of the settlement period is an important factor when considering 
the actions of investors on Mondays, there are other significant days during the week 
which may prove iinportant in the analysis of seasonal effects on the LSE. 
As hypothesised above, due to the expectation of information arriving during the 
weekend, when the market is closed, investors on a Friday may perceive equities more 
risky and reduce their exposure by subsequently selling. Additionally, due to 
settlement systern rules the ensuing account Monday could influence investors who 
may sell on average in order to settle up outstanding accounts with the Stock 
Exchange. Returns on settlement Mondays are positive and higher than on other days 
due to the longer interest free period enjoyed by purchasers of equities on this day. 
In order to allow for the possibility of seasonal effects related to settlement procedures 
(5.1) can be modified to yield an equation of the form in (5.2) below 
Rp't = ocoR p, t-I + 
POMI + PI M2 PID 
I-+ 
P5 F, + P6 F2 +Ct 
I-I 
(5.2) 
where R,,,, , and 
Pi are as before in (5.1). M, is a durniny that takes the value I 
on settlement Mondays, M2 is a dum-ny that takes the value I on account Mondays, 
zero otherwise. Di is a dummy variables that takes the value I on a Tuesday (i=2), 
Wednesday (i==3) or Thursday (i=4) and zero otherwise. F, is a durnmy that takes the 
value I on Fridays before settlement Mondays, and F2is a dummy that takes the value 
I on Fridays before account Mondays, zero otherwise. This model then allows for the 
distinction to be made between day of the week anornalies and anornalies due to the 
settlement systern. Given the evidence on monthly effects, we can hypothesise that 
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these seasonal returns at the beginning and the end of the calendar week may be 
influenced by the touch. 
5.3.2. The hifluoice of'the Touch on Seasonal Porýfolio Returns 
Of equal interest here is the extent to which seasonality occurs due to the influence 
of the touch in portfolio returns. One such explanation is that seasonality may occur 
as a result of illiquidity in the market [Roll (1984)], or may reflect investors' 
transaction costs accruing to market makers when buy or sell orders are made. 
Consequently, *true' returns are hidden since closing prices include this touch 
component. 
Previous evidence [see section 5.2.2.1 suggests that the nature of the relationship 
between returns and the touch implies that these parameters 'interact'. In order to 
account for this likely interaction between returns and the touch, the use of a dummy 
variable representing the touch on each day of the week can be included into equations 
(5.1) and (5.2), which consequently may change the slope and intercept terms in the 
regression relationship. 
Thus, dummy variables representing returns can be specified simultaneously with 
interactive durnmy variables representing the corresponding daily touch, in order to 
test for the microstructure effects present in seasonal returns. Thus we have, for day 
of the week effects, 
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55 
Rl, = cc() R,,,, -, 
+ DI. + 1: 'yi SP17 DI. + ct (5.3) 
where SP, )D is the daily touch on portfolio p and the other variables are given as 
previously, and for settlement effects equation (5.4) below 
R=aR+ ýjm, +, y SP M 17 ,t () 1), t-I+ 
ýo mI+ yt) SPI) mI1 
1) 2 
4 
D+1: 7, SPI) D, (5.4) 
I. =2 
F, + y, SPI? F, + ß F, + y, SPI) F2 
Here SPPM, is an interactive spread variable tirnes a duiru-ny variable on settlement 
Mondays . SPpM, is an 
interactive spread variable times a durnmy variable on account 
Mondays, SPPF, is an interactive spread variable times a dummy variable on Fridays 
before settlernent Mondays, and SPPF2is an interactive spread variable times a dummy 
variable on Fridays before account Mondays. The other variables are the same as 
previously given. 
So far this chapter has addressed tests for a day of the week effect with specific 
reference to the two days surrounding the weekend: the Fridays and Mondays 
associated with the settlement system. Clearly, the advent of these trading regulations 
influences investors' behaviour. Allied to this fact is the changing risk levels, 
reflected in the touch, across the week which could under this scenario account for 
differing daily returns seasonality; this is the subject of section 5.3.3. 
5.3.3. Seasonal Touch Behaviour and Day of the Week Eftý, cts 
Due to the nature of the relationship between the n-licrostructure and returns, the touch 
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can be hypothesised as a possible cause of daily seasonality in returns and 
turthermore, as an explanation of the settlement effect. Again the question of what 
causes these micro structure and return seasonal effects is posed. While the interaction 
bet,, veen the touch and portfolio returns may show whether the touch influences 
seasonal behaviour on the LSE, it does not give an explanation for this seasonality. 
However, since we know investor behaviour is reflected in the n-ticro structure, there 
is a possibility that portfolio returns could be driven by seasonality in the touch. This 




SPI) MI+y, SPP M2+ýy, SP p Di (5.5) 
i=2 
+ y5 SPI? FI+y, SPP F2+t 
where the variables are given as previously. 
Additionally. there is a likelihood that seasonal returns could drive market makers' 
behaviour, which is reflected in the touch. This scenario can be tested as follows 
SP =(x +ßR M +ßIR M +E ß, R D. +ß R F, +e 
(5.6) 
p, t pp2p _ýRP 
F1+ ß6 
where RPDj are the portfolio returns times a durnmy variable which takes the value I 
on Tuesday (1=2), Wednesday (i=3) or Thursday (i=4), zero otherwise. RTMI and 
RPM, are portfolio returns times a dummy variable which takes the value I on 
settlement Mondays and on account Mondays respectively, zero otherwise. RPF, and 
RPF, are portfolios returns times a dummy variable which takes the value I on the 
Fridays before settlement Mondays and on the Fridays before account Mondays, zero 
otherwise. The empirical results from estirnating all the above models are shown 
in 
section 5.4. below. 
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5.4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS: TESTING ' FOR DAILY SEASONALITY 
5.4.1. Results of'Tests fi)r Day of'the Week Eftýcts 
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 show the regression results from specifying seasonal durnmy 
variable models from the equations (5.1) and (5.2) respectively, defined in section 
5.3.1. All the following analyses use the portfolios desci-ibed in section 3.3.2. above. 
The results in this section examine the day of the week effect as well as the influence 
of the settlement systern on daily returns. 
Table 5.1 shows the results for a daily durnmy variable regression representing each 
day of the week. For market value classified portfolios, lagged returns are statistically 
significant for the smallest portfolio only, and generally the variables of daily returns 
are insignificant. However, Friday returns are negative and significant for portfolios 
sized 3 and 4, as well as for the largest portfolio. This indicates that investors may 
well be selling on Fridays in anticipation of the ensuing non-trading period - the 
weekend. Across all the portfolios, the value of the coefficients appear small and do 
not experience an inverse relationship with portfolio size. DUM is a durnmy variable 
that corrects for outliers and hence non-nori-nality in the data corresponding to periods 
of volatility in the market. DUM corresponds to observation numbers 132,177,241, 
246,559 and 630. Observation number 132 corresponds to 7th August 1990 which 
was the time of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Observation 177 corresponds to 9th 
October 1990 which corresponded to worries about the crisis in Kuwait. Observation 
number 241 and 246 coincide with the start and end of the fighting in the Gulf War 
respectively. Observation 559 corresponds to 10th April 1992 and the General Election 
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Table 5.1 
OLS Regression Model Results of Returns Dependent upon Lagged Returns and Daily 
Dummy Variables Representing each Day of the Week for Equally Weighted 
Portfolios 
Market Value Portfolio Classification 
Size sin', dIest 2 3 4 5 Largest 
RI(-, 0.1746*** 0.0175 0.0611 0.0231 0.0411 0.0229 
(0.0365) (0.0352) (0.0379) (0.0364) (0.0364) (0.0378) 
D, -0.0006 -0.0018** -0.00 11 -0.0009 -0.0004 -0.0000 
«). ()()()9) (0.0008) «). ()()()9) «). 0()()9) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
D, 0.0017* 0.0014 0.0009 0.0008 0.0011 0.0015 
(C). ()009) (0.0008) (0.0008) «). 0()()9) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
D-, -0.0012 0.0004 -0.0011 -0.0009 -0.0002 -0.0005 
(0. ()0()9) (0.0008) «). 00()9) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
D4 0. M04 0.0007 0.0003 -0.0003 0.0009 0.0009 
«-). ()()()9) «). 0()()9) «). ()()()9) «). ()0 1 o) «). ()()()8) (0.0008) 
D, -0.0011 -0.0014 -(-). ()()19** -0. ()(-)22** -0.0009 -0.0016** 
«). ()()()9) «-). 0()()8) (0.0009) «). 0(-)(-)9) «). 0()()8) 
DUM 0.1003*** 0.1023*** 0.1054*** 0.1076*** 0.0987*** 0.1025*** 
(0.0097) (0.0073) (0.0123) (0.0087) (0.0085) (0.0120) 
R2 = 0.166 
2= R 0.237 2= (). 111 R 2= R 0.175 R' = 0.170 
2= R 0.102 
il, (1,621) = 0.077 ll, (1,621) 3.117 fll(1,621) = 0.377 il, (1,621) = 0.023 il, (1,621) = 0.139 il, (1,621) = 3.746 
T120,621) = 0.039 T120,621) 0.050 1120,621) = 0.008 il2(1,621) = 0.007 1120,621) = 0.210 T120,621) = 0.007 
E, (2) = 7.163 U2) 9.964 ý3(2) 7.699 U2) 4.748 t3(2) = 5.646 U2) = 5.729 
11'(1 , 627) = 1.336 T140,627) 
1.709 il, (1,627) 0.996 Tl, (1,627) 1.439 T140,627) = 1.501 1140,627) = 1.846 
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Table 5.1 cont. 
Closing Price Portfolio Classification 
size Sin, -dlest 245 Largest 
0.0999*** 0.0285 -0.0207 0.0846*** 0.0642* 0.1223*** 
(0.0372) (0.0373) (0.0349) (0.0359) (0.0369) (0.0360) 
D, -0.0010 -0.0010 -0.0012 -0.0005 -0.0007 -0.0006 (O. oo 1 o) (0.001o) «). ()()()9) (0-0008) «). ()()()8) 
D, 0.0016 0.0014 0.0008 0.0013 0.0013* 0.0010 
(0. ()0()9) «). ()0(-)9) «). ()()()9) (0-0007) (0.0007) 
D3 
-0.0008 -0.0003 -0.0010 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0003 
«). 0()10) (0.0009) «-). 00()9) «). 00()9) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
D4 0.0011 0.0005 0.0004 0.0006 0.0008 -0.0006 
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.00()9) (0.00()9) (o. 0008) «). ()008) 
D -0.0011 -0.0()23*** -0.0013 -(). ()()19** -0.0012 -0.0017** 
«-). ()() 1 o) (0.0009) «-). ()0()9) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0007) 
DUM (. ). (-)996*** (). 1()()9*** 0.10 19*** (). 1007*** (). 1017*** 0.1051*** 
(0.0104) (0.0105) (0.0071) (0.0084) (0-0097) «). ()()9(» 
R'- = 0.134 R= 0.125 R' = 0.243 
R2= (), 189 R2 
= 0.148 R2=0.186 
TII(1,621) 1.468 Tl, (1,621) 0.287 Tl, (1,621) 1.429 q, (1,621) 0.828 il, (1,621) 0.055 71, (1,621) 0.640 
1120,621) 0.028 T12(1,621) 0.006 T120,621) 0.004 T12(1,621) 0.002 T120,621) 0.002 T120,621) 0.012 
,! ý, 
(2) -5.374 
U2) 1.799 U2) 8.038 ý3(2) 4.738 ý3(2) 6.769 U2) = 4.949 
ll, (1,627) 1.198 il, (1,627) 1.642 Tl, (1,627) 1.720 Tl, (1,627) 1.738 ll, (1,627) 1.624 Tl, (1,627) = 2.925 
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Table 5.1 cont. 
Touch Portfolio Classification 
Size 
4 Largest 
Rl, t-I -0.0053 0.0694** 0-0113 0.0565 0.1198*** 0.0958*** 
(0.0351) (0.0351) (0.0359) (0.0358) (0.0342) (0-0356) 
Dý 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0008 -0.0010 -0.0001 -0.0011 (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) ((). ()()()9) (0.0009) (0.0009) 
D, 0.0015** 0.0016 0.0012 0.0009 0.0015 
(0.0007) ((). 0()()8) ((. ). ()()()9) 
D-, -0.00 10 -0.0006 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0-0007 
(0.0008) ((-). 0()09) (0.001o) 
D4 0.0008 0.0009 0.0004 0.0008 -0.0004 0.0003 
(0.0008) (0.00()8) (0.0()()8) ((). ()O(-)g) (0.0009) (0-0010) 
D5 
-0.0015** -0.0013 -(), 0()19** -0.0015 -0.0016 -0.0014 
(0.0008) (0.0008) (OmO08) ((). 0()09) (0.0009) (0.0010) 
DUM 0.1018*** 0.1011*** 0.1005*** 0.1011*** 0.1001*** 0.1022*** 
(0.0073) (0.0075) (0.0081) ((). 0()80) (0.0067) (0.0081) 
R2 0.236 R2=0.228 R2 = 0.197 R2 = 0.201 R2 0.269 R2 = 0.207 
TII(1,621) 0.001 Tl, (1,621) = 0.363 Tl, (1,621) 0.042 yl, (1,621) = 0.001 il, (1,621) 0.199 T11(1,621) = 0.222 
T120,621) 0.011 T12(1,621) = 0.001 T12( 1,621) 0.0197 1120,621) = 0.011 Tj 2(1,621) 0.005 
T12( 1 621) = 0.017 
ýc, (2) 4.012 E, (2) 2.202 U2) 0.759 ý3(2) = 4.239 U2) 2.499 tj(2) = 0.058 
T14(1,627) 4.179 T140,627) 3.427 T14(1,627) 2.415 1140 627) = 2.663 T14(1,627) 3.897 T140,627) = 3.919 
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Table 5.1 cont. 
Turnover by Volume Portfolio Classification 
size simillest 2 3 4 5 Largest 
0.1460*** 0.0564 0.0119 (). ()8(-)3** 0.0638 -0.0015 (0.0352) (0.0355) (0.0334) (0.0341) (0.0351) (0.0371) 
D, -0.0004 -0.0009 0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0001 
(0. (-)0()8) (0.0008) ((). ()()()9) ((-). ()()()9) 
D., -0.0010 -0.0001 0.00 1 0.0014 -0.0013 0.0017 
(0.0007) (0.0008) ((). ()()()9) ((). ()()()9) 
D3 
-0.0011 -0.000 1 -(). ()()(-)5 -0.0011 -0.0003 -0.0005 
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.00()9) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0008) 
D4 
-0.0002 0.0006 -0.0004 0.0007 0.0005 0.0005 
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0()()9) ((). 0()()9) ((). 0009) (0. ()0()8) 
D -0.0018 -0.0012 -(). ()()()9 -0.0016 -0.0018 -0.0015 
((-). ()()08) ((-). ()0()9) ((-). ()()()9) ((). ()()09) 
DUM 0.1 () I1 (). 0939*** 0.1()(-)9*** 0.1013*** 0.0965*** 
(0.0079) (0.0073) (0.0078) (0.0066) (0.0075) (0.0094) 
R20.225 R2=0.212 R2 0.300 R20.274 R2 0.227 R2 0.139 
(). ()24 il, (1,621) = 0.322 TI, (1,621) 0.377 il, (1,621) 0.314 yl, (1,621) 0.059 il, (1,621) 1.027 
y120,621) 0.028 1120,621) = 1.8-4-4 T12(1,621) 0.017 il, (1,621) 0.013 y120,621) 0.009 TI2(I, 621) 0.646 
ý, (2) = 3.707 = 1.844 ý, (2) = 1.486 U2) = 0.123 ý3(2) 5.923 c3(2) = 2.024 
il, (1,627) = 3.556 TI, (1,627) = 0.125 11, (1,627) = 4.381 il, (1,627) = 4.122 il, (1,627) 4.799 yl, (1,627) = 1.485 
Notes. 
Di are the dummy variables representing differing days of the week. 
Wlien i=I it is a Monday, when i=2 a Tuesday and so on until 1=-5, a V6day. 
Figures in parentheses are , standard errors. 
R2 is the adjusted R'-. 
DUM is a dummy variable that captures unusually large outliers in the data 
*** t-statistic significant at the 1% level 
** t-statistic significant at the 5% level 
T11 is an F(,., ) distributed test for ti"' order serial correlation under the null of no serial correlation. 
T12 is a RESET test, F(,., ) distributed for functional fon-n under the null of correct functional forni. 
I12 ibuted test for normality of the residuals under the nuH of nonnally distributed residuals. is a (n) distri 
714 is an F(,., ) distributed test for h etero scedast] city under the null of homos cedasti city. 
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Victory by the Conservative Party in the UK. This durnmy variable is highly 
significant in these and all the subsequent seasonal regression models in this chapter. 
For the other classifications of portfolios the results follow a similar pattern to the 
market value classified portfolios. However, for a larger number of the portfolios, 
lagged returns are significant indicating that in sorne instances yesterday's returns 
influence today's returns. Overall however, the results indicate that a day of the week 
effect does not generally seern to be significant on the LSE. Apart from the turnover 
by volurne portfolios however, negative Friday effects for around half the portfolios 
seern prominent. These negative returns imply that investors may be selling securities 
before the weekend non-trading period. 
Due to the fact that a day of the week effect does not seem prominent on the LSE, 
other explanations for daily seasonality need to be investigated. Clearly, the rules 
governing the timing of transactions and the settling up of previous transactions on the 
market may cause institutionalised seasonality on the LSE. One obvious seasonal 
influence hence may be the settlement systern operating on the market. This system 
may be a cause of daily seasonality, specifically on settlement and non-settlernent 
Mondays. Following Theobald & Price (1984) and Board & Sutcliffe (1988) amongst 
others, the settlement (first) Monday of the two week account period generally should 
have positive returns, while the account day or middle Monday should have negative 
returns due to the 'interest hypothesis' examined in section 5.2.1. In addition, 
negative returns on the account day could be caused by investors liquidating their 
portfolios in order to settle up outstaiiding accounts with the Stock Exchange. 
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Table 5.2 shows the, results of testing for settlement and non-settlement Mondays 
simultaneously with the other days of the week. Firstly, for size I and 3 of market 
value portfolios, daily lagged returns are positive as well as statistically significant. 
Lagged returns are also significant for at least 3 of the 6 sizes of closing price, touch 
and the volurne classified portfolios. Settlement Monday returns (M, ) appear to be 
positive and significant for at least 4 sizes of each classification of portfolio. 
Account Mondays (M2) on the other hand have highly significant negative returns 
across all the sizes and classifications of portfolio. Also, generally returns across 
other days of the week are insignificant apart from on the settlernent Fridays (F, ), 
which are highly significant across all the portfolios. The diagnostic tests are 
generally passed for all the portfolios. Allied to this are significant negative Friday 
returns on the last day of the settlement period i. e. the day before the new two week 
account period. This may indicate that investors are selling securities in order to 
balance their account books since this Friday is the last trading day before the next 
account day (the middle Monday of the following settlement period). In this scenario 
and under the assumption that investors hold long positions in the market, they may 
be selling, since this is the last opportunity to earn interest on open long positions. 
These results suggest that on the LSE, daily seasonality can be explained by the 
influence of the settlement systern operating in the market on Mondays and on the last 
Friday of the account period. The interest opportunity cost hypothesis seerns to be 
supported by these results and the middle Monday account 
day seems to be partly 
determined by investors systematic transacting behaviour. 
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Table 5.2 
OLS Reýlression Model Results of Returns Dependent upon Lagged Returns and Daily Dummy Variables Representing the Fridays before a Settlement or Noll -S ettlerrient Monday, the Settlement and Non-Settlernent Mondays and the Other Days of the 
Week for Equally Weighted Portfolios 
Market Value Portfolio Classification 
Size SmAest 2 3 4 5 Uvgest 
(11777*** 00299 ()A754** U357 U566 OM335 
(OM363) (40347) (0.0374) (0.0357) (0.0358) (0.0373) 
ml 0.0016 0.0013 0.0026** (). ()035*** (). 0032*** 0.0036*** 
(0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0014) ((). 0011) (0.0011) 
A -(). 0(-)55*** -(). 0()53*** -0.0057*** -(). 0043*** -(). 0038*** 
(OMO 13) (0 00 12) (OJX) 13) MOD) (OA)01 1) (OJX) 11) 
D, (10017** (10005 R0009 OM008 0.0012 OJ)016** 
(06009) (0.0008) (OM009) (OAX)09) (0.0008) (0.00()8) 
D3 
-0.0012 0.0004 -0.0011 -0.0002 -0.0005 
(OM009) MOOT (01009) (OJWIO) (OAX)OS) (OJXX)8) 
D4 0.0005 OM006 U003 QM003 OM009 03009 
(OJWO9) (OA009) WHO) (ROO09) (0.0008) 0,0008) 
F, 4)AO29** -01041*** -01044*** -RO(47*** -10033*** 410036*** 
(OM014) (0.0013) ((10014) (OMO 15) (0.0012) (0-0013) 
F, -OA003 (10001 -OA008 -0.0014 U002 -OA)007 
(OJW14) (OAO 13) (0 J)O 14) (0 AO 14) (0.0012) (0.0012) 
DUM 0.099 1 *** (11019*** (11056*** R1021*** OA988*** (&1012*** 
(0.0097) (OA)073) (0.0122) (OA086) (o. 0085) (0. ()119) 
R2 
= 0.175 
2= R 0.263 2= R 0.142 M' = 0.209 
2= R 0.203 R' = 0.133 
Tl, (1,619) 0-000 il, (1,619) 3.695 il, (1,619) 0.074 il, (1,619) 0.287 11, (1,619) 0.769 ýq, (1,619) 3.312 
T12(I, 619) H, 054 q2(I, 619) 0.158 T12(J, 619) 0.205 1120,619) 0.010 1120,619) 0.124 1120,619) 0.001 
E, (2) 6.709 ý3(2) 13.33 E, (2) 5.771 ý3(2) = 5.555 ý3(2) 7.855 ý3(2) = 11.08 
-q, (1,627) 1.384 yl, (1,627) 1.474 TI, (1,627) 0.715 il, (1,627) = 1.297 1140,627) 1.609 T14(1,627) = 1.691 
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Table 5.2 cont. 
Closing Price Portfolio Classification 
size SmIdlest 2 3 4 5 Largest 
P-11,1 (). 114()*** 0.0372 -0-0057 (-). ()991*** (-). 0737** 0.124 1 *** 
(0.0364) (0.0369) (0.0345) (0.0355) (0.0363) (0.0358) 
ml 0.0039*** 0.0024* (). 0(-)24* (). ()(-)29*** 0.0025** 0.0012 
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0012) ((). ()() 11) ((). ()() 11) 
M, -0.0062*** -0.0048*** -0.005 1* ** -(-). (-)042*** -(-). 0041*** -0.0029*** (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0012) ((). 0011) 
D, 0.0016 0.00 14 0.0013 0.0013 0.00 1 () 
((). 0()()9) ((). (-)0()9) ((-). 0()()9) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
D-, -0.0008 -(). 0(. )()3 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0003 
I ()) ((). 0()()9) ((). 0()08) (0. ()()()8) 
D4 0.001" 0.0005 0.0003 0.0005 0.0008 -0.0007 
I ()) (0.0009) ((-). 00()9) ((-). (-)008) ((). 0008) 
F, -0.0036*** -0.0048*** -0.0042*** -0.0044*** -0.0033*** -0.0033*** 
(0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0012) 
F, 0.0002 -0.0015 0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0015 
(0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0011) (0.0012) 
DUTN4 (). ()999*** 0.1016*** 0.1013*** (). 1006*** (). 10177*** (-). 1028*** 
(0.0102) (0.0104) ((-). 0()7(-)) (0.0083) (0.0096) ((). ()09()) 
R2=0.173 R2=0.151 R' = 0269 R2 = 0.216 
R2 
= 0.177 
R2= (). 198 
il, (1,619) = 1.161 TI, (1,619) = 0.503 il, (1,619) = 1. -594 il, (1,619) = 0.923 yl, (1,619) = 
0.040 Tl, (1,619) = 0.701 
r120,619) = 0.000 T12(1,619) = 0.000 iI2(J, 619) = 0.027 1120,619) = 0.004 T12(1,619) = 0.002 y120,619) = 9.002 
ac_, (2) = 6.137 ý3(2) = 2.455 U2) 11.30 U2) 6247 U2) = 6.258 ý3(2) 5.663 
TI(1,627) = 1.130 q, (1,627) = 1.605 il, (1,627) 1.559 rl, (1,627) 1.695 fl, (1,627) = 1.436 _n4(I, 627) 3.083 
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Table 5.2 cont. 
Touch Portfolio Classification 














(0.0011) ((). O()Il) 
-0-00 16** 0.00 16** 




-0.0028** -(). 0()27** 
((-). ()()12) (0.0013) 
-0.00 1 () 
1) (0.0012) 
0.1000*** 0.099 1 *** 
(0.0073) (0.0074) 
0.0277 0.07 11 ** 0.1282*** 0.1045*** 
(0.0355) (0.0351) (0.0336) (0.0354) 
(-). 0025** (-). 0028*** 0.0038*** 0.0015 
(o. Ooll) (0.00 12) (MM) 12) (0.0014) 
-(). 0()41*** -(). ()049*** -0.0041*** -(). 0038*** 
«). ()()()9) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0014) 
0-0007 0.0012 0.0009 0.0015 
(0.0008) (0.0008) (o. 0008) «). 0()()9) 
-0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0008 -0.0007 
(0.0008) «). ()0(-)8) «). ()()()9) «). ()0 1 o) 
0.0004 0.0007 -0.0005 0.0003 
«). 0()(-)8) (0.0008) (0. (. )(-)()9) «). ()()()9) 
-(-). 0042*** -(). ()046*** -0.0035*** -0.0039*** 
(0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0015) 
-0.0006 0.0002 -0.00 11 -0.0004 
«). (-)() 11) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0014) 
0.0983*** 0. ()998*** 0.0996*** 0.10 11 * ** 
(0-0079) (0.0067) (0. ()081) 
R2=0.254 R2=0.249 R2=0.222 R2=0.236 R2 = 0.294 R2=0.220 
Tl, (1,619) = 0.008 Tl, (1,619) = 0.457 Tl, (1,619) = 0.507 Tl, (1,619) = 0.032 Tl, (1,619) = 0.369 Tl, (1,619) = 0.118 
T120,619) 0.046 T12(1, ()19) 0*016 1120,619) 0.089 112(1'619) = 0.002 Tl, (1,619) = 0.075 T120,619) = 0,000 
ý, (2) 6.418 1 , ý_, (2) 
4.068 U2) 2.077 U2) 6.212 U2) = 2.415 U2) = 0.263 
Tl, (1,627) 3.795 Tl, (1,627) 3.217 il, (1,627) 1.993 Tl, (1,627) 2.303 Tl, (1,627) = 3.635 Tl, (1,627) = 3.863 
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Table 5.2 cont. 
Turnover by Volume Portfolio Classification 





M, 0.0013 0.0016 
(o. wil) ((). om 1) 
M, -0.0()24** -(). 0(-)36*** 
(omow) (omm 1) 
D, 0.0010 0.0012 











(o. Ooll) (0.0012) 
DUM 0.0989*** 0.0927*** 
(0.0078) (0.0073) 
0.0241 (). 0970*** 0.0744** 0.0161 
(0.0332) (0.0337) (0.0348) (0.0362) 
() -00 31** (). 0(-)3(-)*'- (-). 0029** 0.0043*** 
(0.00 12) ((. ). (-)()13) (0.0013) (0.0012) 
-0.003 1 *** -(). ()(, )46*** -0.0042*** -0.0044*** 
(0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0013) 1) 
0.0009 0.0015 0.0013 0.0017** 
((). (-)(-)09) ((). 0009) (0.0008) 
-0.0005 -0.0011 -0.0003 -0.0005 
((). 0()()9) ((). 0009) ((). 0009) (0.0008) 
-0.0004 0.0007 0.0005 0.0005 
((). 00()9) ((-). ()()()9) (0.0009) (0.0008) 
-0.0036*** -(). 0049*** -0.0042*** -0.0043*** 
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0-0013) 
-0-0003 0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0010 
(0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0012) 
0.1011*** 0.0994*** 0.0996*** 0.0948*** 
(0-0060) (0.0065) (0.0074) (0-0093) 
R2 ý 0.235 R'= 0.228 R2=0.318 R2 = (001 R2=0.249 R2=0.1, ý3 
Tl, (1,619) = 0.011 Tl, (1,619) = 0.290 q, (1,619) = 0.461 ll, (1,619) = 0.147 Tl, (1,619) = 0.031 Tl, (1,619) = 1.964 
T12(1,619) = 0.057 il2(1,619) = 2.777 il2(1,619) = 0.002 il, (1,619) = 0.006 T120,619) = 0.029 1120,619) = 0.666 
c3(2) = 4.831 E, (2) = 2.318 -j(2) 
3.247 U2) = 0.059 E, (2) = 7.440 ý3(2) = 4.709 
Tl, (l 627) = 269 Tl, (1,627) = 0.029 Tl, (1,627) 3.949 627) = 3.561 T)4( 1 ll, (1,627) = 4.199 Tl, (1,627) = 1.618 
Notes: 
M, are dummy variables representing Settlement Mondays. M2 are dummy variables representing Non-Settlement Mondays 
1)2 are dummy variables representing Tuesdays. 1)3 are durnmy variables representing Wednesdays. 
1). are dummy variables representing Thursdays. 
F, are dummy variables representing the Fridays before Settlement Mondays 
F. are dummy variables representing the Fridays before Non-Settlement Mondays 
DUM is a durru-ny variable that captures unusually large outliers in the data 
Figures in parentheses are standard errors. R2 is the adjusted R'. 
t-statisti-c significant at the 117,, level. t-stati.,, tic significant at the 5IX, level. 
TI, is an F(,., ) distributed test for nt" order serial correlation under the null of no senial correlation. 
T12 is a RESET test, F(,., ) distributed for functional forni under the null of correct functional forni. 
* X2 ibuted test for normality of the residuals under the null of nonnally dist ibuted residuals. 173 is a (n) distri inI 
TI, is an F(,., ) distributed test 
for h ete ros cedasti city under the null of horn os cedast, city. 
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5.4.2. Resit/ts of Tests, for the billuciwe ofthe Touch m Seasonal Returlis 
As we have in-iplied in section 5.3, seasonality in portfolio returns around calendar 
turning point opens up the possibility that the touch may influence returns. Table 5.3 
below show the results from test for seasonal return patterns when excluding the 
effects of the touch. The analysis is based on the seasonal settlement results which 
are shown in Tables 5.2 . 
Table 5.3 examines the significance of seasonality for settlement and non-settlernent 
Mondays as well as on the other days of the week when the effects of the touch are 
removed. The results for the market value classified portfolios are as follows: (i) 
lagged returns are significant for portfolios size 1,3 and 5; (ii) the previously 
docurnented positive settlement Monday (M, ) returns become insignificant and 
negative for 3 out of the 6 portfolio sizes; (iii) the negative returns previously 
docurnented for the account or middle Monday (M2) of the settlement period are now 
only significant in the size 5 portfolio. Wednesday seasonality seems prominent in 
portfolios size 3 and 4 even with the effects of the touch removed. 
For the other classifications of portfolios, the results indicate that lagged returns are 
highly significant in each portfolio for around 3 out of the 6 portfolios. Additionally, 
an account Monday effect 
(M2) 
ý 
is significant for a few of the larger sized portfolios 
specifically sizes 3,4 and 5. Again the diagnostic tests are again generally passed. 
The results in Table 5.3 imply that the previous docurnented Monday settlernent and 
non-settlement effects, as well as settlement Fridays effects, reported in section 5.4.1, 
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Table 5.3 
OLS Regression Model Results of Returns Dependent upon Lagged Returns and Daily 
Dummy Variables Representing Settlement and Non-Settlement Mondays and the 
Fridays before a Settlement or Non-Settlernent Monday and the Other Days of the 











Market Value Portfolio Classification 
Simdlest 2345 
0.1765*** 0.0389 0. ()829** 0.0342 
(0.0 364) (0.0353) (0.0379) (0.0358) 
-0.0079 0.0026 0.0041 -0.0032 
(0.0075) (0.0070) (0.0075) (0.0092) 
-0.0104 -0.0116 -0.0044 -0.0133 
(0.0068) (0.0066) (0.0073) 
-0.0015 -0.0025 -0.00 11 -0.0061 
(0.0049) (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0068) 
0.0040 -0.0030 0.0 128*** 0.0160** 
(0.0051) (0.0047) (0.0046) (0.0071) 
-0.0103** 0.0062 -0.0022 0.0042 
(0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0051) (0.0068) 
-0.0019 -0.0050 0.0075 0.0157 
(0.0077) (0.0071) (0.0074) (0.0103) 
-0.0041 -0.0051 -0.0049 -0.0008 
(0.0060) (0.0047) (0.0054) (0.0063) 
0.0982*** 0.1012***- 0.1()23*** (). 1(-)42*** 






































R20.178 R2=0.260 R2= 0.152 R2=0.218 R2=0.205 R2= 0.128 
TI, (1,612) 0.000 ill(1,612) = 1.785 il, (1,612) = 0.137 il, (1,612) = 0.485 il, (1,612) = 2.629 11, (1,612) = 3.835 
1120,612) = 0-008 T12(1,612) = 0.262 1120,612) = 0.307 1120,612) = 0.138 1120,612) = 0.020 112(1,612) = 0,003 
ý3(2) = 6.819 ý3(2) 14.22 ý3(2) = 6.866 ý, (2) = 4.745 ý, (2) = 5.941 ý, (2) = 8.918 
1140,627) = 1.082 11, (1,627) 1.175 1140,627) = 0.637 1140,627) = 0.990 1140,627) = 0.953 1140,627) = 1.513 
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Table 5.3 cont. 
Closing Price Portfolio Classification 
4 L, -wgest 
0.1157*** 0.0462 -0.0004 0.104 5 (). ()755** 0.1287*** 
(0.0365) (0.0374) (0.0345) (0.0358) (0.00366) (0.0360) 
mi -0.0021 0.0072 0.0071 0.0080 -0.0105 -0.0089 (0.0064) «). ()()81) (0.0052) (0.0077) (0.0085) (0.0073) 
-0.0091 -0.0122 -(). ()129**" -0.0066 -0.0112 -0.0006 (0.0059) (0.0069) (0.0047) (0.0066) (0.0061) (0.0066) 
D, -0.0062 -0.0072 0.0014 0.0005 -0.0026 0.0035 
(0.0042) (0.0053) (0.0036) (0.0051) (0.0056) (0.0044) 
D-, 0.0069 0.0089 -0.0024 -0.0060 0.0029 -0.0103 
(0.0045) (0.0054) (0.0033) (0.0053) (0.0055) (0.0054) 
D4 -0.0017 -0.0021 -0.0007 -0.0018 0.0040 -0.0024 
(0.0044) (0.0054) (0.0034) (0.0056) (0.0056) (0.0048) 
F, 0.0120 0.0030 _O. ()()99 -0.0144 0.0016 -0.0119 
(0.0071) (0.0087) (0.0054) (0.0097) (0.0094) (0.0072) 
F, -0.0012 -0.0029 -0.0070 -0.0037 -0.0083 -0.0057 
(0.0058) (0.0060) (0.0041) (0.0055) (0.0049) (0.0049) 
DUM (-). 10()8*** (-). 1037*** (-). 1003*** (). 1012*** o. 10 18*** 0.1()()1*** 
(0.0104) «). 01()9) (0.0071) (0.0086) (0.0097) (0.0091) 
R' = 0.181 R2= 0.154 R' = 0.272 
2 R=0.214 2 R=0.179 R2 = 0.200 
Tl, (1,612) = 1.308 il, (1,612) = 0.646 Tl, (1,612) = 0.018 il, (1,612) = 1.551 Tl, (1,612) = 0.018 Tl, (1,612) = 0.549 
T120,612) = 0.006 712(1,612) = 0.004 il2(1,612) = 0.297 T12(1,612) = 0.010 T120,612) = 0.008 7120,612) = 0.047 
(2) 6-054 E, (2) 2.144 ý3(2) 12.65 U2) = 6.161 U2) = 9.178 U2) = 5.179 
Tl, (1,627) 1.062 Tl, (1,627) 1.364 T14(1,627) 1.318 Tl, (1,627) = 1.607 T14(1,627) = 0.997 il, (1,627) = 2.960 
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Table 5.3 cont. 
Touch Portfolio Classification 
size simillest 3 4 5 Largest 
Rp't-I (). ()()48 (-). 0786** 0.0262 (). (. )745** (). 1291*** (). 1168*** 
(0.0348) (0.0351) (0.0358) (0.0351) (0.0339) (0.0359) 
K -0.0048 -0.0006 0.0155 -0.0065 -0.0065 -0.0027 (0.0052) (0.0049) ((). 0()89) (0.0077) (0.0086) (0.0069) 
M, -0.0017 -0.0090 -(-). 0()98*** -(). ()1()9** -0.0126** -0.0075 (0.0042) (0.0041) (0.0053) (0.0052) (0.0058) (0.0053) 
D, -0.0004 -0.0002 0.0022 -0.0055 -0.0088 0.0000 
(0.00-15) (0.0033) ((). ()(-)59) (0.0054) (0.0059) (0.0050) 
D-, 0.0046 -0.0034 -0.0037 0.0066 0.0062 -0.0061 
(0.0039) (0.0033) (0.0057) (0.0056) (0.0058) (0.0051) 
D, 0.00L) -0.0002 -0.0060 0.0056 0.0046 0.0087 
(0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0046) (0.0044) (0.0047) (0.0046) 
F, 0.0026 0.0022 -0.0074 -0.0096 -0.0009 -0.0113 
(0.0056) (0.0048) (0.0086) (0.0097) (0.0085) (0.0072) 
F, 0.0044 -0.0018 -0.0068 0.0044 -0.0006 
(0.0058) (0.0044) (0.0083) ((). ()()9 1) (0.0081) (0.0077) 
DUM 0.1()02*** (-). ()988*** 0.1006*** (). 0994*** (). 1022*** 0.1022*** 
(0.0073) (0.0076) (0.0082) (0.0086) (0.0097) (0.0082) 
R20.253 R20.247 R2 (). 221 R2 = 0.237 R20.297 R2=0.219 
Tl, (1,612) 0.000 TII(1,612) 0.615 Tl, (1,612) 1.129 Tl, (1,612) = 0.042 il, (1,612) 0.648 ill(1,612) = 0.009 
TV1,612) 0.087 T12(1,612) 0.025 T120,612) 0.063 ll, (1,612) = 0.011 T12(1,612) 0.326 T120,612) = 0.001 
ý , (2) 6.687 l, (2) 4.162 
U2) 2.296 U2) = 5.768 U2) 2.117 ýý(2) = 0.062 _ Tl, (1,627) 3.856 Tl, (1,627) 2.683 Tl, (1,627) 1.867 Tl, (1,627) = 1.737 Tl, (1,627) 3.048 il, (1,627) = 3.652 
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Table 5.3 cont. 
Turnover by Volume Portfolio Classification 
sizc Sin. dIest ? 3 4 5 Largest 
RIt-, 0.1492*** 0.0683 0.0277 (). 1()48*** (). (-)739*ý' 0.0219 
(0.0354) (0.0353) (0.0334) (0.0337) (0.0349) (0-0363) 
M, -0.0092 -0.0129 0.0051 -0.0070 0.00 10 0.0046 
(0.0078) (0.0087) (0.0044) «). ()(-)89) (0.0077) (0.0065) 
m' -0.0071 -0.0079 -(). 0104*** -0.0080 -0. ()120** -0.0068 (0.0051) (0.0052) (0.0039) (0.0059) (0.0054) (0.0047) 
D, 0.0015 -0.0015 -0.00 11 -(-). ()153** -0.0016 -0.0065 (0.0045) (0.0056) (0.0032) (0.0064) (0.0050) (0.0047) 
D-, -0.0038 -0.0088 0.0003 -0.0106 0.0116** 0.0084 
(0.0054) (0.0057) (0.0031) (0.0063) (0.0051) (0.0046) 
D4 -0.0050 0.0042 0.0006 0.0092 0.0014 -0.0018 
(0.0042) (0.0045) (0.0030) (0.0048) (0.0043) (0.0038) 
F, -0.0108 -0.0086 -0.0070 0.0069 0.0055 0.0066 
(0.0077) (0»0()98) (0.0048) (0.0116) (0.0080) (0.0063) 
F, 0.0012 -0.0098 -0.0017 0.0091 0.0003 0.0068 
(0.0072) (0.0084) (0.0045) (0.0117) «-). ()081) (0.0069) 
DUM (-). 0987*** 0.0922*** (). 1()04*** (). 1007*** 0.1006*** 0. (-)963*** 
(0.0079) (0.0073) (0.0061) (0.0086) (0.0075) (0.0094) 
R2 = 0.23 ý R= 0.229 R2=0.316 R' = 0.310 R2=0.253 
R2 
= 0.189 
il, (1,612) 0.022 TII(I, 612) 0.220 TI, (1,612) 0.026 TI, (1,612) 0.137 Tll(1,612) 0.000 q1(1,612) 1.368 
1120,612) 0.004 1120,612) 2.379 112(1,612) 0.015 T120,612) 0.042 1120,612) 0.078 1120,612) 1.173 
ý, (2) 3.642 E, (2) 2.416 ý3(2) 2.146 ý3(2) = 0.052 U2) = 7.478 U2) 4.197 
II'(I , 627) 
3.205 1140,627) 0.033 1140,627) 3.579 1140,627) = 3.569 1140,627) = 3.818 1140,627) = 1.077 
N ot e S: 
M, are dummy variables representing Settlement Mondays. M, are dummy variables representing Non-Settlenlent Mondays I, 
f)2 are dummy variables representing Tuesdays. 1)3 are dumniy variables rcprestý, ntlng Wednesdays. 
[)4 are dummy variables representing Thursdays. 
F, are dummy variables representing the Fridays before Settlement Mondays 
F2 are dummy variables representing the Fridays before Non-Settlement Mondays 
Figures in parentheses are standard errors. R2 is the adjusted R2. 
DUM is a dummy variable that captures unusually large outliers H) the data 
t-statistic significant at the 1% level. ** t-statistic significant at tile 5% level 
TI, is an F(,., ) distnbuted test for n" order senial correlation under the null of no serial correlation. 
T12 is a RESET test, F(,., ) distributed for functional form under the null of correct functional form. 
I' riality of the residuals under the null of non-nally distributed residuals. q) is a X2(n) distributed test for non 
1 ributed test for heteroscedasticity under the null of hoinoscedastic' TI, is an F(.., ) dist ity. 
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generally become insignificant when the inicrostructure is accounted for in daily 
returns. Therefore predictable daily seasonal variables representing settlement effects 
seerns to be explained away by the micro structure present in returns. Clearly, this 
seerns to suggest that investor transacting behaviour represented by the touch 
accounts for return seasonality. 
One interesting aspect of all the results so far in this chapter is that a size effect 
(examined using market value classified portfolios) and a small price effect (examined 
usingy closing price classified portfolios) does not seern to effect daily seasonality on 
the LSE. Indeed a settlement effect seerns as likely in small size/price portfolios as 
it does in larger ones. Again following the intuition in chapter 4, we have no 
evidence thus far to suggest whether this seasonal behaviour is actually in the returns 
process or in the touch. This question will be answered in the next section by testing 
for seasonality in the touch as well as seasonality in returns. 
5.4.3. Results of Tests for Seasonality in the Touch. 
The previous analysis firstly confirms the existence of a settlement effect on the LSE 
and then finds that the microstructure can account for such daily seasonality in the 
market. However, there is no evidence to suggest whether seasonality is in the touch 
or returns. The results of tests for each explanation of daily seasonality are shown in 
Table 5.4 and 5.5 respectively. As is evident in Table 5.4, seasonality in the touch 
is prominent across most of the portfolios for the settlernent Monday SPPM,, and 
highly significant across all the portfolios for account MondaysSPPM2and on the last 
Friday of the two week account period, SPPFI. However, the results shown in Table 
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Table 5.4 
OLS Regression Model Results of Returns Dependent upon Lagged Returns and Daily 
Touch Durnmy Variables Representing Settlement and Non-Settlernent Mondays and 
the Fridays before Settlement or Non-Settlernent Monday for Equally Weighted 
Portfolios 
Market Value Portfolio Classification 
size SmAest 2345 Largest 
lý"t-1 0.1740*** 0.0261 0. (-)753** 0.0346 (-)-0543 0.0320 
(0.0364) (0.0346) (0.0374) (0.0 35 6) (0.0358) (0.0373) 
SPPMI 0.0905 0.0951 0.2201** (). 3124*** 0.3576 0.4509*** 
(0.0646) (0.0788) (0.1006) (0.1079) (0.1209) (0.1429) 
SPI)m1 -0.1240** -0.3397*** -0.4095*** -0.4361*** -0.4025*** -0.4589*** 
(0.0648) (0.0061) (0.1013) (0.1094) (0.1215) (0.1433) 
SP, Ti -0.1395** -0.2557*** -(-). 3685*** -0.4045*** -0.3549*** -0.4433*** 
(0.0719) (0.0861) (0.1104) (0.1183) (0.1368) (0.1619) 
SPPF, -0.0057 0.0379 -0.0340 -0.1112 0.0517 -0.0568 
(0.0685) (0.0837) (0.1075) (0.1171) (0.1307) (0.1589) 
DUM 0.0984*** 0.1004*** 0.1031*** 0.1004*** 0.0966*** (). 1008*** 
(0.0097) (0.0072) (0.0123) (0.0086) (0.0084) (0.0119) 
R2 
= 0.170 R2=0.262 R2=0.144 R2=0.212 R2=0.199 R' = 0.129 
TI, (1,622) = 0.052 11,0,622) = 5.908 TI, (1,622) = 0.398 yl, (1,622) = 0.0-5-4 TI, (1,622) = 0.298 il, (1, (-)22) = 2.495 
'q2(I, 622) = 0,096 1120,622) = 0.169 T12(I, 622) = 0.055 1120,622) = 0.005 T12(I, 622) = 0.198 T12(1,62-'1) = 0.023 
, ý, (2) = 
7.099 E, (2) 16.98 ý3(2) 5.675 ý3(2) = 6.142 U2) = 9.506 c, (2) = 9.649 
11, (1,627) = 1.359 il, (1,627) 1.4-, 49 'r14(I, 627) 0.874 T14(I, 627) = 1.385 il, (1,627) = 1.446 il, (1,627) = 1.505 
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Table 5.4 cont. 
Closing Price Portfolio Classification 
Size S mallest I 
(). 1136*** 0.0333 
(0.0365) (0.0369) 
sppml 0.2263-*** 0.1753 
(0.0757) (0.0959) 
SPPM" -0.3264*** -0.3241*** 
(0.0769) (0.0972) 
SPt, F, -0.21392*** -0.3599*** 
(0.0861) (0.1076) 
SPIY2 0.0213 -0.0993 
((-). ()811) (0.1045) 
DUM (-). 0973*** 0.0992*** 
(0.0102) (0.0105) 
45 Lafgest 
-(). () I () 1 0.0983*** 0.0703 (). 1229*** 
(0.0346) (0.0355) (0-0364) (0.0358) 
0.1697 (-). 2668*** (-). 2598*** 0.1396 
(0.1005) (0.1028) ((). 1()18) (0.0959) 
-0.3402*** -0.3439*** -0.3660*** -0.2459*** 
(0.1014) (0.1029) (0.1038) (0.0929) 
-(-). 2868*** -0.3495*** -0.3159*** -0.2489** 
((). 1()91) (0.1120) (0.1137) (0.1040) 
0.0868 -0.0145 0.0355 -0.1064 
(o. I (-)g 1) ((). I o9g) (0.1093) (0.1003) 
0.1()()()*** 0.0985*** 0.1002*** 0.1017*** 
(0.0071) (0.0083) (0.0096) (0.0091) 
R'- = 0.172 
2 R=0.150 R' = 0.262 R2=0.214 R2=0.174 R2=0.197 
il, (1,622) = 0.754 il, (1,622) = 0.099 ill(1,622) = 3.350 11, (1,622) = 0.507 il, (1,622) = 0.169 11, (1,622) = 0.437 
TI, (1,622) = 0.016 T12(1,622ý ý 0.016 112(1,622) = 0«019 T12(I, 622) = 0.003 1120,622) = 0,015 T12(1,622) = 0.006 
c 'ý-3(2) = 7.572 ý3(2) 2.400 U2) 9.178 U2) = 8.063 U2) = 6.726 ý3(2) = 6.193 
il, (1,627) = 1.091 il, (1,627) 1.697 TI, (1,627) 1.537 Tl, (1,627) = 1.677 T14(I, 627) = 1.373 il, (1,627) = 2.957 
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Table 5.4 cont. 
Touch Portfolio Classification 



















(). ()998*** (). ()987*** 
(0.0072) (0.0077) 
0.0244 0.0671 0.1253*** 0. (-)986*** 
(0.0355) (0.035 1) (0.0336) (0.0354) 
(). 1648** 0.2554" (-). 3762*** 0.1976 
(0.0829) (0.1034) (0.1172) (0.1726) 
-(). 2826**" -(). 3929*** -0.3410*** -(). 4404*** 
(0.0851) ((). 1(-)48) (0.1166) (0.1749) 
-(). 3103*** -0.3929*** -0.33 10*** -0.4452** 
(0-0938) (0.1147) (0.1268) (0.1913) 
-0.0296 0.0311 -0.1202 -0.0477 
(0.0902) (0.1116) (0.1233) (0.1869) 
(). (. )967*** (). 0982*** (). 0992*** 0.1006*** 
(0.0080) (0-0079) (0.0067) (0.0081) 
R' = 0.252 
2= R 0.241 2 R 0.220 R2 0.232 2 R 0.293 2 R 0.217 
11, (1,622) = 0.001 il, (1,622) = 0.081 il, (1,622) 0.176 TI, (1,622) 0.001 TI, (1,622) 0.706 TI, (1,622) 0.015 
il, (1,622) = 0.198 T)2(I, 622) = 0.054 1120,622) = 0.113 'r12(1,622) = 0.007 T12(1,622) = 0.063 1120,622) = 0.002 
r-, (2) = 4.623 ý, (2) 4.924 U2) 2.086 ý3(2) = 6.993 U2) = 2.402 U2) = 0.400 
il, (1,627) = 4. WO il, (1,627) 3.148 yl, (1,627) 2.107 1140,627) = 2.492 il, (1,627) = 3.793 TI, (1,627) = 3.926 
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Table 5.4 cont. 
Turnover by Volurne Portfolio Classification 
Size sill(diest 2 
0.1469*** 0.0585 
(0.0350) (0.0352) 
splimi 0.1111 0.1399 
(0.0767) (0.0857) 
SPI)MI -0.1541** -0.2619*** 
(0.0753) (0.0875) 
SPI, Fj -(). 2171*** -0.2143** 
(0.0835) (0.0956) 
SPIT, -0.1062 -0.04679 
(0.0786) (0.0914) 
DUM (-). ()987*** (). 0922*** 
((). (-)(-)79) (0.0073) 
-A 5 Largest 
0.0200 (). ()929*** (). ()7()2** 0.0154 
(0.0332) (0.0337) (0.0347) (0.0363) 
(-). 1983** 0.2011 * -1 0.2216** 0.4251*** 
((). ()891) (0.0844) (0.0974) 
-0.1654 -(. ). 2832*** -0.4326*** 
(0.0923) (0.0864) ((). ()990) (0.1209) 
-(). 2297** -0.3237*** -(, ). 3432*** -0.4884*** 
((). ()989) (0.0928) (0.1095) (0.1913) 
0.0374 0.0177 -0.0198 -0.0087 
(0.0975) (0.0904) (0.103 3) (0.1300) 
(-). ()997*** (). 0985*** (). 099()*** 0.0933*** 
(0.0061) (0.0065) (0.0074) (0.0093) 
R2 
= 0.231 
2= R 0.227 R' = 0.312 R' = 0.298 R' = 0.248 R' = 0.179 
il, (1,622) 0.051 -q1(1ý622) 0.852 q, (1,622) 1.018 il, (1,622) 0.043 il, (1,622) 0.024 il, (1,622) 1.468 
112(1,622) (). ()42 112(1,622) 2.563 TI2(I, 622) 0.008 n2(I, 622) 0.022 112(1,622) 0.030 1120,622) 0.812 
ý--3(2) 4.861 
TI, (1,627) 3.195 
ý3(2) 2.283 
1140 627) 0.000 
ýý, (2) 2.850 
il, (1,627) = 3.985 
U2) = 0.076 






il, (1,627) = 1.529 
Notes: 
SPPM, are dunirny variables representing the Touch on Settlement Mondays 
SPPM2 are dw-nmy variables representing the Touch on Account Mondays 
SP, F, are dummy variables representing the Touch on Fridays before Settlement Mondays 
SPPF2 are durnmy variables representing the Touch on Fridays before Account Mondays 
Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
DUM is a dummy variable that captures unusually large outliers in the data 
R2 is the adjusted R2. 
*** t-statistic significant at the PX level 
t-statistic significant at the 5% level 
11, is an F(,., ) distributed te,, t for n"' order serial correlation under the null of no serial correlation, 
T12 is a RESET test, F(,., ) distributed for functional form under the null of correct functional form. 
is a X'(n) distributed test for norniality of the re.,, Idual-,, under the null of normally distributed residuals 
TI, is an F(,., ) distributed te,, t for hetero scedasti city under the null of hornoscedast i city. 
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Table 5.5 
OLS Regression Model Results of the Touch Dependent upon Daily Return Dummy 
Variables RepresentiDg, Settlement and Non-Settlernent Mondays and the Fridays 
before a Settlement or Non-Settlement Mondays for Equally Weighted Portfolios 
Market Value Portfolio Classification 
size Smallest 2 3 4 5 Largest 
CONSTANT (-). 0200*** (. ). 0152*** (). ()125*** (). ()122**'- 0. ()093*** (-). 0079*** 
1ý'Mj 0.0683 -0.0122 0.0240 0.0260 0.0109 0.0146 
(0.0533) (0.0422) (0.0311) (0.0248) (0.0193) (0.0160) 
'ý, M2 0.0186 0.0356 -0.0244 -0.0225 -0.0169 -0.0053 (0.0434) (0.0309) (0.0225) (0.0173) (0.0131) (0.0064) 
R. PFI 0.0095 -0.0288 -0.0547 -0.0599 0.0001 0.0211 
(0.0605) (0.0514) (0.0311) (0.0274) (0.0178) (0.0187) 
RPF 0.0249 0.0450 0.0484 -0.0014 0.0192 0.0033 
(0.0466) (0.0285) (0.0193) (0.0176) (0. ()1()1) (0.0117) 
R2 = 0.003 R2 = 0.005 R2=0.011 R2=0.005 R' = 0.002 R2 = 0.004 
Closing Pri ce Portfolio Classification 
Size Siwdlest 3 4 5 Largest 
CONSTANT 0. (-)176*** 0.0137*** 0.0122*** 0.0 117*** (). 0105*** 0.0115*** 
(0.0002) 1) 1) 1) (0. ()001) 1) 
RPM, 0.0363 0.0024 -0.0409 0.0134 0.0390 0.0351 
(0.0614) (0.0399) (0.0462) (0.0256) (0.0201) (0.0246) 
RPM2 
-0.0129 -0.0021 0.0230 -0.0172 0.0079 -0.0097 
(0.0457) (0.0284) (0.0334) (0.0215) (0.0144) (0.0166) 
RpFj -0.0132 -0.0145 0.0297 0.0037 0.0127 -0.0128 
(0.0694) (0.0397) (0.0494) (0.0283) (0.0214) (0.0287) 
RPF2 0.0042 0.0153 0.0311 0.0113 0.0266 0.0328 
(0.0482) (0.0297) (0.0308) (0.0146) (0.0143) (0.0166) 
R2=0.0()l R2= (). ()()I R2=0.004 R2=0.002 R2=0.006 R2=0.004 
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Table 5.5 cont 
Touch Portfolio Classification 
stle Smidlest 1) 3 4 5 Largest 
CONSTANT 0.0192*** 0.0 15 1 0.0134*** 0.0 113*-"* 0.0105*** 0.0078*** 
((). ()001) ((). ()0()1) 
0.1111 0.0451 -0.0299 0.0449 0.0227 0.0129 
(0.0634) (0.0573) (0.0288) (0.0277) (0.0207) (0.0192) 
1ý, M2 
-0.0119 0.0743 -0.0333 -0.0254 -0-0183 -0.0022 
(0.0486) (0.0427) (0.0202) (0.0164) (0.0137) 
RPF, -0.0488 -0-0879 0.0144 0.0080 -0-0077 0.0214 
(0.0656) (0.0598) (0.0276) (0.0264) (0.0233) (0.0224) 
0.0072 0.0562 -0.0353 0.0396 0.0248 0.0134 
(0.0383) (0.0194) (0.0176) (0.0137) (0. ( 13 ) 
R2 = 0.006 R'= 0.006 R 0.002 R' = 0.009 R' = 0.003 
2 R=0,004 
Turnover by Volume Portfolio Classification 
Size Smallest 2 3 4 5 Largest 
CONSTANT (). ()137*** (). 0129*** (). ()131*** 0.015()*** 0. ()130*** 0.0095*** 
(0. ()001) (0.0001) 1) ((). 0()(-) 1) (0.0000 (0.0001) 
RPM, 0.0637** 0.0549 -0.0139 0.0239 0.0076 0.0136 
(0-0313) (0.0309) (0.0456) (0.0269) (0.0340) (0.0256) 
RPM, 0.0206 -0.0190 0.0408 -0.0496 -0.0033 -0.0195 
(0.0231) (0.0203) (0.0387) (0.0201) (0.0222) (0.0194) 
RPFI 0.0288 0.0165 0.0328 -0.0363 -0.0288 -0.0434 
(0.0355) (0.0311) (0.0537) (0.0287) (0.0359) (0.0274) 
0.0195 0.0286 0.0401 0.0117 0.0240 0.0067 
(0.0261) (0.0182) (0.0309) (0.0178) (0.0218) (0.0204) 
R2=0.003 R2 = 0.004 
R2= (). ()()j R2=0.007 R- = 0.003 R2=0.006 
Notes: 
R.,, M, are dummy variables representing Returns on Settlement Mondays 
RPM, are dummy variables representing Returns on Account Mondays 
RPF, are dummy variables representing Returns on the Fridays before, Settlement Mondays 
RPF2 are dummy variables representing Returns on the Fridays before Account 
Mondays 
Figures in parentheses are standard errors. R2 IS the adjusted R 
2, 
*** t-statistic significant at the 1% level 
** t-statistic significant at the 5% level 
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5.5 indicate that seasonality is not present in i'etunis since when the touch is regressed 
on seasonal return variables there appears to be no statistically significant effect. 
Clearly, this re-affirms the results in Table 5.4, that the daily seasonal process is in 
the touch rather than portfolio returns. 
These results provide proof that it is the microstructure, a measure of illiquidity in 
stock prices, around calendar turning points that causes seasonality in returns. 
Generally, the touch is a measure of investors' transacting behaviour in the market. 
Since the level of transactions reflects information about a security, market makers 
determine the risk attached to each security (as measured through the touch) by 
reacting to this investment behaviour. The touch size can be seen as a signal to the 
market reflecting the short run risk characteristic of a security, which around calendar 
turning points exhibits seasonal behaviour, still further. 
5.5. CONCLUSIONS 
Following evidence from the 
U S45, short run calendar anomalies such as the weekend 
effect have shown that security returns can be predictable during certain periods of the 
week. More specifically, this evidence suggests that Friday returns should on average 
be positive, while Monday returns should be negative. This so-called day of the week 
effect could arise due to the uncertainty caused by the non-trading period over the 
weekend. Investors would hence want to exit the market on a Friday (causing 
'ý See French (1980) and Rogalski (1984). 
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negative returns) and re-enter the market on a Monday after the weekend (causing 
POSitiVe retUrFIS) to avoid this period of uncertainty. 
More recently, evidence in the UK 46 suggests that short run calendar anornalies such 
as the weekend effect occLir due to the influence of the fixed institutionalised 
settlement systern that operated on the LSE up until very recently. Specifically, a 
weekly trading effect corresponding to predictable seasonal returns occurs on the first 
Monday and the account (middle) Monday of the two week settlement period. This 
previous evidence suggests that returns on the former Monday are positive, while 
returns on the latter Monday are negative due to the opportunity cost of the interest 
foregone from not buying on the first day of the settlement period and selling on the 
last. 
Additionally, the influence of other anomalies such as the firm size effect and the 
micro structure in prices can help to explain this seasonal effect. Evidence from the 
US4' has suggested that short run daily seasonality may at least be partially explained 
by the bid-ask spread. This is perhaps because investors' buying and selling 
behaviour influences the size of the bid-ask spread around seasonal turning points. 
This chapter aims to test the proposition that a day of the week effect and a settlernent 
effect are prominent on the LSE, and that these predictable calendar returns can be 
" See TheobaId & Price (1984), Board & Sutcliffe (1988) and Choy & O'Hanlon 
(1989) for example. 
47 See Keim (1989) and Porter (1992). 
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accounted for by the effect of touch. Across the six sizes and four classifications of 
portfolios the initial results indicate that day of the week effects similar to those 
docurnented in the US are not prominent on the LSE. 
However, analysis of the influence of the settlement systern on calendar anornalies 
shows that the settlernent (first) Monday of the two week settlement period is 
characterised by positive returns, while the middle or account Monday has negative 
returns. In addition the Fridays before settlement Mondays (i. e. the last day of the 
settlement period) has negative returns. This is consistent across all the sizes and 
classifications of portfolios and confirms the 'interest hypothesis' advocated by 
Theobald & Price (1984) arnongst others. Overall, this evidence therefore seems to 
support seasonal effects on the LSE". Finally, what is clear from the results is that 
the value of returns is not related to the size of each portfolio, so contradicting 
evidence of a firm size and price effect in returns. 
Due to the theoretical and empirical relationship between returns and the 
micro structure, especially around calendar turning points, investigation is made into 
the influence the touch has on seasonal returns. For daily seasonality on the Mondays 
and Fridays associated with the settlement period, the previously significant 
seasonality is nullified when the effects of the touch are removed. In addition, this 
effect seems prominent in smaller sized as well as larger sized portfolios implying that 
the touch and settlement effects are not a function of firm size. 
4" Lagged returns also proved generally significant indicating that daily returns 
may be predictable. 
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These results sm-'est that it is the micro structure that contributes to predictable 
settlement effects in returns on the LSE. In order to test this hypothesis, we test for 
seasonality in the touch and seasonality in the returns process. Interestingly, the 
results suggest that day of the week effects common to the LSE are determined by 
seasonality in the touch on settlement and account Mondays as well as on the last 
Friday of the two week settlement period. 
The obvious implication frorn these and the previous chapter's results, is that 
seasonality in portfolio returns is not prominent on the LSE, and that any documented 
seasonal effects occur due to seasonality in the touch. This in turn reflects market 
maker and ultimately investors' behaviour around calendar turning points in the 
market. Therefore, profitable opportunities from timely transactions around short run 
calendar anornalies [after accounting for the touch] seern to be unavailable to investors 
transacting on the LSE. 
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PREDICTABILITY OF DAILY STOCK RETURNS ON 
THE LSE: A PRICE ADJUSTMENT APPROACH 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
So far we have tested for long run and short run seasonality on the LSE. The results 
initially support the hypothesis of seasonality in the market across differing sizes and 
classifications of portfolios. However, market seasonality seems to depend upon the 
raicrostructure in returns, to the extent that the touch explains seasonal returns. What 
is more apparent from the results in the previous two chapters is that daily stock 
returns are more dependent upon predictable past returns rather than any seasonal 
parameters. 
These results support much statistical evidence in the finance literature (especially 
from the US49) of security return predictability. Indeed, more recent empirical 
research 50 also suggests that returns from differing sized portfolios and market 
indices are predictable. One such study is by French & Roll (1986). They suggest 
that daily price variance is transitory and characterised by 'noise trading' by 
uniformed traders [Black (1986)]. Such pricing errors due to noise trading, especially 
in smaller firms, are eventually reversed as informed traders act on this divergence and 
" See Fama (1991) for a review. 
"' See French & Roll (1986), Farna & French (1988) and Jegadeesh (1990) 
amongst others in the US, and MacDonald & Power (1992) in the UK. 
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bring prices back towards fund amen tal s. 
Additionally, Farna & French (1988) following Summers (1986), support the theory 
that prices take divergent swings away frorn fundamentals in the long run and find 
that 3 to 5 year returns had strong negatively correlated returns. Such correlation 
reflects a slow inean-reverting component in security prices which appeared to be 
predictable for about 4()'/( of the 3 to 5 year return variances in small sized portfolios. 
Jegadeesh (1990) again in the US finds, using monthly data, highly significant first- 
order serial correlation across all sizes of portfolios. 
Explanations for this predictability have centred upon the influence of the bid-ask 
spread in returns. Indeed, Roll (1984) shows the direct link between predictiveness, 
measured by negative correlation, and the spread. Evidence from the UK study by 
MacDonald & Power (1992) confirm that positive autocorrelation caused by price 
divergence, is eradicated by the spread. Apart frorn the iegadeesh (1990) study, firm 
size and the spread seerns to influence the degree of return predictability. 
Conformation of this evidence is shown by Conrad, Kaul & Nimalendran (1991) in 
the US, who imply that between II 11c. and 241/(. of the variation in weekly returns can 
be explained by the bid-ask spread. Clearly, evidence from the studies highlighted 
above imply that return predictability is not as econornically significant as its 
advocates jinply it should be. 
While the literature above (despite the influence of the spread) finds statistical 
evidence of return predictability, it gives no indication of the predictiveness of an 
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investors' decision making process in the market. This chapter aims to redress this 
imbalance by using, a model that rnimics more closely investor behaviour. In the light 
of this. and given the assumption that current and future information in the market is 
uncertain, risk-averse investors will try and minimise the cost of the deviation of 
actual price from its underlying intrinsic value. The assumptions underlying this 
investor behaviour model are given as follows. Firstly, prices react to information in 
the market. Secondly, the 'value' of a security represents fundamental information 
(I since this information is costly) and thirdly, noise trading in the market causes 
uncertainty. In the light of these assumptions the following hypothesis can be stated: 
risk-averse investors will not fully adjust prices on the receipt of fundamental 
information, so subsequently prices will only partially adjust to changes in value and 
hence follow a partial adjustment model (PAM) [Arnihud & Mendelson (1987)]. 
This chapter extends Amihud and Mendelson's idea of partial price adjustment and 
provides a theoretical framework frorn which investors rninimise the cost of price 
adjustment. An additional advantage of this frarnework is that it allows the more 
(empirically) rigorous Error Correction Mechanism (ECM) to be specified. The 
predictability question is hence examined using this more rigorous ECM framework 
and models various equally weighted portfolio series. Portfolios are constructed from 
market value, touch, and turnover by volume classifications formed from 5 years of 
daily data 51 . 
As we have already shown, the first classification, market value, 
enables the examination of a size effect in security returns. The second, the touch, 
5' The transaction price classification was dropped since it replicated the results 
from testing for firm size using market value. 
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following Roll (1984), gives an indication of returns behaviour under differing 
liquidity levels and the third classification, turnover by volurne, following Dernsetz 
(I WS) shows the effects of classifying by differing information levels. 
The results suggest that daily security predictability is a negative function of firm size 
regardless of portfolio construction. Interestingly, many portfolio series have a 
significant lag 4 and 10 returns component which intuitively may correspond to a 7 
weekly effect and II day cycle in prices. Also, smaller size portfolios are 
characterised by a significant error correction component which may be indicative of 
an adjustment process in prices where investors correct for disequilibrium in intrinsic 
value. 
Finally, return predictability seems more prominent when prices include a touch 
component i. e. when closing as opposed to bid prices are estimated. Clearly, despite 
the absence of a day of the week effect, daily return predictability for one and two 
week cycles seerns prominent on the LSE. The chapter is organised as follows: 
section 6.2 reviews issues on return predictability, 6.3 the theoretical modelling issues, 




6.2. ISSUES ON RETURN PREDICTABILITY 
6.2.1. Return PredictabilitV, Overreaction and Noise 
Inefficiencies in the securities market can be caused by persistent noise, overreaction 
and volatility. Much of the volatility debate has centred around the Shiller (198 1) and 
LeRoy & Porter ( 198 1) papers which imply that stock prices are too volatile compared 
to underlying dividends. In the scenario of an efficiently priced stock, its intrinsic 
fundamental value should equal the present value of future dividends. It is the 
efficiency with which intrinsic value adjusts to new information that can lead to stock 
mispricing. Clearly the greater the mispricing the greater the likelihood that anomalies 
will exist and that returns are predictable. 
As we have shown previously in the DeBondt & Thaler (1985,1987) studies 
overreaction by investors initially to recent information may cause a temporary 
movernent of prices away from fundamentals. This literature is directly related to the 
mean-reverting behaviour of stock prices found by Farna & French (1988) and Poterba 
& Summers (1988). Their emphasis is on a transitory component in stock returns that 
could be caused by a movement of prices away frorn a fundamental permanent 
component which is dependent on rational expectations of stock returns. 
Indeed it seems that this previous work 52 only uses ex-post variables with lower 
frequency data and provides only weak evidence that the autocorrelations of returns 
are zero (i. e. returns are unpredictable). This latter point, arguably, according to 
52 See Farna & French (1988) and Poterba & Summers (1988). 
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Campbell ( 199 1) implies that if all autocorrelations are zero then ex-post stock returns 
are white noise and hence expected returns are constant. The point here is that small 
autocorrelations of ex-post returns can result even when expected returns are volatile 
and persistent; but more on this in chapter 7. 
Explanations for these movements of prices away from fundamentals could be the 
result of noise tradingý-. An investor's a priori information set determines the type 
of trade that will occur. Under the assumption that underlying value and prices follow 
a geornetric random walk, noise traders may trade on non-fundamental information 
that could carry little economic relevance 54. Information traders however, who seek 
out more costly fundamental information will be able to trade on the back of noise 
traders who have caused prices to move away from their intrinsic underlying value 
and hence make profits. In this scenario there is the problern of noise in prices, i. e. 
knowing whether transactions are rnade using noise or fundamental information. 
As we know from chapter 3, the larger the volume of trade the larger positions 
information traders will take up in the market. Clearly the size of these long and short 
positions depends on an investors risk preference; as a result positions taken are 
limited in size. Since it is difficult to tell non -fund arnental from fundamental 
information, traders will not know the full extent of noise trading in the market. 
Indeed fundamentalists generate further noise (in some cases inadvertently) in order 
" See Black (1986). 
54 See for example the evidence in Dubofsky (199 1), showing increased volatility 
subsequent to stock splits. 
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to indLice noise traders to push prices fufther away from their intrinsic value. Indeed, 
noise trading is a continual short run phenomenon and causes prices to move away 
trom value. Large positions will be taken by information traders and as a result prices 
\xill revert back to fundamentals in the long run. This is consistent with the mean 
reversion representation of price movernents. 
Noise and hence the volatility of prices are also affected by the speed and type of 
information that traders use. With underlying intrinsic value being difficult to 
observe, any new information will affect the level of noise in prices. Indeed noise 
trading could be the result of so-called positive feedback trading, hypothesised by De 
Long, Shleifer, Suryu-ners & Waldrnann (I 990a)'ý. However, of potentially more 
interest is the influence that the bid-ask spread has on return predictability. Clearly, 
mispricing of underlying returns may occur, due to the size of the spread as well as 
intra-spread movernents caused by investors transacting behaviour. Thus the spread 
may cause false inferences about the level of return predictability. 
6.2.2. The InjZuence of'the Bid-Ask Spread on Return Predictability 
As has been shown, the difference between the bid (selling) and ask (buying) price 
facing investors can help to explain, for example, the anomalies highlighted above. 
Roll (1984) shows that overreaction and price reversals cause negative autocorrelation 
in stock returns which is the result of the bid-ask spread. Atkins & Dyl (1990), 
Lehmann (1990), Conrad, Kaul & Nimalendran (1991) and specifically Kaul & 
11 Such trading is generally seen as usurping the buying and selling action of 
noise traders. 
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Nimalendran ( 1990) show that a large proportion of overreaction can be accounted for 
by the bid-ask spread. This is because the spread component in observed transaction 
prices causes prices to be pushed away from the underlying value of the stock. In 
tact, Kaul & Nimalendran (1990) show that up to 50% of overreaction in small firms 
and up to 2311c of overreaction in larger firms can be explained by the effects of the 
quoted spread. 
The Kaul and Nimalendran (1990) study also used variance ratio (VR) tests of daily 
to twelve weekly NASDAQ stock returns. The results indicate that spread errors 
caused substantial spurious volatility. The VR results show little evidence of market 
overreaction, however one week bid-bid returns show some price reversal which could 
be due to the effects of weekend non-trading which can induce negative 
autocorrelation. Hence, explanations for overreaction and rriispricing compared to a 
given underlying value are clearly influenced by the bid-ask spread in returns. 
Furthermore as we have seen, examination of the overreaction hypothesis using the 
winner and loser stocks phenomenon", by Atkins & Dyl (1990), found that 
overreaction is small especially when compared to the bid-ask spread effect. Indeed 
overreaction, especially to negative information (according to a number of studies) 
may be explained by movements between the ask and bid price. In fact, Conrad, Kaul 
Nimalendran (1990) found that tirne-varying expected returns and bid-ask errors 
explained up to 24% of security returns variance and the majority of returns negative 
autocovanance, a common measure of overreaction. Whereas Zarowin (1990) found 
56 See DeBondt & Thaler (1985,1987). 
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that firm size and not overreaction explains loser returns, Lehmann (1990) found that 
price reversals are common on a weekly basis even after taking account of the bid-ask 
spread. 
Finally. another source of security mispricing may be due to the influence of the 
dealing systern operating in a market. The LSE operates as a dealership market" 
where orders for securities are executed by dealers at a preset quoted price given on 
the SEAQ (Stock Exchange Autornatic Quotation) system. The dealers in the market 
quote the bid and ask prices they are willing to buy and sell at, up to a specified 
transaction size. Each dealer operates independently and so does not know until the 
infoirnation of a transaction is displayed on the systern, who else, if anyone is buying 
or selling in the market. Both these two characteristics of the LSE mean that there 
are invariably many differing bid and ask prices and hence touch sizes quoted at 
anyone time, and without the knowledge of the market participants. This may 
contribute to noise in the market and the mispricing of securities compared to some 
underlying value. 
Clearly, the evidence above points to a link between the bid-ask spread (or touch in 
the UK) and firm size. Some of the earlier evidence frorn Stoll & Whaley (1983), 
show that market value and share price vary inversely with risk-adjusted returns, but 
that higher transaction costs due to spread illiquidity and cornrnission rates negate any 
size effects. Recent work by Jegadeesh (1992) however found, that the size effect 
remained even with a beta risk adjustment. Other risk factors were deemed as a likely 
57 See Pagano & R6ell (1991) for a discussion on dealership markets. 
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Cause of this effed". 
The following scenario may help to explain the link between firm size and the touch. 
Us, inc, the Lissumptions examined in chapter 3, that smaller firms have less volume of Z7, 
trade and therefore less information about thern in the market", following Roll 
(1984) we can hypothesise that market makers are less informative about smaller firms 
since they perceive thern as more risky. Consequently, they widen the difference 
between their buying (bid) and selling (ask) price to cover this risk. This can result 
in i-nispricinu, overreaction and noise, which may contribute to larger expected returns. Cý 
By intuition a wider touch implies more illiquidity in stock prices which increases 
their risk. Riskier stocks will discourage investors frorn transacting in them. This fall 
in the volume of trade of stocks will rnean there is less information in the market. 
Hence we have returned full circle, since these are the characteristics of smaller 
stocks. Differing sized portfolios should therefore exhibit different returns behaviour 
and may help to explain and contribute to return predictability"'. The following 
section hypothesises a test for return predictability using a model of investor price 
adjustment behaviour, using portfolio returns, prices and intrinsic value. 
11 Additionally, we have shown that Leong & Zaima (199 1) and Lamoureux & 
Sanger (1989) implied the size effect was a calendar anornaly. 
See Garbade (1982) and Demsetz (1968) 
" Many of the studies on the size effect are subject to the constraints imposed by 
using asset pricing models such as the capital asset pricing model. Mis-specIfication 
of these models, may distort investigations into the size effect. 
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6.3. THE PRICE ADJUSTMENT PROCESS 
6.3.1. The Hypothesis of Price A(Il*ustmew 
Arnihud & Mendelson (1987) in the US [hereafter A&M], hypothesise that observed 
stock prices, p, adjIust efficiently (though noisily) to changes in underlying intrinsic 
value, vt. The difference between price and value is attributable to 'noise' which may 
cause the 'pushing' of price away from value. Noise in turn can be attributed to two 
main sources. The first could be described as noise trading [see Black (1986)]. This 
is perhaps due to illiquidity in traders stock positions, the speed with which 
information arrives and inefficiencies in its use and assimilation. The second type of 
noise is to do with the influence of a trading mechanism on stock prices. 
The LSE operates on a dealership basis where market makers continually quote prices 
they are willing to offer in a stock. One form of noise is the quote-revision of the 
price, i. e. a continually changing touch and/or price". Others include discreteness 
in stock prices (Harris (1990)), the random arrival of buy and sell orders to the market 
and delays in price discovery". In order to examine the contribution the touch 
makes to inefficiencies in the price adjustment process when there are changes in 
intrinsic value, both bid and closing price series are used". Prices devoid of the 
, 61 See Jang & Venkatesh (1991) who cite evidence from the US. 
62 A&M cite Mendelson (1987) and Cohen, Maier, Schwartz & Whitcomb (1986) 
respectively on these points. 
63 This is following Kaul & Nimalendran (1990) who found that market 
overreaction when measured by variance ratios (VR) was substantially reduced when 
bid-ask bounce was accounted for in the price series. 
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touch should adýjust i-riore efficiently. 
Due to the fact that information has a cost and noise in the market implies risk, 
investors will only partially adjust price to changes in the underlying value of a stock. 
This price adýjustment process can be captured in a myopic backward looking partial 
adjIustment model (PAM) with noise, used by A&M and shown below 
Apt = a() + P, [ v, - pt_1 ]+ et 
Here (x, is a constant, P, is the adjustment coefficient, p, and v, are the log of price 
and intrinsic value respectively. Ap, is logged returns and F, is an error term where 
- N(O, u, ý). The error term F, is due to noise trading and trading mechanism effects. 
The adjustment coefficient P, will reflect the efficiency of the adjustment of prices to 
changes in value. When O<P, <I, there is a partial adjustment and in the unlikely 
scenario P, =O, there are no price movernents to changes in value. ClearlY when P, >I, 
traders overreact to new information about the value of the security, and when P, =I, 
there is a full price adjustment. 
When this latter adjustment occurs the PAM takes the following form 
Vt (6.2) 
Investors, because they are risk averse and rational, airn to optimally adjust the price 
of a security when they receive fundamental information which affects the value of 
that security. This is the partial adjustment process without the existence of noise 
traders. Optimal adjustment involves rninimising a so-called quadratic loss function 
(QLF). The QLF penalises deviations from equilibrium and rapid price adjustments 
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made by investors. Following Pagan (1985), the myopic PAM theorised in equation 
( 6.1) above arises when agents minimise a QLF that penalises deviations of actual 
price, p, from target value, v, and changes in the 'normal' growth rate, at. This is 
shown below as 




d' +2' (Apt - (x 
)2 
where OP as well as 0, shown in (6.5) below, are the marginal cost of adjustment 
re ative to the marginal cost of being away from equilibrium. By finding the optimal 
p, that rninirnises the QLF. (6.1) above can be written as a strict version of the myopic 
PAM condition where 
Ap, = P, (v, - pt_l) (6.4) 
when cý, =O. However, Hendry & von Ungern Sternberg (1981) argue that variables 
can actually change from their normal growth rate and that this will not be too costly 
if the variable changes in the sarne direction as the equilibrium. As a result an 
additional term such as 
- 02 (Pt - I)t-I )( VI - Vt-I ) (6.5) 
can be added to (6.3) to take account of this fact. Minimising the QLF in (6.3), 
augmented by (6.5) with respect to p,, yields an ECM such as (6.6) 
Apt = a() + y, Avt - ýI(pt-l - vt-d (6.6) 
which imposes proportionality between p, and v, in the long run, i. e. p, = v, where 
=(1 -1-02)/(' +0, ) and P, = 1/(1+01). The advantage of specifying such an ECM model 
of price behaviour, is that it is an optimal decision rule and so is more representative 
of the actions of investors and it encompasses the PAM as a subset when y, = -Pl. 
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6.3.2. EXO*(Icting Intriiisic Value usbi, (,, the Kalman. Filter 
Following (6.2) and assuming homogeneous restrictions on p, and v, the following 
relationship can be shown to hold 
pt =U 
() + I" I+Et 
(6.7) 
where p, is the observed market price of the security, v, is initially an unobservable 
component of a securities price that represents fundamental information, and follows 
a random walk and F, is the noise or error term which fluctuates around this value. 
The model in (6.7) shows how price is determined by the information updating 
process influencing intrinsic value. Equation (6.7) can be seen as an unobservable 
components model and intrinsic value, represented by vt, can be extracted using the 
Kah-nan Filter. The Kalman Filter enables (6.7) to be written as a measurement 
equation, and the process of the unobservable component, vt, as a series of transition 
equations in a state-space form as shown 
beloW64: 
pt Stvt + el et N((-), cyC) (6.8) 
1"t Vt-I + Pt-I + ut u, (6.9) 
Pt = pt-I + ýt ýt - N(O, cyý2) 
(6.10) 
The transition equations in (6.9) and (6.10) show that v, and the global trend in v, 
evolve as a stochastic random walk process since information arrives stochastically, 
" Harvey (1982) examines the Kalman Filter as an application in tirne-series 
models. Harvey shows that the state space form in his words [page 4] ... "makes two 
fundamental contributions to classical tirne-series analysis. " Firstly, the state-space 
models enables the prediction error of a dynamic model to be decornposed and 
secondly it enables signal extraction from a time-series model. 
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and, following the assumptions of Ross (1989), prIces and their rate of change respond 
to new inforination. We estimate 6.8 - 6.1 () to obtain an estimate of v, 
6.4. DATA 
The data set used in this chapter is the sarne as used in chapter 5. Returns are 
calculated frorn closing prices and bid prices. The touch variables for each portfolio 
are not used to show the influence of the microstructure in returns due to problems 
of multicollinearity which arise in the model with a large number of lags of the touch 
variable. Therefore bid prices are used to account for the influence of the touch. This 
is consistent with Kaul & Nimalendran (1991) who find that transaction prices over- 
estimate overreaction by up to 50% for small sized portfolios when compared to 
portfolios constructed using bid prices. Portfolios are again classified by market 
value, the touch and turnover by volume. Closing priced portfolios are omitted since 
they replicate the market value results. Thus the remaining classifications enable the 
robustness of return predictability across the differing classifications of portfolios to 
be tested. Test results of the predictability question are shown in section 6.5 below. 
Here a general multi-lag model is estimated which, in its restricted form can be 
represented as a partial adjustment model. 
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6.5. ESTIMATING PRICE ADJUSTMENT BEHAVIOUR AND ANOMALIES 
Due to the use of high frequency data and the dynarnic nature of investment decisions 
highlizghted in previous sections, a returns series is more than likely to be represented 
by a multi-lag model than a single-lag model. In order to examine sorne of the 
t eoretical and empirical issues discussed above, OLS regression techniques were 
used. Under the assumptions of Hendry & von U ngern- Sternberg (1981), a dynamic 
linear regression model with multiple lags of returns, price and intrinsic value was 
specified as shown below in (6.11) 
Apt = (X() oc I P, . 
C (6.11) 
where Ap, p, and v, are the logarithms of returns (including dividends), price and 
value respectively, in time t, and e, is an error term. In order to capture any weekly 
seasonality in the model lags of around ten were specified for each of the variables 
used in the regression. 
6.5.1. Unrestricted Models of Returns Behaviour 
The statistically significant results (at least at the 5% level) given in Tables 6.1 - 6.9 
below, show unrestricted models of returns behaviour after estimating (6.11) above. 
Attaching econornic meaning to the results ffom these models is obviously important. 
Thus, returns variables with a lag in period 4 may correspond to five day or weekly 
predictability and variables with a lag 10 similarly correspond to an II day cycle in 
prices. Sirnilar lags in p, and v, show their influence on the dependent variable. 
Equal value but opposite signed coefficients of specific lags of p, and vt, which up 
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hold the restriction that pt = v, can be formulated as an error correction mechanism 
(I ECM) cornponent. 
The ECM shows the daily adjustment process in prices when investors are correcting 
tor disequilibriurn in intrinsic value. Clearly, higher order ECM components, such at 
lag 4 may be correcting for the adjustment process for weekly predictability. The 
diagnostic specification of the results, in Appendix 2 shows that the residuals frorn all 
the models of return predictability are well specified, are of correct functional form, 
exhibit no serial correlation or non-nori-nality and are hornoscedastic. 
6.5.2. Results fior PortfMos Classified by Market Value. 
Tables 6.1 - 6.3 show the statistically significant parameters of (6.11) for portfolios 
classified by different sizes of market value, which is the conventional way used to 
test the influence of firm size on portfolio returns. One of the most important 
observations from the results, is that as portfolio size increases frorn I to 6, generally 
the number of significant parameters reduces (especially those which carry most 
economic meaning, such as lagged returns). A set of durnrny variables, DUM, 
corrects for large outliers and non-norinality seen in the diagnostic tests of all the 
portfolio series. This is the same dummy variable used in chapter 5. 
For all the bid and closing priced portfolio returns, R, is dependent upon R, 10 (10 day 
lagged returns). Rt-I lags are prominent in the smallest size portfolios and in portfolio 
size 3. Additionally lag 4 of R, is also prominent in portfolios size I and 2, indicating 
that predictable weekly prices are perhaps a function of firm size. In addition to the 
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Table 6.1 
Unrestricted Regression Model of Returns Dependent upon Lagged Returns, Price and Value for Equally Weighted Portfolios Classified by Market Value 
Bid Price Data 
size Simillest 345 Largest 
Rt-, (). 13 1 *** (-). ()76*-ý 
ýO. 036) (0.037) 




Rt-10 0.0()4*** 0.079*** 0.143*** 0.153*** 0.145*** (). ()98*** 
(0.037) (0.035) (0.038) (0.036) (0.037) (0.038) 





Vt-1 _O. ()98*** -0.052** -0.040** 




c 0.016 -0.000 -0.005 0.022 -0.003 0.000 
golp (o. o(V) (0.020) (0.015) (0.024) gooo) 
DUM 0.044*** 0.041 *** (). ()4(-)"** 0. (-)41*** 0.034*** 0.037*** 
(0.004) (0.027) (0.004) (0.003) (0-003) (0.004) 
R2= (). 21 R2=0.293 R2=0.15 R2 = 0.22 R2=0.17 R, = 0.10 
Notes: 
C is a constant. 
DUM is a dwnniy variable. 
Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
R2 is the adjusted R2. 
Statistical-ly sigruficant at the I% level 
Statistically significant at the 511( level 
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Table 6.2 
Unrestricted Regression Model of Returns Dependent upon Lagged Returns, Price and Value for Equally Weighted Portfolios Classified by Market Value 
Closing Price Data 
Size Sm., dlest 2345 Largest 








Rt-, (, 0.067 0. ()80** 0.141*** 0.158*** 0.147*** 0.099*** 
(0.036) (0.035) (0.038) (0.036) (0.037) (0.039) 




vt-i -0.095*** -0.055** - 0.042 0.054 
(0. () -? 1-) ) (0.026) (0.020) (0.033) 
VV4 0.058** 
(0.023) 
c 0.007 -0.003 0.098 -0.003 0. Offl 
(0.011) «). 000) «). ()19) (0.054) (0.025) (0.000) 
DUM 0.044*** 0.047*** 0.043*** (). 098*** 0.038*** 0.037*** 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.054) (0.004) (0.005) 
R2= 0.205 R' = 0.276 R' = 0.152 
2 R=0.221 R'= 0.185 R' = 0.082 
Notes: 
C is a constant. 
DUM is a dun-nny variable. 
Figures in parenthfscý, are standard en-ors. 
R2 is the adjusted R 2. 
*** Statistically significant at the lY(, level 
** Statistically significant at the 5% level 
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influence of firm size, the touch may contribute to the size of return predictability on 
the market. In the case of weekly price predictability, the predictable Rt-4 has a 
coefficient at least larger for portfolio size I and around 10% larger for portfolio 
size when closing as opposed to bid returns are used. This points to a hypothesis 
that the weekly cycle of significant security prices is exaggerated by the touch, 
especially for small firms. 
C -, I learly a firm size effect is influencing the number of predictable return components 
across portfolios. The reason for this may be to do with the constituent companies of 
each portfolio. For example, large portfolios such as size 6 include securities that are 
more highly traded and so are subject to less mispricing. This is because information 
about them is more widely disseminated and hence they are more efficiently priced. 
It follows therefore, that partly as a result of less information about a security, there 
is greater uncertainty in the market for smaller firms. As a result these firms are less 
frequently traded and are more likely to exhibit return predictability. 
When analysing the price, p, and intrinsic value, v, variables one can see that lag 4 
has coefficients of sin-fflar value but of opposite sign which may point to an 
adjustment component in returns. pt-, and vt-, are prominent for all the smallest (size 
1) and medium (size 3 and 4) portfolios. However, in Table 6.2 the inclusion of the 
bid-ask spread into prices causes the lag I of the dependent variables p, and v, to 
appear in the returns for the second largest (size 5) portfolio. Lag 4 of p, and v, are 
also prominent for the portfolios size 5 indicating some form of weekly adjustment 
in prices. 
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Table 6.3 shows the results of restricting lags I and 4 of p, and v, The prominence 
of the unit lags in p, and vt may mean that a 'conventional' unit ECM components can 
be formed by restricting p, -, = v, -,. 
For all portfolios with a unit ECM component, the 
coefficient is positive. This implies that prices adjust away frorn equilibrium and 
hence there is noise in the returns series. Such mispricing is however a short run 
phenomenon since a Wald X2( I) test that the restriction p, -, = v, -, 
implies homogeneity, 
is accepted for each portfolio at the 51/c level. Another interesting price adjustment 
is in portfolio size 5. Here there is a negative coefficient ECM in lag t-4, again 
implying an adjustment process towards equilibrium around this significant parameter. 
When comparing market value classified portfolios, what again is noticeable is that 
coefficients are larger when closing, as opposed to bid returns are used. This occurs 
across most lags where coefficients of closing priced portfolios are between 1% and ý7 
25% higher. Therefore, while the touch does not explain the predictable behaviour 
in security returns, it does contribute to it. 
Since the touch can induce noise, mispricing, and hence a divergence of price away 
from intrinsic value, especially in smaller securities, it is not surprising that these 
portfolios are characterised by an ECM adjustment process. Under the assumption 
that investors are ma sub-optirnal position one would expect that an adjustment 
parameter (ECM component) would carry a negative coefficient. This in effect would 
be the usual adjustment towards equilibrium for a returns series. 
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Table 6.3 
Wald Tests of the Restrictions that p, = v, hold under the Hypothesis Wald(l) :: ý X 2(l) 
for each of the Equally Weighted Portfolios Classified by Market Value 
Bid Price Data 
size Sim-dIest 23 4 5 Largest 
Restriction 
pt-I Vt-I 0.386 0.046 1.027 0.018 
R-4 Vt-4 0.153 
Closing Price Data 
Size Simillest 23 4 5 Largest 
Restriction 
pt-I Vt-I 0.561 0.012 0.844 0.067 
R-4 Vt-4 0.083 
In summary, the results of the market value weighted portfolios seei-n to suggest that 
weekly and II day predictable cycles in prices are quite prominent. Indeed, this 
cyclical predictability intuitively may support short run weekly calendar anomalies 
docurnented in the previous chapter. Alternatively, weekly calendar anornalies may 
correspond to the institutional arrangements specific to the LSE, such as the settlement 
system which seems to influence the larger sized portfolios. 
The results also indicate that firm size influences the level of return predictability. 
This is because smaller sized portfolios have a larger number of predictable returns 
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components when compared to larger sized portfolios. The effect of using closing as 
opposed to bid prices is also docurnented in these results. This touch or mispricing 
effect ill closing prices increases the size of the coefficients of parameters in the 
returns regression series and so cannot be overlooked as a contributor to seen 
anornalies. 
6.5.3. Results fi)r Poq6Vios Classified by the Touch 
Tables 6.4 - 6.6 show significant coefficients for portfolios classified by touch. When 
compared to the results for market value portfolios, what is immediately obvious is 
that there are fewer significant parameters for touch classified series. Generally, the 
results show that touch sized portfolios are positively related to the number of 
significant variables. Intuitively, following Kaul & Nimalendran (1990), because the 
touch is inversely related to firrn size, large touch portfolios are characterised by small 
ffirns and due to this negative relationship have more predictable returns components. 
Also theoretically, since market makers widen the touch of stocks when they perceive 
them to be more risky, these portfolios may be characterised by a greater number of 
significant predictable variables. 
Closer examination of the results shows that a size effect is present in larger touch, 
smaller market value sized portfolios, where sizes 3, and specifically 4,5, and 6 have 
more significant returns components. Due to the fact that the touch is a measure of 
risk and is inversely related to the level of information, the results indicate that larger 
touch, higher risk, smaller information stocks are characterised by more predictable 
exogenous variables. Interestingly a Rt-4weekly component occurs in medium touch 
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sized firms such as in size 3 and 4. The weekly effect is therefore not exclusively a 
small firm effect, as in the case of market value classified portfolios, but is prominent 
in medium touch, larger firms as well. The coefficient on the weekly component is 
a so positive which is consistent with previous evidence and market value classified 
portfolios. 
The weekly anornaly therefore, may be prominent enough not to be traded away by 
investors who are transacting in more infori-nati on ally efficient portfolios, such as FT- 
SE 100 stocks. In addition, the coefficient on 
R, 
-4 increases by between 5% and 20% 
when closing as opposed to bid prices are used to construct a returns series. The 
inverse is true for the equally weighted size 3 portfolio where the coefficient falls 
from 0.083 to 0.061. Apart from this latter, seerningly unexplainable result, the touch 
contributes to the size of the coefficient of the returns parameter corresponding to a 
weekly effect in this classification of portfolio. Finally, a predictable return variable 
Rt-I occurs in all the portfolios sizes, thus implying that changes in yesterday's prices 
partly determine current prices". Again all the portfolio classifications are 
charactensed by a positive R, -,,, component corresponding 
to an 10 day calendar cycle. 
Overall the value of coefficients increases on the whole when closing (as opposed to 
bid) prices are used. However, the extent of this mispricing is such that the effect of 
the touch contributes an average of around 511c to their coefficients. Again a dummy 
variable DUM as defined in chapter 5 corrects for outliers in the returns series. 
'5 The coefficients on the Rt-, variables implies that between 6.2% and 11.8% of 
present returns are determined by lagged returns. 
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Table 6.4 
Unrestricted Regression Model of Returns Dependent upoi-i Lagged Returns, Price and Value for Equally Weighted Portfolios Classified by the Touch 
Bid Price Data 
Size silildlest 34 Largest 
Rt-, 0,062 0. ()79** 0.118*** (). 098*** 




0.084** 0.109*** 0.082** 
(0.036) (0.038) (0.370) 
Rt-10 0.121 0.141 *** 0.1 W*** 0.118*** 0.097*** 
(0.037) «-)ý036) (0.037) (0.038) (0.036) (0.038) 
Pt-1 0.075*** (-). ()29** 0.062*** 
(0.030) (0.015) (0.023) 
Vt-1 -0.079*** -0.029** -0.062*** (0.030) (0.015) (0.023) 
c 0.025 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.003 
(0.016) «). 0()0) (0.016) «). 0()(» «). 008) 
DUM (). ()42*** (). 045*** 0. (-)39*** 0.038*** 0.045*** 0.048*** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
R' = 0.199 R- = 0.183 R' = 0.203 
2= R 0.138 2= R 0.207 - R' = 0.172 
Notes: 
C is a constant. 
DUM is a durniny variable. 
Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
R22 is the adjusted R. 
*** Statistically significant at the 117( level 
** Statistically sionificant at the ý'/, level 
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Table 6.5 
Unrestricted Regression Model of Returns Dependent upon Lagged Returns, Price and 
Value for Equally Weighted Portfolios Classified by the Touch 
Closing Price Data 
Size Smallest 2345 Largest 
Rt-, 0. ()77** (). 1()()*** 0.069 




R, 0.061 0.124*** 0.087** 
(0.036) (0.037) (0.037) 
Rt-10 0.086** 0.139*** 0.152*** 0.116*** 0.119*** 0.102* ** 
(0.037) (0.037) (0.036) (0.038) (0.036) (0.038) 
p(A 0.077*** 0.059*** 
(0.030) (0.023) 
Vt-1 -0.081*** -0.058*** 
(0.030) (0.023) 
c 0.024 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.003 
(0.016) (0.000) (0.00(» gooo) (0.000) (0.008) 
DUM 0.041*** 0.046*** 0.038*** 0.037*** 0.044*** 0.046*** 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
R2=0.196 R2 158 R2= 0.201 R2=0.1-53 R2=0.170 R2=0.170 
Notes: 
C is a constant. 
DUM is a durnmy variable. 
Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
R2 is the adjusted R2. 
Statistically significant at the PX level 
Statistically significant at the W, level 
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Table 6.6 below shows the ECM i-nodel results for portfolios classified by the touch. 
An imeresting insight into these models is that only a unit ECM parameter is 
promment. Price adjustments, at higher lags are not econornically or statistically 
signi icant. Explanations for this centre on institutional factors. Following Merton Z7, 
(1987). the size of the touch is directly related to the availability of information in the 
market and hence it is the action of market makers which establishes the level of the 
touch for each equity in the market. This action is highly dependent on the volurne 
of shares (a direct measure of information) traded on a transaction by transaction 
basis. It is the constant trading of securities which provides market makers with their 
information and the strength of this information will generally be determined by the 
size of buy and sell order placed with thern. 
Under this frarnework it is easy to see that market makers through the touch can 
rapidly adjust the illiquidity, perhaps representative of investor risk, attached to each 
security as their information set changes. Such rapid adjustment of the touch is not 
possible when portfolios are characterised by market value since price does not 
necessarily change on a transaction by transaction basis. Weed, movement of the 
closing price within the touch may explain the inefficiency of price adjustment shown 
in the higher order ECM components when market value classified portfolios are used. 
Even under the hypothesis of a rapid touch adjustment, sorne of the portfolio returns 
series are still characterised by a positive unit ECM component. This (as before) 
implies a noisy disequilibrium in the price adjustment process, but again the Wald 
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Table 6.6 
Wald Tests of the Restrictions that p, - v, hold under the Hypothesis Wald(l) ,: ý 7,2(l) 
for each of the Equally Weighted Portfolios Classified by the Touch 
Bid Price Data 
size Smallest 1) 345 Largest 
Restriction 
pt-I ý--- Vt-I 2.440 0.0 1 () 0.070 
Closing Price Data 
Size Simdlest 2345 Largest 
Restriction 
Pt-I ::::::: vt-I 2.380 0.190 
X1 (1) test that the restriction p, -, = v, -, 
implies homogeneity is accepted for all 
portfolios. Disequilibrium is therefore a short run phenomenon. 
In conclusion, the results show that an 10-day returns cycle perhaps corresponding to 
an LSE settlement effect is consistent across all sizes of portfolios. Also as the size 
of the touch portfolio classification widens and the information set of securities 
decreases, each portfolio is generally characterised by a greater number of predictable 
return components. The size of the predictable anomalies are also determined by the 
touch which can contribute up to 20% of the returns coefficient. Compared to market 
value classified portfolios, the principle difference in these results is the greater 
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number of predictable returns components in time periods I and 4 and greater 
efficiency in price adjustment around these cycles. Finally, the rapid nature of the 
touch adjustment made by market makers which is reflected in each portfolio 
classification contributes to more efficient pricing and overall to more predictable 
returns components especially for larger touch, smaller sized stocks. 
6.5.4. Results fiv Porýý)Iios Classý` 
, 
fied by Turnover by Volume 
Tables 6.7 - 6.9 show significant predictable parameters of portfolios classified by 
turnover by volurne. Following the theories of portfolio construction reviewed in 
chapter 3, intuitively si-naHer sized securities have a fewer number of shareholders. 
As a result they are characterised by less turnover by volume. Therefore, portfolios 
comprised of these securities have less information in the market and so consequently 
firm size is positively related to the turnover by volume. 
Information signalled through the volume of transactions will have a direct influence 
on the exogenous variables of such classified portfolios. Since information in the 
market is a function of volume, such a classification of portfolio should mimic directly 
investors actions. Therefore, it is not surprising that there are a large number of 
predictable components in each portfolio returns series. If we follow jointly the 
argurnents of Kaul & Nimalendran (1990) who showed the inverse relationship 
between spread and firm size, and Demsetz (1968), who showed that spread is 
inversely related to the number of shareholders and hence the volume of transactions, 
it follows that firm size is positively related to the volume of shares traded. Hence, 
larger volume portfolios are characterised by larger sized equities, and is representative 
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Table 6.7 
Unrestricted Regression Model of Returns Dependent upon Lagged Returns, Price and Value for Equally Weighted Portfolios Classified by Turnover by Volume 
Size Smallest 1) 
Bid Price Data 



















c 0. (-)63** 0.063 
(0.025) (0.017) 






0.125*** ('). 153*** 0.150*** 0.100*** 

















R2 = 0.2-41 R2 = 0.253 R2 = 0.187 R2 = 0.201 R2 =: 0.145 R2=0.107 
Notes: 
C is a constant. 
DUM is a dununy variable. 
Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
R' Is the adjusted R'-. 
*** Statistically significant at the, Hk level 
** Statistically significant at the W, level 
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Table 6.8 
Unrestricted Regression Model of Returns Dependent upon Lagged Returns, Price and 
Value for Equally Weighted Portfolios Classified by Turnover by Volume 
Closing Fý-ice Data 
Sue Smallest 34 Largest 
0.133*** 0.093 0.128*** 

























0.156*** 0.127*** 0.152*** 














C 0.060** 0.064*** 0.015 0.022 -0.000 -0.000 
(0.026) (0.004) (0.016) (0.017) ((-). 00()) (0.0()0) 
DUM 0.031*** 0.052*** 0.046*** 0.045 *** (). ()5()*** 0.033*** 
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0-023) 
R2= 0.261 R2=0.249 R2=0.211 R2= 0.201 R2=0.147 R2=0.265 
Notes: 
Figures in parentheses are standard errors. C is a co nstant 
R2 is the adjusted R'. DUM is a dummy variable. 
Statistically significant at the 1% level 
Statistically significant at the 5% level 
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of a firm stze effect. It follows then that small volurne portfolios are small in market 
value. Under this frarnework one can see that larger volurne portfolios should have 
a smaller number of significant parameters. 
In addition. when volurne classified portfolios are constructed using closing, as 
opposed to bid prices the exogenous positive variable R, -4 
becornes significant. This 
implies specifically that the weekly effect is a function of the touch in sized 3 
portfolios. Unlike market value and touch classifications of portfolios, the use of 
closing returns does not significantly contribute to the value of the coefficients of 
higher order significant variables. However, the use of closing returns as opposed to 
bid returns reveals one R, -3 variable 
for the smallest sized portfolio at the 5% level. 
Clearly, this is due to mispricing in security returns and hence is the consequence of 
a touch effect. Finally, the last main statistically significant anomaly is that 
coiTesponding to R, -, (, 
(the two week cycle) which is significant in all the portfolios. 
Results of the tests of the restrictions that p, =v,, and hence that an ECM representation 
of the portfolios can be formed, are shown in Table 6.9. The ECM results, as well 
as showing a firm (or volume) size effect generally across portfolios, also exhibit 
higher order ECM parameters. Consistent with market value classified models, t-4 
parameters are only present in small volume sized portfolios. Portfolios sized I have 
a positive ECM t-4 variable which corresponds to a cyclical price adjustment. What 
is potentially more interesting is the Wald X2(1) test of the restriction Pt-4 = Vt-4. fails 
at the 5% level for portfolios sized 1. This implies that there is a long run permanent 
disequilibrium in the cyclical price adjustment process. Given this is in a portfolio 
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Table 6.9 
Wald Tests of the Restrictions that p, = v, hold under the Hypothesis Wald(l) 7,2(j) 
for each of the Equally Weighted Portfolios Classified by Turnover by Volume 
Bid Price Data 

















characterised by a small information set, investors may seek out such anomalies since 
they may be profitable. 
More meaningful is the result of the Wald X2( I) test that the restriction p, -, = v, I 
for 
portfolios sized 2, is rejected at the I% level. Again, since this disequilibriurn occurs 
in smaller portfolios it could be the result of a small information set and hence mis- 
information by investors as to the adjustment process of prices. All the other Wald 
tests of equality between pt-, and vt-I are accepted at the 5% level. 
In summary, the results suggest that portfolios classified by turnover by volurne (a 
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direct measure of information) experience a firm size effect, and that parameters in 
R, 
4 (corresponding to the weekly period) occur only in smaller firms. The Rt-4 
predictable variable in size 4 portfolio occurs when closing as opposed to bid returns 
are used. This is a product of the touch effect documented previously. The Rj() 
predictable components corresponding to a two week cycle occurs across all portfolios, 
and permanent disequilibria in the ECM variable is common to the portfolios size I 
(in period t-4) and portfolios size 2 (in period t-1). This disequilibria may mean that 
investors may be able to seek out profitable investment opportunities corresponding 
to daily and 4 day calendar anornaly effects. 
6.6. CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter airns to test for return predictability on the LSE using a model of partial 
price adjustment which evolves from a restricted multi-lag linear regression model. 
The robustness of the model was tested using three classifications of portfolios that 
reflect differing economic influences including, a firm size effect, liquidity or touch 
effect and a turnover by volume effect. 
The results indicate that a positive R, -,,, component 
is prominent across all the sizes 
and classifications of portfolios. This indicates that a two week predictable return 
cycle may be prominent in the market. This predictability may support previous 
findings of a settlement effect on the LSE investigated in chapter 5, and supported by 
Jaffe & Westerfield (1985) and Condoyanni, O'Hanlon & Ward (1987) amongst 
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others. However, because the data is essentially undated, care should be taken when 
making such an interpretation since we do not know what day of the week 
corresponds to Rt-,, ), 
In addition, the use of closing, as opposed to bid prices, does generally increase the 
size of the coefficients of predictable variables and contributes between 1% and 25% 
to return predictability. This touch influence is, however, rnore prominent in smaller 
sized portfolios and especially for variables corresponding to the weekly anomaly. 
Pricing efficiency therefore may be a function of the touch and the pricing mechanism 
in stocks. Even though weekly anomaly variables are only found in smaller firms they 
are generally not a product of the touch. This is not the case for portfolios sized 4 
classified by turnover by volume where the use of closing returns causes the 
emergence of a weekly returns component. The touch therefore in this case is a 
determinant of the weekly effect. 
Large sized, lower risk, larger information classified portfolios in accordance with the 
theoretical market value - touch- volume relationship generally have homogeneous 
results. Clearly, portfolio classification does not influence return predictability on the 
market, Also, mispricing in the form of an ECM price adjustment component 
represented by the restriction p, =v, in the portfolios is not just confined to small sized 
portfolios and is not a product of the micro structure. 
In summary, the results point to the prominence of daily and weekly predictability on 
the LSE, and are to sorne extent dependent on firin size and micro structure. Overall, 
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predictability is fairly consistent across different types of portfolios which reinforces 
the justification for their existence. 
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7. RETURN PREDICTABILITY AND AUTOCORRELATION: 
NONSYNCHRONOUS TRADING EXPLANATIONS. 
7.1. INTRODUCTION 
The results in the previous chapter suggest that there is substantial short-horizon 
portfolio return predictability across differing classifications of portfolios in the UK. 
Nevertheless, there is a body of evidence to suggest that such return predictability is 
in sorne ways dependent upon infrequent or 'thin' trading in security return S66. More 
precisely and following Miller, Muthuswamy & Whaley (1992) we can distinguish 
between 'non-trading' and 'nonsynchronous trading' as explanations of return 
predictability. The former implies infrequent trading at the close and/or in other time 
intervals, while the latter implies infrequent trading only at the close. Scholes & 
Williams (1977), Perry (1985) and Shanken (1987) are earlier examples of the 
latter 67 . The terms will, 
however, be used interchangeably here. 
As Perry (1985) for example, has shown, nonsynchronous trading comes about when 
some of the constituent shares in a portfolio do not trade at every closing tirne 
imerval. Portfolios which are subject to such trading may contain 'stale' prices. The 
observed portfolio return as a result, does not reflect its true value. Such so-called 
" The first main proponent of 'thin' trading was Fisher (1966). 
67 Additionally there is much evidence of non-trading in the guise of 
nonsynchronous trading. See Fisher (1966), Dirnson (1979), Lo & MacKinlay (1990) 
and Stoll & Whaley (1990) for example. 
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thinty traded stocks may react to information with a time tag. This generates positive 
autocorrelation in observed portfolio returns and consequently may create false 
interpretations about portfolio return predictability. 
Evidence on the effects of nonsynchronous trading has recently made a resurgence in 
the financial economics literature. Initially, this evidence was confined to problems 
ot measuring etas in the market model [see, as examples Schwartz & Whitcomb 
(1977), Scholes & Williams (1977) and Dirnson (1979)]. The more recent literature 
is concerned with the influence of nonsynchronous trading on portfolio return 
predictability [see Lo & MacKinlay (1990a, 1990b), Sentana & Wadhwani (1992), 
Boudoukh, Richardson & Whitelaw (1993) to narne but a few]. Clearly, of interest 
here is the fact that apparent portfolio return predictability may occur due to the 
effects of nonsynchronous trading. 
In this chapter we test for the presence of nonsynchronous trading in each of the 
constructed portfolios classified by market value, touch and turnover by volume shown 
in the previous chapter. Moreover, we examine the first-order autocorrelation 
coefficient. If all the securities in a portfolio have the sarne non-trading probability 
this coefficient following, Lo & MacKinlay (1990b), shows the probability of trading 
infrequency. Nonsynchronous trading of this nature cornes about because smaller, less 
frequently traded firms react with a lag to market wide information, whereas larger, 
more frequently traded portfolios react more immediately to the same information. 
Secondly, we also test for any cross-correlation effects between portfolios. 
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Examination of the cross-correlations between differing sizes of portfolios indicates 
that the cross-effects range between I% and 15 % and that there is an asymmetric lead- 
lag effect between smaller and (lagged) larger portfolios. Following Boudoukh et al 
Mech (1993) and Lo & MacKinlay (1990b), we can say that any substantial 
cross-correlations between small and lagged large sized portfolios may indicate 
delayed security price reaction and hence nonsynchronous trading in the smaller sized 
portfolios. 
As well as examining levels of correlation in portfolio returns, we also re-examine the 
portfolio return predictability question by re-estirnating the results from chapter 6. 
This time, following Miller et al (1992) we adjust the variables for the effects of 
nonsynchronous trading. Initially only weekly and 10 day return predictability 
remains after adjusting for these effects. Even the imposition of the touch onto prices 
devoid of such effects only slightly increases the strength of return predictability. The 
effect of using nonsynchronous trading consistent parameters also causes the value of 
the adjusted R, to fall from an average of 2()'/(-. to around 311c. This implies that the 
independent variables have little or no predictive power and therefore make it difficult 
to really profit from predictable trading. We can conclude that the results lend support 
to the loyalist explanation of market efficiency. 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: section 7.2 examines the literature 
on nonsynchronous trading and portfolio correlation, with section 7.3 showing tests 
for portfolio correlation and a simple model that adjusts for the effects of thin trading 
in portfolio returns. Section 7.4 shows autocorrelation and cross-autocorrelation 
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evidence of nonsynchronous trading as well as the results from testing for 
nonsynchronous consistent portfolio returns, with section 7.5 concluding. 
1 7.2. EVIDENCE OF NONSYNCHRONOUS TRADING 
As we have docurnented in the overview of the literature, the theory of 
nonsynchionous trading in portfolio returns due to so-called 'thinness' in trading was 
perhaps ggiven most prominence by Fisher (1966). Infrequent trading by sorne of the Z7 
constituent companies of a portfolio may cause closing prices to lag behind more 
frequently traded stocks. This 'thinness' in trading will lead to positive first-order 
autocorrelation between portfolio returns which may imply predictability in portfolio 
returns. Given the nonsynchronous trading problern, and the prominence of the daily, 
weekly and two weekly predictability shown in chapter 6, attaching meaning to 
portfolio correlations remains a hurdle. Following Boudoukh et al's (1993) debate 
about the strength of any correlation and hence predictability in portfolio returns, we 
are going to examine the loy(j. 1ist school in reviewing the evidence on nonsynchronous 
trading. 
Evidence of the loyalist belief that short run predictability measured by autocorrelation 
and/or cross-correlation is econornically spurious is supported by many studies and 
clearly has implications for the strength of any predictability found in the previous 
chapter. Perry (1985) was one of the first to examine explanations for serial 
correlation in portfolio returns. He found that this correlation is larger for a portfolio 
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of large sized firms than for the sun-i of the correlations of the individuals firms that 
make up the portfolio so contradicting the theory of nonsynchronicity in smaller firm 
portfolios. 
Perry also shows that as the number of constituent firms in both smaller and larger 
firm portfolios rises, correlation levels rise to a maximurn of 26% and 20% 
respectively. The implication of this is that factors other than nonsynchronous trading 
contribute to portfolio serial correlation. From the loyalist perspective, this could 
mean measurement errors such as the bid-ask spread in security returns as well as 
institutional structures contribute to portfolio serial correlation, and therefore return 
predictability. 
In related work, Atchinson, Butler & Simonds (1987) use the Scholes & Williams 
(1977) (SW) model of nonsynchronous trading in order to compare the implied 
theoretical portfolio autocorrelation with the observed market autocorrelation on the 
NYSE. SW is one of the first well known studies that documented the biases in betas 
calculated on a daily basis and over other fixed intervals. SW show that 
nonsynchronous consistent estimates of the intercept and slope coefficients of the 
market model can be derived by specifying, in their words "the directions and 
magnitudes of these asymptotic biases .... and then [using thern to construct] consistent 
estimators of alpha and beta. " The estimators can then be applied to daily returns in 
each of the portfolios used, to get nonsynchronous consistent results. 
In SW tests for return predictability Atchinson et al use and derive the first-order 
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autocoffelation of portfolio transaction (rather than true) returns as 
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where i#j. x, is the set of weights applied to each portfolio which in (7.3) are not 
equal. 
In order to account for the nonsynchronous trading problem, SW assume that 
transactions for each security follow a Poisson process with a transaction arrival rate 
ki. They establish the relationship between transaction returns parameters [shown in 
(7.3)] and the variance-covariance matrix of true unobservable returns. This is given 
in (7.4) to (7.12) below 
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Applying the covariance equation of true returns below (derived from the market 
model) to (7.3), 
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along with the SW relationships between true and transaction- based returns shown in 
(7.4) to (7.11), the following nonsynchronous trading consistent transaction-based 
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Var(R,,,, ) is the variance of the market index, and 0,6,7, and u, are functions 
of ki the transaction arrival rate shown above and the coefficients of variation vi = 
G(Rit)/E(Rit). 
In the SW study it was found that 0 was close to 1, and 6 was close to zero. This 
meant that true and measured variances and autocovariances were very similar. 
However, Atchinson et al imply that 7 does not have to be close to one and as a result 
observed covariances may understate true covariances. Also given (x#O, this implies 
the first-order cross-covariances could be present and true betas appeared not to be 
related to transaction arrival rates. Therefore, when n is large, the value weighted 
portfolio autocorrelation becomes 
Corr(, = 
x X. Oc 
(7.14) 
x. x. 7, y, EE1jx, 
1=11=1 
where i#ýj . The model 
in (7.14) implies that as n rises the level of positive 
autocorrelation rises depending on the sizes of (x and y. 
Atchison et al ( 1987) used the SW model of nonsynchi-onous consistent autocorrelation 
for value and equally weighted portfolios indices of NYSE and CRSP data as well as 
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a self constructed 280 firm NYSE portfolio". Their results indicate that the 280 firm 
sample portfolio experiences comparable autocorrelation when compared to the NYSE 
and CRSP indices. Furthermore, the equally weighted portfolios have a correlation 
approximately twice as high as for the value weighted portfolio. This difference in 
correlation would be expected given that smaller sized securities (which generally 
experience higher autocorrelation due to infrequent trading) in a portfolio have the 
same weighting as larger, more frequently traded securities. 
The results indicate that measures of observed autocorrelation rise to much higher 
levels than is predicted by the theoretical rnodel in (7.14) as the number of firms in 
the portfolio rises. This rise in autocorrelation seerns to occur as the portfolio- 
variance associated with non-market risk falls. However, even after using the 
nonsynchronous consistent SW model of transaction returns, autocorrelation of the 
order of 1511c remains. Clearly, other factors are contributing to autocorrelation. 
Followers of the loyalist argurnent would suggest that trading mechanism frictions and 
delayed information processing may account for this remaining predictability. Finally, 
although we do not specifically compute the autocoiTelation in the adjusted manner 
as suggested by SW in this chapter, we do adjust correlations, although along different 
lines. 
In a similar study Berglund & Li1jeblorn (1988) test for index correlation by 
comparing the serial correlation of the market index and individual securities on the 
" The equally weighted correlation equation is not shown here but is shown in 
equations (7) and (9) in Atchinson et al (1987), p 114. 
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Helsinki Stock Exchange. Reported fii-st-order market index autocorrelatioii proved 
to be greater than the average first-order serial correlation across i individual stocks on 
the market ii-iainly due to institutional structures operating in the Helsinki market. 
More specifically, the procedure of 'calling out' security transaction prices during the 
first half of the day, one by one frorn a list, has the effect of causing lags in security 
returns which are at the end of the list. This contributes to serial correlation in the 
market index. Furthermore, under the SW model, randorn nonsynchronous trading 
effects were also found to be present perhaps due to closed market effects, or even the 
clustering of transactions during the day. Any remaining serial correlation was 
theorised to be caused by delays in incorporating information into share prices. 
Not content to just examine market correlations, Lo & MacKinlay (1988) in the US, 
test for the random walk hypothesis with weekly data using variance ratio analysis. 
Consistent with previous studies they find return predictability in market indices 
induced by significant positive serial correlation. For individual stocks insignificant 
negative serial correlation, the opposite effect, was docurnented. This supports the 
hypothesis that the procurability of company- specific information on individual 
securities makes it difficult to forecast returns. However, the formation of portfolios 
tends to diminish this 'idiosyncratic' noise and makes returns more predictable. 
Further tests of the randorn walk hypothesis for differing market value sized portfolios 
dernonstrated greater serial correlation for smaller sized portfolios (up to 49%) than 
for larger sized portfolios (as low as 9%) High levels of predictability may be 
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hiduced by biases associated with nonsynchronous trading. As we have already seen, 
due to infrequent trading, smaller sized portfolios may react with a lag to information 
in the market when compared to larger more frequently traded portfolios. It is this 
lat., which induces positive serial correlation, and hence not necessarily any 'true' 
predictability in the returns process. 
Lo and MacKinlay explain the theory behind the nonsynchronous trading problem as 
one that is determined by the cumulation of returns over a non-trading period. 
Cumulated returns exhibited spuriously induced correlations due to the non-trading lag. 
By specifying a probability model (Bernoulli trial) they are able to detern-iine the 
magnitude of autocorrelation under different probabilities of a trade in a security. 
Under this contrived test for nonsynchronous trading their results indicate that weekly 
first-order autocorrelation ranges from 2.1 when the probability of non-trading is 
1017c, to 171/c autocorrelation under the unrealistic assumption of a 50% probability of 
a non-trade. Consequently, Lo and MacKinlay rejected the random walk hypothesis, 
not solely because of the nonsynchronous trading problem, but because of the loyalist 
n-ýispricing explanations for correlations in portfolio returns. 
In a later paper, Lo & MacKinlay (1990a) refined their nonsynchronous trading 
explanation of return predictability by examining the overreaction problem in terms 
of contrarian investment strategies. Most of the literature on portfolio overreaction 
had documented negative autocorrelation as evidence for some form of mean-reverting 
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behaviour in stock returns". Lo and MacKinlay approach this issue from another 
angle by examining cross-autocorrelation effects in portfolios. 
Evidence of these correlations enable positive expected profits to be made frorn a 
contrarian investment strategy. Positive autocorrelation can occur due to cross- 
correlation effects for the following reason. Let us assurne that there are two stocks 
in a market A and B. Suppose stock A has a high return today. A contrarian 
strategist will therefore sell A today and buy B. However, if A and B are positively 
correlated, a high return for A today will mean a high return for B tomorrow. Hence, 
by holding B for more than a day, a contrarian can profit without there being any 
overreaction in the market. What is interesting from this study is that these cross- 
effects generally always occur when large firms lead smaller sized firmS70 . Therefore 
it is the lead-lag behaviour (i. e. nonsynchronous trading) between differing sized 
portfolios that seerns to determine contrarian investment strategies. 
Similarly, Lo & MacKinlay (1990b) construct estimators that measure the non-trading 
effects in stock returns and again test for rejections of the random walk hypothesis. 
Their approach tries to model non-trading under the assumption of stochastic time 
intervals. This framework allows the formation of expressions of the mean, variance 
and covariance of observed returns as a function of the non-trading process and shows 
" See Poterba & Summers (1986) and Fama & French (1987) for two of the best 
known examples. 
'0 Since these cross-effects may contribute to positive autocorrelation, which 
implies nonsynchronous trading, tests later in this chapter provide further evidence of 
the influence of thin trading by examining the extent of these cross-effects in our own 
portfolios. 
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a simple estimate for the probability of non-trading. Lo and MacKinlay show that the 
following ratio detern-ýines the degree of nonsynchronicity in security returns, where 
the relative likelihood of security i trading more frequently than security j is given by 
the ratio of the (ij)th autocovariance with the 0j)th autocovariance. Hence, the 
degree of nonsynchronicity is determined through the degree of asymmetry in the 
autocovanance returns matrix. 
In order to derive a model of nonsynchronous trading Lo and MacKinlay use 'virtual' 
or 'true' continuously compounded returns that follow a stochastic process. Here it 
is assurned that the observed return is just the surn of virtual returns from all past 
consecutive periods that did not trade. This enables the characteristics of 
nonsynchronous trading; inu-nediate price adjustment of frequently traded stocks and 
lagged price adjustment of thinly traded stocks to news, to be captured in a model. 
Their results indicate that there is a lead-lag pattern of larger stocks leading smaller 
stocks. This indicates that nonsynchronous trading is present and supports the positive 
autocoff elation found in the indices. 
Conrad, Kaul & Nimalendran (1991) try to reconcile Lo & MacKinlay's (1988,1990a 
and 1990b) results of negative correlation in individual security returns and positive 
portfolio autocorrelation. Here the assumption is that securities are rnade up of a 
positively autocorrelated common component as well as a negatively autocorrelated 
idiosyncratic component related to the bid-ask spread, and a white noise component. 
Under this framework, Conrad et al (1991) show that for NASDAQ weekly returns, 
the expected common component reflects asymmetric lagged cross-correlations 
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between large and small firms and that the bid-ask spread can explain the individual 
g neptive autocorrelation in security returns, which is consistent with Roll (1984). This 
suggests that evidence of nonsynchronous trading is prominent after taking account 
of the effects of the touch in returns. The tests in this chapter hope to show that 
prices, devoid of the influence of the touch, exhibit nonsynchronous trading and 
therefore confirm that portfolios are not characterised by any sizeable amount of 
negative autocorrelation. 
More recently Sentana & Wadhwani (1992) in their US/UK study also segregate the 
pretence between ne. gative and positive autocorrelation. Their results suggest that 
when stock price volatility is low, short run stock returns exhibit positive serial 
correlation and when volatility is high, returns exhibit negative autocorrelation due to 
the influence of positive feedback trading on prices. Positive feedback trading is 
greater following price declines, rather than price rises and when volatility changes 
reduced nonsynclironous trading may cause changing autocorrelation. This is 
consistent with results in chapter 6 showing greater levels of return predictability for 
smaller firi-n-sized portfolios. Clearly, given this scenario we should expect 
nonsynchronous trading consistent returns not to exhibit return predictability, 
especially in small firm-sized portfolios. 
Although not formally tested in either this or the previous chapter, evidence of 
seasonality in autocorrelation patterns may help to explain the weekly predictability 
prominent in our results. To this end, Bessenbinder & Hertzel (1993) in the US find 
that there is a high positive correlation between Friday and Monday equity returns, 
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and similarly on the day before and the day after holiday periods. Also, an inverse 
relationship exists between autocorrelation and firm size for equally weighted 
portfolios. Additionally, there appears to be a high negative correlation between the 
second day after a non-trading period with returns the day ii-m-nediately after the non- 
trading period. This correlation is higher than any other lagged correlation and 
implies that there is a price reversal in this period. 
Also, the AR(l) coefficient on a Monday following either a Friday or Saturday 
dramatically exceeds the average AR(l) coefficient on other days. Also, the last day 
of the week, either a Friday or Saturday, is characterised by high AR(l) coefficients. 
Therefore, autocorrelation patterns are dependent upon the proximity to non-trading 
days rather than to the day of the week. Clearly, such evidence points to evidence of 
high predictability on a Monday and hence perhaps to cyclical weekly predictability 
sliydlar to that documented in chapter 6. 
In contradiction, these seasonal patterns of autocorrelation do not seem consistent with 
evidence of positive autocorrelated induced nonsynchronous trading, but perhaps due 
to market makers behaviour. Following Admati & Pfleiderer (1989), market makers 
are presumed to try and encourage discretionary liquidity buyers and sellers to trade 
in different periods. The consequence of this behaviour is that price movements in 
periods following concentrated trading, will tend to reverse price movements in 
previous trading periods thus pointing to return predictability. Additionally, a naive 
trading strategy may be possible given that Bessenbinder and Hertzel show that if the 
prior days returns are positive then investors should buy on Fridays, Saturdays and 
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Mondays. If the prior days returns are negative then investors should sell on these 
days. With regard to Tuesdays, investors should sell if Monday's returns are positive, 
or buy if Monday's returns are negative and on Wednesdays and Thursdays investors 
should buy. This is one of the first studies that shows explicit predictability in 
portfolio returns that is not dependent upon the effects of nonsynchronous trading. 
In a review study of autocorrelation patterns in short-horizon stock returns, Boudoukh, 
Richardson & Whitelaw (1993) identify a debate between the loyalist, revisionist and 
heretic school of explanations for return predictability which has already been 
highlighted. Of the issues in this review paper, what is of most interest to this chapter 
are the authors' questions about the strength of any cross- autocoff elation between 
portfolios. They suggest that the strength of any cross-effects, perhaps is determined 
by the level of contemporaneous correlation between small and large sized portfolios. 
Clearly, under this scenario lagged large firms portfolios may be just proxying for 
small firm portfolio's lagged returns if this correlation is high. 
In order to examine this issue, Boudoukh et al (1993) consider how asymmetry in 
cross- autocorrelations arise by using an AR(l) model [see Lo & MacKinlay (1990a, 
1990b)] of nonsynchronous trading. This is given as 
R, 
t = oc,. + 
01-R,. 
t_l + elt 
(7.15) 
where the unexpected shocks F-j, are conternporaneously correlated across size 
portfolios. This implies that lagged returns on a portfolio completely describe 
conditional expected returns on that portfolio and Ri,, -, are 
lagged returns reflecting 
stale prices. Lo & MacKinlay (1990a) show that portfolio returns can 
be represented 
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This enables first-order cross- autocorrelations between returns i, and lagged returns 
to be calculated in terms of i's first-order cross-autocorrelation and the 
contemporaneous correlation between i and j, as shown in (7.17) below 
Corr(R,,, Rjt_l )= Corr(R, 
, Rjýt) * Corr(R,, R,, -, 
) (7.17) 
where Rit and R,,, are the transaction or bid return on portfolios i and j respectively. 
This implies that given a high level of contemporaneous correlation, cross-effects may 
still be prominent. This, however, is not necessarily evidence of nonsynchronous 
trading since large sized portfolios may be proxying for smaller-sized portfolios. 
Under these assumptions, it is the level of autocorrelation within portfolios that is 
important, given that high levels of cross-autocorrelation are possible even though the 
information set is constant across large and small sized portfolios. Boudoukh et al 
prove this over-estimation of cross-autocorrelation effects, and so imply 
autocorrelation is the stronger indicator of infrequent trading. 
As we have already seen from the loyalist perspective short run predictability 
measured by portfolio autocorrelation or cross-correlation can be seen as evidence of 
nonsynchronous trading. Given the prominence of these predictability measures we 
shall examine the strength of this correlation for our own constructed portfolios. Also, 
since the previous chapter docurnents significant portfolio predictability, there is the 
J 
question as to whether this predictability is dependant on the influence of 
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nonsynchronous trading. Hence, following Miller et al (1992), we can test for 
predictable returns by using nonsynchronous consistent parameter estimations. The 
theory suggests that portfolio return predictability should be nullified when using 
nonsynchronous consistent parameters. These issues are addressed in the next section. 
7.3. MODELLING RETURN PREDICTABILITY ADJUSTIN(ir FOR 
NONSYNCHRONOUS TRADINC'r 
7.3.1. Tests fbr Nonsynchronous Trading in Porýfolio Returns 
Much of the literature 7' establishes short run predictability in portfolio returns by 







R, l )/ 
Var(R,,, ) (7.18) 
where Rit is the transaction or bid return on a portfolio in time t. Here the level of 
autocorrelation measures the degree of non-trading in portfolio returns. More 
formally, Lo & MacKinlay (I 990a) show that the degree of non-trading is the sarne 
as the AR(l) coefficient from (7.15) above. 
Additionally, as we have seen, cross-autocorrelations between returns on a small sized 
portfolio, i, and lagged returns on a large sized portfolio, j, also indicates short run 
return predictability and is indicative of nonsynchronous trading. This is because 
news released to the market will affect stocks that trade more frequently first (i. e. 
" See Lo & MacKinlay (I 990a) for example. 
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larger firm size stocks). However, for smaller-sized more thinly traded portfolios, 
news will be delayed, causing lagged adjustment in returns. Cross-correlations in this 
scenario are just proxying for the level of nonsynchronous trading between differing 
portfolios. and are known as the empirical cro s s- correlations. 
Confirmation of the lead-lag relationship from larger sized firms to smaller sized firms 
is shown by the asymmetry of the cross-effects between portfolios. Clearly, the 
criteria for nonsynchronous trading consistent lead-lag behaviour is if lagged larger- 
sized portfolio returns lead si-naller-sized portfolio returns. This cornes about when 
the upper quadrant above the diagonal of the correlation matrix has higher cross- 
correlations values. 
Following Boudoukh et al (1993) the AR(l) model shown above in (7.15) implies that 
unexpected shocks Fit are conternporaneously correlated across size portfolios and 
therefore implies that own lagged returns on a portfolio completely describe 
conditional expected returns on that portfolio. As we have seen frorn (7.16) portfolio 
returns can be represented by an infinite order moving average disturbance term. This 
enables first-order cross- autocorrelation s to be calculated in terms of first-order cross- 
autocorrelation and the contemporaneous coiTelation as shown in (7.17). This suggests 
that given a high level of contemporaneous correlation, cross-effects may still be 
prominent, but as we have seen this is not necessarily evidence of nonsynchronous 
trading. What is important is the level of autocorrelation within portfolios since this 
is a stronger indicator of infrequent trading. Both the implied and absolute cross- 
correlations are examined for our own constructed portfolios subsequently. 
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7.3.2. A Simple Model that Adjusts Portfi)lio Returlis for Nonsynchronous Trading 
We already know that portfolio construction can induce significant positive correlation 
in returns and so perhaps give erroneous estimates of return predictability. Therefore, 
following Miller et al (1992) we caii derive a test that estimates nonsynchronous 
consistent returns. This involves fitting an AR(l) model to daily data where 
R, = ul. + OIRI,, + el, t 
(7.19) 
The estimated residuals, F-i,, from (7.19) are then used to generate nonsynch-ronous 
consistent estimates of portfolio i's returns, r^j, , as follows 
= /(1 -) (7.20) 
These consistent estimates can then be substituted for observed portfolio returns and 
so purging them of measurement errors (observed correlations) due to nonsynchronous 
trading. The model assurnes that the parameter 0 (which measures trading frequency) 
is constant across days of the week, contrary to evidence 12 of deviations in trading 
volume throughout the week. 
7.3.3. An Adjusted Model of Return Predictability 
The tests for return predictability in chapter 6 suggest that portfolio returns can be 
specified in the form of a dynarnic linear regression model with multiple lags as 
shown in 7.21 below 
tn rn M 
Rt = oco + 1: oc, R, _,. 
+ 1: p, p, -,. 
+E yj v, -,. + et 
(7.21) 
i . =I i=O 1. =o 
where R, , p, and v, represent 
the logarithms of returns (including dividends), price and 
" See Lakonishok & Maberly (1990) in the US. 
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intrinsic value respectively in time t, and et is an error term. Tests of this model 
(shown in chapter 6') indicate that some parameters, notably weekly and two weekly 
returns and daily price and value components are predictable across many of the 
portfolios. 
However, in this chapter we use nonsynchronous trading consistent variables to re- 
estimate returns, Rj, and price, p,,, in order to test for portfolio predictability. Hence, 
we re-adjust the variables in (7.21) subject to (7.20), the nonsynchronous trading 
consistent parameters model, (7.2 1) then becornes 
(7.22) 




j=I i' =o i=O 
with r", p", v and F- being the nonsynchronous trading consistent returns, prices, intrinsic 
value and unexpected shock to portfolio i's returns, respectively. Hence, under these 
assumptions about the dependent variables we would expect that any return 
predictability would be nullified when we test (7.22). 
7.4. RESULTS OF TESTING FOR PREDICTABLE PORTFOLIO RETURNS 
AFTER ADJUSTING"r FOR NONSYNCHRONOUS TRADING 
7.4.1. The Results of Tests for Nonsynchronous Trading in Porlfblio Returns 
As we have already seen from the loyalist perspective, short-horizon return 
predictability and cross-correlation (lead-lag relationships between portfolios) can be 
seen as evidence of nonsynchronous trading. The results in Table 7.1 show that 
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portfolio,, returns are predictable since the first-order autocorrelation coefficient 
is Prominent. This coefficient is generally positive and ranges between 16.2% for the 
smallest closing priced market value portfolio to 1.2% for the largest bid priced 
market value portfolio. Furthermore, the smallest touch classified portfolio is one of 
the few portfolios that has weak negative correlation (around -2%). This is perhaps 
not surprising given that Conrad, Kaul & Nimalendran (199 1) found that the bid-ask 
spread causes negative autocorrelation in security returns. Hence, our results indicate 
that the touch classification could be introducing negative autocorrelation into the 
portfolio returns series, 
Furthermore, it is evident that the degree of predictability falls as portfolio size 
increases. For the touch classified portfolios, of course, the largest touch classified 
portfolio is also a small firm sized portfolio. So, in this case the predictability 
relationship is inverted. Moreover, portfolio returns that include the touch (i. e. 
closing returns rather than bid returns) are generally characterised by higher levels of 
autocorrelation. Indeed for the market value classified portfolios the touch can 
account for up to 30% of return predictability, but less so for the other classifications 
of portfolios. 
Even though return predictability is quite prominent in sorne of the smaller sized 
portfolios its does not seem as strong as sorne of the docurnented evidence from the 
US would suggest. Specifically, Lo & MacKinlay (1990a) found 33% predictability 
in small sized portfolios. Explanations for the lower level of first-order 
autocorrelation may be data specific, since only securities from the alpha classification 
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of stocks (the most frequently traded) were used to construct portfolios. 
Table 7.1 also shows that when the autocorrelation in portfolio returns is adjusted for 
the effects of nonsynchronous trading, due to Miller et al (1992), the level of 
autocorrelation, in this case, p^, falls to around +/- 1% for each size and classification 
of portfolio. Of the 36 sizes and classifications of portfolios considered, 23 
experienced a change in the sign of the observed autocorrelation from positive to 
negative when nonsynchronous trading consistent returns are used. Therefore, these 
results support the current literature highlighted in section 7.2, that implies that 
nonsynchronous trading induces positive autocorrelation in portfolio returns and so 
supports the loyalist explanation of shoft-horizon portfolio return predictability. 
Nonsynchronous trading also occurs due to the lead-lag relationship between size- 
sorted portfolios. Following Lo & MacKinlay (1990a), who found that larger stocks 
lead smaller stocks, but not vice versa, we have examined the estimated cross- 
autocorrelation effects between each of the portfolios. The middle panel of Tables 7.2 
to 7.4 shows that there is lead-lag relationship in these estimated cross- 
autocorrelations. In one or two instances the cross-autocorrelation is negative implying 
that perhaps the effects of the touch dominate any nonsynchronous trading effectS73. 
Nevertheless, this is not the norm, since the results support positive cross- 
autocorrelation that ranges between 1% to 15%. We can hence say that the level of 
73 Conrad, Kaul & Nimalendran (1991) show that the influence of the bid-ask 




Estimated First-order Autocorrelation (p, ) and Nonsynchronous Consistent First-order 
Autocorrelation( ,) for Equally Weighted Portfolios p 
Market Value Classification 
size Sin'Alest 2 34 5 Uirgest 
Bid Price Data 
Pi 0,144 0.053 0.093 0.045 0.052 0.012 
(0.040) (0.040) ((). (-)4(-)) (0.040) (0.040) 
A 
Pi 0.009 0.014 -0.005 0.002 -0.006 -0.021 
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
Closing Price Data 
Pi 0.162 0.069 0.093 0.043 0.051 0.009 
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
A 
p] 0.010 0.014 -0.008 -0.001 -0.009 -0.008 
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
Touch Classification 
Size Smallest 2 34 5 Largest 
Bid Price Data 
Pi -0.020 0.073 0.047 0.075 0.113 0.092 
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
A 
pi 0.003 -0.007 -(-). (-)3() -0.019 -0.021 -0.033 
(o. 040) ((.: ). 04(-)) (0.040) (0.0-40) (0.040) (0.040) 
Closing Price Data 
Pi -0.023 0.073 0.053 0.065 
0.121 0.101 
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
A 
p 0.001 -0.017 -0.010 0.012 -0.004 -0.009 ] (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
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Table 7.1 cont. 
Turnover by Volume Classification 
size SmIdlest 2 3 4 5 Largest 
Bid Price Data 
Pi 0.141 0.036 0.061 0.098 0.090 -0.001 
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
Pi 0.014 0.025 -0.012 -0.028 -0.023 -0.003 
(0.040) (0.040) ((--). 04(-)) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
Closing Price Data 
pi 0.144 0.043 0.067 0,093 0.087 -0.002 
(0.040) (0ý040) (0.040) (0,040) (0.040) (0.040) 
A 
p] 
-0.002 0.031 -0.009 -0,028 -0.002 -0.007 
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
Notes: 
Figure,, in p arentheses are standard errors. 
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ýIrtlficial predictability measured by cross- autocorrelation patterns, synonymous with 
nonsynchronous trading, is generally fairly weak for the portfolios we have considered 
in this chapter. 
As an illustration, one can look at market value classified portfolios constructed using 
bid prices shown in Table 7.2. Here the first-order autocorrelation between 
yesterday's returns on the largest sized portfolio, R,, -,, and today's returns on the small 
sized portfolio, R, is 0.087. On the other hand, the first-order autocorrelation 
between yesterday's return on the small-sized portfolio, R, -1, and 
today's return on the 
largest sized portfolio, R,,, is very small. Clearly, this is one example of where large 
firrns lead small firms when information comes to the market. 
More generally, the overall lead-lag relationship between the smallest sized returns R,, 
and R,, . and the largest sized portfolios R_,, and R,,, for both the bid and closing priced 
market value portfolios, shows that current returns of smaller sized portfolios are more 
highly correlated with past returns of larger sized portfolios, than vice versa. Both of 
these results clearly confirms Lo & MacKinlay's (1990a) nonsynchronous trading 
hypothesis in the lead-lag relationship between portfolio correlations, and supports the 
conventional view of cross-correlation between large and small market value sized 
portfolios. 
Following Boudoukh et al (1993), we have additionally calculated, using (7.19) above, 
the implied cross-autocorrelations for our portfolios. In Table 7.2, for the market 
value weighted portfolios the implied value is close to the actual estimates of the 
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cross-correlation. Taking an average portfolio, for example size 3, we can see that the 
estimated cross-correlation values of lagged closing returns with respect to the 
portfolio size s, the sinallest portfolio, through to size 1, the largest portfolio, are . 082, 
. 100, . 093, . ()78, . 041 and . 041. In comparison the implied cross-correlation values 
for these portfolios are . 071, . 073, . 093, . 078, . 078 and . 076. This closeness between 
implied and estimated values suggests that given high contemporaneous cross- 
auto c orrelatio n, where large firms have a similar information set to small firms, lagged 
cross-predictability is still prorriinent. Therefore, as we have shown the lead-lag 
relation is just a less efficient way of describing the autocorrelation patterns of short- 
horizon portfolio returns. 
The implied cross-correlations in Tables 7.3 and 7.4, for touch and volume 
classifications again have values fairly similar to estimated correlation values. For 
example, for the touch classified size 4 portfolio calculated using closing prices, the 
estimated cross-correlation values of lagged closing returns between the smallest and 
largest sized portfolio are . 014,063, . 029, . 065,. 
081 and . 053, when compared to the 
implied estimates which are . 
054,. 055, . 055, . 065, . 
053 and 0.053. Similar results can 
be seen for the volume classified portfolios. Again this supports the hypothesis of an 
over-reliance on cross-autocorrelation effects to measure nonsynchronous trading when 
compared to the more efficient individual autocorrelation values. 
Due to the inverse relationship between market value and the spread highlighted by 
Kaul & Nimalendran (1991), the estimated cross- autocorrelation effects follow a 
somewhat different pattern in Table 7.3. For the closing priced portfolios, when the 
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Table 7.2 
Lead -Lag Relationships and Estimated Correlations for Equally Weighted Portfolios 
Classified by Market Value 
Bid Price Data 
Estimated Contemporaneous AMOCOITekition 
R, R, t R3t R4t 
R5t RIt 
R, 1.000 0.771 0.756 0.779 0.770 0.771 
R, t 0.771 1.000 0.781 0.817 0.835 0.802 
Rýt 0.756 0.781 1.000 0.842 0.838 0.816 
R4,, 0.779 0.817 0.842 1.000 0.867 0.831 
R5t 0.770 0.835 0.838 0.867 1.000 0.872 
R, t 0.771 0.801 0.816 0.831 0.872 1.000 
Estimated Cross-Autocorrelation 
R, t-I 
R2t-I K-It-I R4t-I R5,1 Rj, 
_, 
R, 0.144 (). 10 1 0.121 0.119 0.080 0.087 
R, t 0.066 0.053 0.043 0.050 0.024 0.026 
KII 0.085 0.106 0.093 0.085 0.046 0.041 
R4 
t 0.028 0.033 0.031 (). 045 0.003 -0.003 
R5 
t 0.056 0.064 0.051 0.061 0.052 0.037 
RIt 0.026 0.015 0.017 0.019 -0.001 0.012 
Implied Cross- Autocorrelation 
R, t-, 
R2t-1 R3t-1 R4t-1 R5t-1 Rj, 
-j 
R, t 
0.144 0.111 0.109 0.112 0.111 0.111 
R2t 0.040 0.053 0.041 0.043 0.044 0.021 
R, t 
0.070 0.073 0.093 0.078 0.078 0.033 
R4t 0.035 0.037 0.038 0.045 0.004 -0.002 
R5 
t 0.040 0.043 0.044 0.045 0.052 0.045 
R1, 0.009 O. Oil 0.009 0.010 -0.001 0.012 
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Table 7.2 cont. 
Closing Price Data 






R,, 1.000 0.773 0.759 0.779 0.772 0.773 
R, l 0.773 1.000 0.789 0.822 0.837 0.807 
R,, 0.759 0.789 1.000 0.845 0.840 0.816 
R, t 0.779 0.822 0.845 1.000 0.869 0.834 
R5t 0.772 0.837 0.840 0.869 1.000 0.874 
RIt 0.773 0.807 0.816 0.834 0.874 1.000 
Estimated Cross-Autocorrelation 
R, t-I 
R2t-I R3t-I R4,1 R5t-I Rlt-I 
R, t 0.161 0.102 0.121 0.117 0.075 0.088 
R, t 0.079 0.069 0.051 0.055 0.032 0.036 
R3t 0.082 (). 100 0.093 0.078 0.041 0.041 
R, 0.024 0.027 0.024 0.043 -0.008 -0.077 
R5t 0.055 0.063 0.047 0.055 0.051 0.035 
RI, 0.028 0.013 0.013 0.014 -0.003 0.009 
Implied Cross-Autocorrelation 
R, (-, Rt-I 
R3t-I R4t-I R51-1 Rl, 
-, 
R,, 0.161 0.124 0.122 0.125 0.124 0.124 
R2t 0.053 0.069 0.054 0.057 0.058 0.056 
R3t 0.071 0.073 0,093 0.078 0.078 0.076 
R4t 0.033 0.035 0.036 0.043 0.037 0.036 
R5t 0.039 0.042 0.043 0.044 0.051 0.044 
RI, 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.008 0.008 0.009 
N(-)Ic,,,: and RI, are the first-order autocorrelation of returns on small (s) mid large (1) portfohos respectively. 
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when the first-order autocorrelation is, for example, between today's returns, R, and 
yesterday's returns, R,, -,, 
the cross-correlation is 0.084. When the inverse is true and 
the first-order autocorrelation is between yesterday's return, R2t and today's return R,, -,, 
the cross-correlation falls to 0.02 1, a quarter of the value! This is an example of 
where the lead-lag relationship shows large sized spread classified portfolios leading 
small sized touch classified portfolios. 
Consequently, because of the inverse relationship between firm size and the touch, this 
perhaps implies that small firm portfolios lead large firm portfolios, the opposite effect 
to market value sorted portfolios. Again, a general examination of the comparison 
between the largest and smallest sized portfolios shows that any size induced lead-lag 
relationship appears inconsistent. 
For the turnover by volume classified portfolios, the results follow the familiar pattern 
to the market value classified portfolios. This is as would have been expected given 
that larger turnover by volume is the characteristic of larger sized securities. Indeed 
the sized based lead-lag relationship synonymous with nonsynchronous trading is the 
most prominent for the turnover by volurne classified portfolios. 
Analysis of the all the cross-autocorrelation results shows that generally there is weak 
positive serial correlation, as well as weak nonsynchronous trading effects in portfolio 
returns. The level of artificial correlation due to thin trading is therefore small. This 
is partly confirmed by the contemporaneous cross-autocorrelation effects shown in the 
upper panel of Tables 7.2 - 7.4. This correlation ranges between 0.759 and 0.874 
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Table 7.3 
Lead-Lag Rel -ation ships and Estimated Correlations for Equally Weighted Portfolios 
Classified by the Touch 
Bid Price Data 
Estimated Contemporaneous Autocorrelation 
R, 
t 
R2t R,,,, R4t R5t RI, 
R,, 1.000 0.863 0.845 0.824 0.806 0.769 
R,, 0.863 1.000 0.852 0.849 0.826 0.769 
R, 
t 0.845 0.852 1.000 0.840 0.814 0.794 
R, 0.824 0.849 0.840 1.000 0.804 0.809 
R5t 0.806 0.827 0.814 0.804 1.000 0.782 
RIt 0.769 0.769 0.794 0.809 0.782 1.000 
Estimated Cross- Autocorrelation 
R, 
(- I 
R2t-I R3t-I R4,1 R5t-1 Rlt-I 
R, -0.020 0.022 -0.005 0.029 0.033 0.004 
R, 
t -0.004 0.073 0.009 0.047 0.061 0.024 
R3t 0.012 0.077 0.047 0.066 0.088 0.062 
R4t 0.021 0.068 0.035 0.075 0.091 0.055 
R5t 0.029 0.085 0.061 0.075 0.113 0.070 
RI, 0.043 0,092 0.074 0.077 0.120 0.092 
Implied Cross- Autocorrelation 
R, 
t-I 
R2t-I R3t-I R4t-I R5t-I Rlt-I 
R, 
t -0.020 -0.017 -0.017 -0.016 -0.016 -0.015 
R2t 0.063 0.073 0.062 0.062 0.060 0.056 
R3t 0.040 0.040 0.047 0.039 0.038 0.037 
R4t 0.062 0.064 0.063 0.075 0.060 0.061 
R5t 0.091 0.093 0.092 0.091 0.113 0.088 
K, 0.070 0.070 0.073 0.074 0.072 0.092 
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Table 7.3 cont. 
Closing Pfice Data 
Estimated Contemporaneous Autocorrelation 
R, t 
R2t R3t R4t R5 
t RI, 
R,, 1.000 0.863 0.844 0.827 0.803 0.772 
R, )t 0.863 1.000 0.852 0.855 0.826 0.776 
R, t 0.844 0.852 0.845 0.816 0.799 
R, t 0.827 0.855 0.845 1.000 0.814 0.817 
R_5, 0.803 0.826 0.816 0.814 1.000 0.793 






Rýt-l R4t-I R5t-I Rj, I 
R, 
t -0.023 
0.021 -0.006 0.020 0.029 0.004 
R, t -0.007 
0.073 0.009 0.036 0.059 0.021 
R,, 0.015 0.082 0.053 0.063 0.090 0.067 
R4, 0.014 0.063 0.029 0.065 0.081 0.053 
R5, 0.041 0.096 0.068 0.080 0.121 0.075 
RIt 0.043 0.084 0.071 0.070 (). 110 0.101 
Implied Cross- Autocorrelation 
R, j 




t -0.023 -0.020 _0.019 
0.019 -0.018 -0.018 
R2t 0.063 0.073 0.062 0.062 0.060 0.057 
R3t 0.045 0.045 0.053 0.045 0.043 0.042 
R4t (). ( '-, A 0.055 0.055 0.065 0.053 0.053 
R5t 0.097 0.099 0.098 0.098 0.121 0.096 
RI, 0.078 0.078 0.091 
0. (IQ-1 
JO-) 0.080 0.101 
Notes: R.., and R, are the first-order autocorrelation of returns on small (s) and 
large, (1) portfolios respectively. 
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Table 7.4 
Lead- Lag Relationships and Estimated Correlations for Equally Weighted Portfolios 
Classified by Turnover by Volume 
Bid Price Data 
Estimated Contemporaneous AWOCOITelation 
R, Rt Rt R4t R5t RIt 
R, 1.000 0.795 0.769 0.771 0.771 0.769 
R, t 0.795 1.000 0.827 0.822 0.842 0.813 
R3, 0.769 0.827 1.000 0.813 0.828 0.800 
R4, 0.771 0.822 0.813 1.000 0.830 0.812 
R5t 0.771 0.842 0.828 (). 830 1.000 0.830 
RI, 0.769 0.813 0.800 0.812 0.830 1.000 
Estimat ed Cross-Autocorrelation 
R, 
t-I 
R2t-I R_3,1 R4,1 R5t-I RIt-I 
R, 0.141 0.097 0.077 0.144 0.134 0.105 
R2t 0.059 0.036 0.016 0.055 0.064 0.035 
Rit 0.034 0.034 0.061 0.077 0.094 0.042 
R4t 0.051 0.046 0.028 0.098 0.090 0.035 
K5, 0.041 0.040 0.031 0.053 0.090 0.025 
RIt 0.007 -0.005 -(-). 0()9 0.015 0.052 -0.001 
Implied Cross-Autocorrelation 
R, t-I 
R2t-I R3t-I R4,1 R5,1 Rj, 
_j 
R, 0.141 0,112 0.108 0.109 0.108 
R2t (). 029 0.036 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.029 
Rýt 0. (-)47 0.050 0.061 0.050 0.050 0.049 
R4t 0.076 0.081 0.080 0.098 0.081 0.080 
R5t 0.069 0.076 0.075 0.075 0.090 0.075 
RIt _0.00 1 -0.001 _0.00 1 -0.001 _0.00 
1 -0.001 
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Table 7.4 cont. 
Closing Pfice Data 
Estimated Contemporaneous Autocoffelation 
R, t Rt 
R3 
t R4t R5, RIt 
R,, 1.000 0.801 0.775 0.781 0.779 0.777 
R, t 0.801 1.000 0.834 0.824 0.842 0.814 
R3t 0.775 0.834 1.000 0.819 0.838 0.811 
R, 0.781 0.824 0.819 1.000 0.836 0.818 
R5t 0.779 0.842 0.838 0.836 1.000 0.830 
RI, 0.777 0.814 0.811 0.818 0.830 1.000 
Estimated Cross- Autocorrelation 
R, I Rt-, 






0.144 0.101 0.077 0.144 0.132 0.104 
R, )t 0.057 0.043 0.026 0.062 0.071 0.043 
R3t 0.034 0.036 0.067 0.078 0.090 0.039 
R4t 0.041 0.042 0.024 0.093 0.080 0.028 
R5t 0.034 0.040 0.030 0.051 0.097 0.025 
P-1 
t -0.002 -0.007 -0.015 
O. Oil 0.048 -0.002 
Implied Cross-Autocorrelation 
R, t-, 
R2t-I Rt-, Rt-I Rst-I Rlt-I 
P-It 0.144 0.115 0.112 0.112 0.112 0.112 
R2t 0.034 0.043 0.036 0.035 0,036 0.035 
R3t 0.052 0.056 0.067 0.055 0.056 0.054 
R4t 0.073 0.077 0.076 0.093 0.078 0.076 
R5t 0.068 0.073 0.073 0.073 0.087 0.072 
RIt -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
Notes: R,, and RI, are the first-order autocorrelation of retums on small (s) wid large (1) portfolios respectively. 
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across the portfolios and indicates that despite the lead-lag relationship highlighted 
above. small and large sized portfolios are closely correlated. The implication of this 
is that lead-laL, effects are weaker if returns of differing sized portfolios are not CN 
independent. This is supported by the results of the implied cross-autocorrelation 
estimates which on the whole are close to the estimated cross -correlation estimates. 
As we have seen this implies it is the autocorrelation patterns of each portfolio that 
provides most evidence of nonsynchronous trading rather than any cross-effects. 
7.4.2. Test Results from a Nonsytichronous Consistent Model of Predictable Returns 
In chapter 6 we have docurnented quite substantial predictable returns, price and 
intrinsic value parameters across portfolios using a dynamic linear regression model. 
This section docurnents these results when using nonsynchronous trading consistent 
estimates of the model parameters, shown in (7.22). This equation substitutes in 
consistent parameters for observed portfolio returns and prices. This purges the 
observed parameters of measurement errors, in this case taking the form of 
autocorrelation due to nonsynchronous trading. 
When compared to the results in chapter 6, Tables 7.5 - 7.7 show that the effect of 
using nonsynchronous consistent parameters on the level of return predictability, for 
instance, is substantive". For example the AR(l) coefficient falls dramatically in 
value and statistical significance, when the effects of infrequent trading are removed. 
in fact for most of the portfolios, the AR(l) coefficient, a measure of the probability 
74 We can see from Appendix 3 that these models are well specified, and pass all 
the familiar diagnostic tests examined in chapter 6. 
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of infrequent trading, reverts frorn a strongly positive value to an insignificant negative 
value. In fact most of the parameters apart from the cyclica I 
At 
A,,,, variables r -4 and r 
become insignificant. 
These seemingly significant cyclical parameters seern to suggest that portfolio return 
predictability remains even after adjusting for the effects of nonsynchronous trading. 
However, the use of nonsynchronous consistent parameters causes the adjusted R 
measures to fall frorn between 15-20% (shown in chapter 6) to around an average of 
3'Zc. Given that if the true R' is zero, portfolio returns are a martingale differenced 
process, these results suggest that the consistent parameters models are very near being 
unpredictable. Therefore, the statistically significant cyclical returns parameters carry 
little predictive power. Additionally, the results show that the value of the predictable 
parameter coefficients is greater when the touch is included in daily portfolio returns. 
Finally, DUM, is the durnmy variable highlighted in chapter 5 are corrects for outliers 
in the data caused mainly by the effects of the Gulf War and the UK General Election. 
These results have important implications for models of daily return predictability. 
Tables 7.5 - 7.7 show that the level of return predictability is drarnatically overstated 
if the effects of infrequent trading are not accounted for. Indeed the results suggest 
that lagged price adjustment across differing sizes of portfolios, given new market 
information does not cause portfolio return predictability. 
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Table 7.5 
Unrestricted Regression Model of Returns Adjusted for Thin Trading and Dependent 
upon Lagged Returns, Price and Value for Equally Weighted Portfolios Classified by 
Market Value 
Bid Price Data 
Size Sim. d lest 3 Uargest 
A 
-0.003 -0.014 (0.040) (0.041) 
A 




rt-10 0.129*** 0.122*** 0.163*** 0.200*** 0.175*** 0.109*** 
(0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.058) (0.041) (0.040) 
A 
Pt-I 0.020 0.029 -O. Oil 




Vt-1 -0.023 -0.029 0.017 
(0.035) (0.028) (0.021) 
VtA 0.025 
(0.024) 
c 0.015 0.000 0.000 0.024 -0.009 0.000 
(0.014) (O. Ow) (0.022) (0.016) (0.026) (0.001) 
DUM 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.000 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) 
2= (). (), 1 R 
2= R 0.04 2 R=0.02 
2= R 0.03 R2 = 0.03 
R2 = 0*()' 
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Table 7.5 cont. 
Closing Price Data 
















(l. 1 (p*** 0.104*** 0.159*** 0.202*** 0.168*** 0.109*** 
(0.040) (0.040) (0.041) (0.058) (0.040) (0.040) 
0.006 0.022 -0.014 -0.012 
(0.03ý) (0.029) (0.020) (0.024) 
0.006 
(0.028) 
-0.008 -0.022 0.020 -0.025 
(0.035) (0.029) (0.021) (0.029) 
0.032 
(0.024) 
0.013 0.0 (X) 0.002 0.022 -0.005 0.000 
(0.013) «). 000) (0.022) (0.016) (0.026) (0.000) 
0.001 -0.047 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 
(0.005) (0.0(--)3) (0.0054) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
R'- ý (W2 R2= (). ()4 R2 = (). ()2 R2 = 0.03 R2= (). () 3 




C is a constant. 
DUM is, a dununy vaniable. 
Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
R22 IS the adjusted R. 
Statistically Significant at the I% level 
Statistically significant at the 51k level 
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Table 7.6 
Unrestricted Regression Model of Returns Adjusted for Thin Trading and Dependent 
upon Lagged Returns, Price and Value for Equally Weighted Portfolios Classified by 
the Touch 




4 5 Largest 
A 
r, -, -0,013 -0.026 -0.022 -0.031 (0.040) (0.040) (0.039) (0.040) 
A 0.108*** 
(0.039) 
rt, 0.104*** 0.125*** 0.082** 
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
1 rt-10 0.11')*** 0.136*** 0.154*** 0.131*** 0.149*** 0.119** 
* 
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.040) (0.041) 
pt- I -0.006 - -0.022 -0.002 19) (0.015) (0.026) 
Vt-I 0.002 0.021 
0.002 
(0.029) (0.015) (0.026) 
C 0.025 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.00() -0.001 
(0.016) (0.000) (0.016) ((). ()Ot) ((). 000) (0.009) 
DUM -0.000 -0.001 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.001) (0.009) 
R2 = 0-01 
2=0.01 R 

























Table 7.6 cont. 
Closing Pfice Data 





0.077 (-). 139*** 0.099** 
(0.041) (0.040) (0.040) 
0.151*** 0.1 lo*** 0.149 *** 0.105*** 





0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.00-3 
(0.016) (0. O0(J) (0.000) (0.008) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.046 
(0.003) (0,004) (0.004) (0.005) 
R2= (). () IR2=0.02 R2=0.02 R2 = 0.02 R2=0.03 R2= 
(). () I 
Notes: 
C is a constant. 
I)LT-M is a dun-uny variable. 
Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
R2- ýS 
2. 
iý the adjusted R 
*** Statistically siglufficant at the PX level 
** Statistically significant at the 51/, level 
256 
Table 7.7 
Unrestricted Regression Model of Returns Adjusted for Thin Trading and Dependent 
upon Lagged Returns, Price and Value for Equally Weighted Portfolios Classified by 
Turnover by Volume 
Size S lest 
Bid Price Data 
234 Largest 
-0.021 -0.032 -0.017 









rt-8 (). 098** 0.064 
(0.040) (0.041) 
rt-10 0.136*** 0.166*** 0.144* ** 0.161*** 0.15 1*** 0.137*** 
(0.040) (0.039) (0.040) (0.041) (0.040) (0.040) 
pul -0.006 -0.014 
(0.023) (0.022) 
Pt-4 -0.032 0.003 
(0.049) (0.033) 
Vt-1 0.016 -0.004 -0.009 




c 0.064** 0.058*** 0.013 0.024 0.000 0.000 
(0.030) (o. 018) (0.017) «). 019) (O. o(v) 
DUM -0.0()1** 
0.004 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.001 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) 
R' = 0.02 R' = 0.06 
R2= (). ()3 R2=0.02 R2=0.02 R2=0.02 
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Table 7.7 cont. 
Closing Price Data 
siz(ý sinallest 2 3 4 5 Largest 
A r(A _O. ()-1-3 
(0.040) 
(0.040) 




it-10 0.150*** 0.163*** 0A45*** 0.161*** 0.151*** 0.118*** 
(0.040) (0.039) (OA41) (0.041) (0.040) (0.041) 
Pt-1 -0.003 -0.014 
(0.022) (0.022) 
Pt-4 -0.028 U13 
(0.038) (0.033) 
Vt-1 -0.007 0.009 
(0.022) (0.022) 
Vt-4 0.014 -0.016 
(0.038) (0.033) 
c 0.083*** 0.057*** 0.017 0.024 0.000 0.000 
(0.029) (0.017) (0.016) (0.019) (0.000) (0.000) 
DUM 0.000 0.003*** 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.001 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.00-5) (0.00-5) 
0.06 R 0.02 R' = 0.02 
Notes: 
C is a constant. 
DUM is a dununy variable. 
Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
R2 IS the adjusted R2 
Statistically sigmficant at the 1% level 
Statistically significant at the 5% level 
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7.5. CONCLUSIONS 
Evidence on the effects of nonsynchronous trading has recently made a resurgence in 
the financial economics literature. After much evidence on the effects of thin trading 
when measuring betas in market models [see for example Scholes & Williams (1977) 
and Dimson (1979)], the more recent literature is concerned with the influence of 
nonsynchronous trading on portfolio return predictability. 
Previously in chapter 6, we have found evidence of substantial short-horizon portfolio 
return predictability in the UK. Nevertheless, there is a body of evidence to suggest 
that such return predictability is in some ways dependent upon nonsynchronous trading 
which occurs in constructed portfolios and comes about due to a lagged price 
adjustment to market news. Portfolios which are subject to such trading may be 
characterised by 'stale' prices and exhibit positive autocorrelation in observed portfolio 
returns, which following Lo & MacKinlay (1990a), may create false interpretations 
about portfolio return predictability. 
In this chapter we test for the presence of nonsynchronous trading in each of the 
constructed portfolios classified by market value, the touch and turnover by volurne. 
Moreover, we examine the first-order autocorrelation in the returns process. In the 
case of our constructed portfolios, this probability averages around 8% but hardly ever 
exceeds 10%, except for the smallest sized portfolio. When nonsynchronous trading 
consistent returns are used, any positive first-order autocorrelation effects are removed 
and negative weak first-order autocorrelation occurs across many of the portfolios. 
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Following much of the literature in section 7.2, this indicates that portfolio return 
predictability is dependent upon the level of mispricing in the form of nonsynchronous 
tradin 
I 
Usim-, similar techniques, we also test for any cross-correlation effects between 
portfolios. Following Lo & MacKinlay (I 990a, 1990b) we can say that any 
substantial lead-lag cross-correlations between large and small sized portfolios may 
be indicative of nonsynchronous trading. Cross-correlation occurs because smaller, 
less frequently traded firms react with a lag to market wide information, whereas 
larger, more frequently traded portfolios react quickly to the same information. It is 
this lagged reaction that induces positive autocorrelation in portfolios returns. 
Examination of the cross-autocorrelations (which do not exceed 15%) between 
differing sizes of portfolios indicate that there are some asymmetry in the lead-lag 
cross-effects between larger and smaller portfolios. This is further evidence of 
nonsynchronous trading. Comparisons between estimated and implied cross- 
autocorrelations, given a high level of contemporaneous cross-autocorrelation, suggest 
that cross-effects are just a less efficient way of representing portfolio autocorrelation. 
In further analysis of the nonsynchronicity problem we re-examine the portfolio return 
predictability question by re-estirnating the predictable variables found in chapter 6. 
This time following Miller et al (1992), we adjust the parameters for the effects of 
nonsynchronous trading. The initial results show that only weekly predictability in the 
AA 
form of cyclical r _, and r parameters remains after 
this adjustment. The imposition 
of the bid-ask spread onto prices devoid of such effects does increase the strength of 
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return predictability, but does not render any new predictable return components. 
Finally, inferences about the arnount of predictiveness in the exogenous return 
variables should be made with extreme caution. This is because when using 
nonsynchronous trading consistent returns, the adjusted R' falls from an average of 
between 151/, - and 201/c [shown in chapter 61, to around 3%. This implies that the 
ability of the model to explain return predictability falls close to zero. Therefore, the 
strength of weekly return predictability is perhaps too small to be really profitable. 
In the event, these results lend support to the loyalist nonsynchronous trading 
explanation of market efficiency. 
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8. CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis tests for stock n-iarket anomalies on the LSE using various sizes and 
classifications of constructed portfolios. More specifically, it has taken into account 
the influence that the touch and nonsynchronous trading has on calendar anomalies 
and return predictability. 
An overview of the literature on the efficient markets hypothesis in chapter 2 shows 
that this evidence is wide and varied. Indeed, the consensus view as to whether 
markets are efficient has changed through time. Initially most tests, primarily 
originating from the US, supported the view that securities are efficiently priced. 
However, throughout the 1980's there was a plethora of studies citing stock market 
anomalies as evidence in favour of inefficiency in the pricing process. These 
anomalies have included stock market volatility, portfolio return predictability, 
calendar anomalies and the small firm effect. Despite this, the most recent evidence 
has shown that mispricing due to the bid-ask spread (the touch in the UK) and 
nonsynchronous trading in security and portfolio returns, has at least partly accounted 
for these anornalies. 
The Effects of PoroWio Construction 
Many studies, especially in the UK, examined anomalous security behaviour using 
stock market indices. This thesis however, has tested the robustness of a number of 
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market anomalies by using various classifications and sizes of portfolios. These 
classification,, including market value, closing price, the percentage touch and turnover 
by volurne, have enabled tests to be carried out for the influence of the small firm 
effect, price effect, illiquidity and measures of information flows respectively, on 
portfolio returns. 
The nature of the relationship between security returns and portfolio weights, (for 
example market value may be correlated with portfolio returns), means that in order 
to avoid data-snooping biases highlighted by Lo & MacKinlay (1990c), portfolios are 
re-ordered periodically. Initial descriptive statistics in chapter 3 show the influence 
of portfolio construction on calendar anornalies. The results imply that portfolio size 
detennines the level of seasonality, rather than the type of portfolio classification. 
Turn of the Year and Monthly Effects: Microstructure Explanations 
Subsequently, from these tentative results, examination of the influence of turn of the 
year and turn of the month calendar anomalies was undertaken using four 
classifications and five sizes of portfolios constructed using daily data from the LSE. 
The rationale for this analysis sterns from the questions raised in the literature on the 
weH known January effect and tax effects, mostly docurnented in the US and to a 
much lesser extent in the UK. Sorne of the first evidence in this area by Rozeff & 
Kinney (1976), in the US, docurnented superior average January returns and risk 
premiums. 
These findirigs have raised many questions and encouraged many studies. For 
263 
example, why were returns higher in January'? Some studies found that an increase 
in risk accounted for these anornalous returns, others showed that the January effect 
occwTed only in smaller firms. In the US, the tax year end coincides with the 
calendar year end. Clearly, tax-loss selling and portfolio re-balancing due to investor 
portfolio window dressing could cause superior returns at the turn of the year. 
Evidence froin Ariel (1987), also in the US, suggests that returns vary across differing 
times of the month due to this seasonal behaviour. Additionally, buying and selling 
by investors at calendar turning points may be reflected in the bid-ask spread both 
before and after these turning points. In the light of this evidence, this chapter, using 
daily data has investigated this seasonality using OLS dummy variable regression 
analysis, and found a number of interesting results. 
Initially, a December and January effect seerns to occur sporadically across portfolio 
classification and size. However, intra-monthly results show that seasonality across 
all classifications of portfolios is prominent to sorne extent in the last five days of 
December, but highly prominent in the last five days of January. While none of these 
seasonal effects coincided with the re-appraisal of the constituents of each portfolio, 
the former seasonal variable, being positive, is consistent with investors anticipating 
New Year buying. Subsequently these investors purchase stocks at the end of the 
calendar year. Furthermore, the results suggest that turn of the year seasonality 
occurs in spite of an April 5th tax year end, that seasonality is not tax motivated and 
that portfolio size does not influence the level of seasonality. 
Due to the, nature of investors' transacting behaviour, seasonality may be dependent 
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upon the touch in prices. This hypothesis is confirmed since when the influence of 
the touch is removed, seasonal return variables disappear. Despite this, lagged returns 
synonymous with stale prices and daily return predictability, rernain prominent. This 
suggests that daily returns are dependent upon yesterday's returns and not seasonal 
variables. The question that remains is what is driving seasonality in portfolio returns 
- seasonality in returns or seasonality in the touch'? Examination of intra-monthly 
seasonality reveals that it is the touch that is seasonal and not portfolio returns. Turn 
of the year anornalies therefore occur due to mispricing in securities. 
Day of the Week and Settlement Effects: Microstructure Explanations 
Chapter 5 continues the exarnination of calendar seasonals, but this time over shorter 
horizons. The motivation for examining shorter horizon seasonality sternmed from 
French's 1980 US study which documents a day of the week effect. Initially, French 
(1980) found that portfolio returns appear to be positive on a Friday and negative on 
a Monday. However, tests for this day of the week effect on six sizes and four 
classifications of constructed portfolios from the LSE, suggest that this seasonality is 
not prominent. Tests for short run seasonality do not end here since the UK has a two 
week settlement system which up until recently was over a fixed pre-dated period 
throughout the year. Again using constructed portfolios rather than indices, the results 
suggest that the first Monday (settlement day) of the two week account period has 
highly significant positive returns, while the second Monday (account day) has 
significantly negative returns. Returns are higher, on average, on the former Monday, 
since investors will enjoy an extra II day 'interest free holiday. ' Returns on the 
account Monday are negative since one would expect that on this day investors would 
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settle up their previous account by selling in the market in order to pay for their 
transactions. 
Additionally, evidence of a negative Friday effect on the last Friday of the two week 
account is documented. Clearly, investors at this tirne are selling securities. This may 
be due to investors balancing their account books since this Friday is the last trading 
day before the next account day (the middle Monday of the following settlement 
period). Again contrary to any UK evidence, when the influence of the touch is 
accounted for, all the daily seasonal effects disappear, apart from a fairly significant 
lagged returns variable. I have shown that the explanation for this, is it that 
seasonality is in the touch rather than portfolio returns. 
Overall, these results have shown that across portfolio sizes and classifications both 
short run and long run seasonality is not prominent in the returns process, rather the 
touch. This seasonal touch may be indicative of investor buying and selling behaviour 
at calendar turning points. Also, daily returns are more dependent upon lagged daily 
returns which are indicative of returns predictability. 
Evidence of Predictability hi Daily Stock Returns 
Consequently, due to the lack of empirical support for calendar anomalies, I examined 
more closely, in chapter 6, portfolio return predictability on a daily basis. The 
impetus for such tests stems from evidence suggesting that prices take divergent 
swings away from fundamentals and hence returns are negatively correlated and 
predictable. Using a multi-lag dynamic returns model that rnimics more closely 
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investors behaviour I have shown that in the short run, daily, 4-day and two weekly 
returns are predictable. In addition significant error correction components in the 
model were indicative of investors adjusting prices towards equilibrium. Evidence 
frorn the research suggests that the level of predictability is related to firm size but not 
substantially to the touch. 
Return Predwtabiliný and Autocorrelation. - Nonsynchronous Trading Explanations 
Despite this evidence of short-horizon return predictability on the LSE, there is 
nevertheless a body of literature to suggest that such return predictability is dependant 
upon 'thin' or nonsynchionous trading in security returns. Indeed, Perry (1985) has 
shown that nonsynchronous trading cornes about when sorne of the constituent shares 
in a portfolio do not trade at every closing time interval. Consequently, the observed 
portfolio value does not represent its true value. Since thinly traded stocks may react 
to information with a time lag, this generates positive autocorrelation in observed 
portfolio returns. Hence, apparent portfolio return predictability may occur due to the 
effects of nonsynchronous trading. Additionally, any substantial cross-correlations 
between smaller and larger sized portfolios may indicate delayed security price 
reaction and so nonsynchronous trading in the smaller sized portfolios. 
Tests for nonsynchronous trading and/or apparent return predictability using the first- 
order autocorrelation in the returns process across the portfolios in chapter 6 reveals 
that correlation levels averaged about 8%. Additionally, cross-correlation between 
larger and smaller firms does not exceed 15%. Both these results may be mistakenly 
indicative of moderate portfolio return predictability. This suspicion is confirmed 
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since when nonsynchronous consistent returns are used correlation levels fall to very 
sinall arnounts. 
When the portfolio return predictability results found in chapter 6 were re-estirnated 
with the effects of nonsynchronous trading removed, only weekly and two-week 
predictable returns remain, and are not influenced by the touch. However, inferences 
about the strength of this predictability should be made with caution since the adjusted 
R' falls to 311c. Such results support the loyalist mispricing explanation of return 
predictability highlighted by Boudoukh et al (1993). 
Summary 
Overall, the research undertaken here has implications for many issues in the UK 
finance literature. Firstly, contrary to nearly all the UK, and many of the US studies 
I have examined anomalies robustly using various innovatively constructed portfolios. 
Most studies use indices; a portfolio which cannot easily be mimicked by investors. 
Secondly, using rigorous regression analysis I have tested for a wide range of 
anomalies including the effects of portfolio construction and a firm size effect, a turn 
of the year effect, an intra-monthly effect, a day of the week effect, various settlement 
effects, portfolio return predictability using an econornic model that more readily 
mimics investor behaviour, as well as correlations across portfolios. 
While the established literature has shown that these anomalies may refute the 
efficient markets hypothesis, I have shown that rnispricing in portfolios returns caused 
by the touch and nonsynchronous trading account for these results and that profitable 
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opportunities on the LSE have been overstated. Furthermore, I have shown that 
calendar anomalies are determined by investor behaviour reflected in the touch, and 
that nonsyjichronous trading render predictable portfolio returns unpredictable. The 
implication is this thesis is that contrary to evidence in the UK, anornalies are not as 
prominent on the LSE as previously thought and so the results thus lend support to 
the efficient mafkets hypothesis. 
Further Research 
The motivation for undertaking the research shown in this thesis was the lack of 
rigorous tests, using portfolios, of anomalies in the UK. While the results indicate a 
mispricing explanation for these anomalies there are a number of issues that may be 
worthy of further research. 
Alternative ways of classifying portfolios could be used, for example by applying 
different in s(imple weights over different re-appraisal periods. Classifying by beta 
may be a more appropriate measure of risk, since it reflects company specific risk, 
whereas the percentage touch may be influenced by market makers behaviour 
especially in a dealership market [see Naik, Neuberger, Viswanathan (1994)]. 
The distinction could be made between portfolios comprising companies that have 
year ends in December and companies with year ends in April, when testing for 
seasonal and tax effects. Clearly, for companies with year ends in December, the 
timing of earnings announcernents could account for seasonality at the end of January. 
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Additionally, liniits of the database used may have weakened sorne of the conclusions. 
The availability of bid and ask prices, in order to measure the touch, was limited to 
alpha stocks, which has implications for tests of a small firm effect. Clearly, there are 
no true small firm portfolios in this thesis since I arn using data from alpha stocks, the 
top 160 capitalised companies on the market. The small firm effect is an area in need 
of more rigorous investigation in the anornalies literature. 
In addition to the exclusion of smaller companies, the time series at the time this 
research was undertaken was limited around 6 years since the LSE only started 
recording bid and ask prices from 1986 onwards. Hence, for tests of a January effect 
the analysis was limited to just 5 observations. Clearly, while this is not ideal, further 
work should use a longer time series in order to answer the questions posed by the 
'January Effect' in a more rigorous manner. 
Finally, given the importance attached to the touch in explaining stock market 
anornaties, investigations could be made into whether mis-measurement of the touch 
itself contributes to anomalies on the LSE. The quoted bid and ask prices, peculiar 
to this database, are those of the best two market makers (i. e the smallest touch). The 
data therefore may not reflect the true extent of illiquidity faced by investors, who 
may not transact with these market makers. Consequently, the true extent of the touch 
in portfolio returns may be underestimated. 
270 
Appendix 1: List of Constituent Firms used in Portfolio Construction 
I- Associated British Foods 
I Argyll Group 
3. Arnstrad 
4. Asda Group 
5. Barclays Bank 
6. Bass 
7. B. A. T Industries 
8. Blue Circle Industries 
9. B. E. T 
10. B. I. C. C 
11. Buri-nah Castrol 
12. Bunz1 
13. B. O. C Group 
14. Boots 
15. British Petroleum 
16. BPB Industries 
17. British Telecom 
18. BTR 
19. Cable & Wireless 
20. Cadbury Schwepps 
21. Cookson Group 
22. Courtaulds 
23. Coats Viyella 
24. Dalgety 
25. Dixons Group 
26. ECC Group 
27. Fisons 
28. Forte 
29. General Accident 
30. Guardian Royal Exchange 
31. General Electric Company 
32. GKN 
33. Glaxo 
34. Grand Metropolitan 
35. Granada Group 
36. Guinness 
37. Great Universal Stores 'A' 
38. Hillsdown Holdings 
39. Harnmerson Property 
40. Hanson 
41. Imperial Chemical Industries 
42. Kingfisher 
43. Ladbroke Group 
44. Lloyds Abbey Life 
45. Land Securities 
46. Legal & General 
47. Lloyds Bank 
48. Lonrho 
49, Lucas Industries 
50. MEPC 
51. Midland Bank 
52. Marks & Spencers 
53. Next 
54. National Westminster Bank 
55. Pilkington 
56. Peninsular & Oriental 
57. Prudential Corporation 
58. Pearson 
59. Royal Bank of Scotland 
60. Racal Electronic 
6 1. Redland 
62. Reed International 
63. Rank Hovis McDougal 
64. RMC Group 
65. Rank Organisation 
66. Royal Insurance Holdings 
67. Ratners Group 
68. RTZ Corporation 
69. Saatchi & Saatchi 
70. Si-nithkline Beecharns 'A' 
71. Sainsbury, J 




76. Sinith & Nephew 
77. Stanhope Properties 
78. Sturge Holdings 
79. Sun Alliance Group 
80. Tari-nac 
81. T&N 
82. Trafalgar House 
83. Tesco 
84. United Biscuits 
85. Unilever 
86. U nigate 
87. United Newspapers 
88. Whitbread 




Diagnostic Tests for Unrestricted Models 
Market Value Portfolio Cktssification - Bid Prices 
SmAest 
il, (1,603) = Oý84 
11, (1,603) = 1, -1 2 
: ýý, (2) = 4.15 
il, (1,609) = 0.05 
il, (1,602) = 1.11 
1120,602) = 1.18 
,E , _, 
(2) = 6.81 
il, (1,606) = 1.04 
34 
Tl, (1,603) = 0.15 il, (1,601) = 0.84 
112(1,603) = 0.02 1120,601) = 0.25 
ý, (2) = 1.23 U2) = 3.42 
il, (1.609) = 1.56 114(116()9) = 0.23 
S 
Tl, (1,60-5) 0.41 
ll, (1,605) 0.18 
ý, (2) = 1.95 
Tl, (1,609) = 0.26 
L, -u-gest 
il, (1,604) 0.48 Tl, (1,604) = 1.03 
T12(1,604) 1.53 1120,604) = 1.68 
c, (2) = 0.39 U2) = 4.00 
TI, (1,609) = (). 17 Tl, (1,609) = 0.52 
Market Value Portfolio Classification - Closing Prices 
Smallest 34 5 Largest 
il, (1,603) = 1.50 ijj(1,605) = 3.38 ill(1,603) = 0.16 il, (1,601) = 0.01 Tj, (1,602) = 0.22 il, (1,606) = 0.11 
ij, (E603) = 0.65 il, (1,605) = 2.62 1120,603) = O., ý4 1120,601) = 0.42 1120,60-1) = 0.31 T120,606) ý 0.02 
C, (2) = 3.10 3(2) = 10.84 E3(2) = 2.79 U2) = 3.44 U2) = 2.86 t3(2) = 7.13 
11, (1,609) = 0.01 q, kI, 609) = 0.18 il, (1,608) = 0.18 il, (1,607) = 0.58 Tj, (1,609) = 2.45 TI, (1,608) = 0.46 
Bid-Ask Spread Portfolio C 1, -Lss ifi cation - Bid Prices 
Sim-Dest 34 5 Largest 
TII(1,605) = 0.21 il, (1,606) = 0.23 T11(1,604) = 0.00 ill(1,605) = 0.92 Tl, (1,602) = 0.11 TI, (1,603) = 2.99 
il2(1,605) = 0.26 1120,606) = 3.90 il2(1,604) = 0.08 1120,605) = 0.01 T12(1,602) = 1.12 T120,603) = 1.14 
1 L, (2) = 6.20 , (2) = 5.12 X (2) = 2.49 
ý3(2) = 3.93 ý3(2) = 4.758 U2) = 2.45 
il, (1,609) = 0.9S il, (1,609) = 0.15 TI, (1,609) = 1.29 TI, (1,609) = 1.43 1140,607) = 0.05 TI, (1,609) = 0.22 
Bid-Ask Spread Portfolio Classification - Closing Prices 
Simillest 2 34 5 Largest 
TII(1,605) = 0.23 TI, (1,606) = 1.56 il, (1,606) = 0.03 TI, (1,606) = 3.04 Tj, (1,604) = 0.32 Tl, (1,603) = 0.08 
T120,605) = (). ()2 1120,606) = 0.87 T120,606) = 0.15 TI, (1,606) = 0.00 1120,602) = 1.10 T12(1,603) = 0.39 
I C_ (2) = 6.5 6 I L, (2) = 7.02 U2) = 2.39 U2) = 5.54 U2) = 5.04 
U2) = 3.68 
Tl, (1,609) = 0.94 Tl, (1,609) = 0.46 TI, (1,609) = 1.7 6 Tl, (1,609) = 1.81 T140,608) = 0.19 Tl, (1,609) = 0.49 
Turnover by Volume Portfolio Classification - Bid Prices 
Smallest 
Tl, (1,601) = 0.61 
T12(1,601) = 0.57 
2 
TII(1,603) 1.48 
, q, (1,603) 1.14 
ý, (2) = 5.18 
il, (1,609) = 2.84 
34 5 Largest 
(2) = 3.87 
il, (1,609) = 0-24 
, 91(1,606) = 1.96 
il, (1,606) = 2.19 
U2) ý 2.29 
Tl, (1,609) = 0.22 
il, (1,606)=0.00 
1120,606) = 0.04 
U2) = 3.68 
T140,608) = 0.95 
T11(1,605) 0.03 
Tl, (1,605) 0.29 
U2) = 5.01 
Tl, (1,609) = 1.11 
Turnover by Volume Portfolio Classification - Closing Prices 
Si-n,, dlest 
, rll(1,603) 0.05 
T12(1,603) 0.12 
7.47 
il, (1,609) = 1.57 
2 
Tl, (1,603) = 1.72 
il2(1,603) = 0.08 
t, (2) = 6.17 
, q, (1,609) = 0.33 
34 
TI, (1,604) 0.83 ýq, (1,604) = 1.05 
T120,604) 0.02 T12(1,604) = 1.69 
U2) = 2.96 U2) = 3.99 
il, (1,609) = 1.29 Tl, (1,609) = 0.52 
5 
Tl, (1,607) = 3.05 
T120,607) = 0.59 
ý, (2) = 2.60 
il, (1,609) = 0.26 
Largest 
TII(1,607) = 0.23 
il, (1,607) = 0.00 
U2) = 3.37 
Tl, (1,609) = 0.65 
Notes: T1, is an F(,., ) distributed test for nt" order serial correlation under the null of no senal correlation. 
112 is a RESET test, F(,., ) distributed for functional 
fon" under the null of correct functional fonii. 
ý3 is a X2(n) distributed rest for nomiality of the residuals wider the null of non-nally 
distributed residuals. 
114 is an F(,., ) distributed test 
for h eteros cedast] city under the null of homoscedasti city. 
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Appendix 3 
Diagnostic Tests for Nonsynchronous Trading Consistent Unrestricted Models 
Market V, -due Portfolio Classification - Bid Prices 
Smallest 1 34 5 Largest 
ll, (1,603) 0.01 %(1,605) 0.15 TI, (1,604) 0.26 il, (1,601) 0.22 Tl, (1,605) 0.09 T11(1,607) 0.25 
11, (L603) 0.97 112(1,605) 0.13 ij,, (1,604) 1.96 112(1,601) 3.43 112(1,605) 2.43 T12(1,607) 1.53 ýý, (2) = 4.19 E_, (2) = 6.50 ý, (2) = 4.4, X U2) = 1.97 ý3(2) = 4.33 ý3(2) = 3.14 
il, (1,609) = 2.94 11, (1,609) = 0.50 il, (1,609) = 0,01 1140,609) = 3.39 TI, (1,609) = 2.86 TI, (1,609) = 0.95 
Market Value Portfolio Classification - Closing Prices 
Smallest 34 5 Largest 
il, (1,603) = 0.02 il, (1,605) = 0.03 ill(1,604) = 0.51 ill(1,601) = 0.21 il, (1,602) = 0.30 Tl, (1,607) = 0.02 
1120,603) = 1.25 TI, (1.605) = 0.31 1120,604) = 2.18 1120,601) = 3.39 T120,602) = 0.50 rl2(1,607) = 1.35 
1 t, (2) = 3.77 t: _, (2) = 8.42 -_, (2) = 4.45 
U2) = 1.88 U2) = 3.43 U2) = 6.52 
il, (1,609) = 4.43, il, (1,609) = 0.15 il, (1,609) = 0.25 1140,607) = 4.20 TI, (1,609) =ILI T14(1,609) = 0.64 
Bid-Ask Spread Portfolio Classification - Bid Prices 
Smallest 34 5 Largest 
Tl, (1,605) = 0.01 Tl, (1,606) = 1.89 TII(1,604) = 1.12 TII(1,605) = 0.38 TII(1,605) = 0.57 TII(1,603) = 0.22 
1120.605) = 0.19 T12(1,606) = 0.79 T12(1,604) = 4.16 T12(1,605) = 0.11 7120,605) = 3.05 T12(1,603) = 2.19 
. ý(2) = 
6.00 (2) = 4.73 (2) = 3.50 (2) = 2.67 , (2) = 4.35 U2) = 3.73 
'q4(1'609) = 3.06 TI, (1,609) = 0.10 TI, (1,609) = 0.09 T14(1,609) = 2.29 il, (1,609) = 12.6 1140,609) = 3,48 
Bid-Ask Spread Portfolio Classification - Closing Prices 
Smallest 2 34 5 Largest 
T110,605) = 0.01 il, (1,606) = 0.38 TI, (1,604) = 0.12 il, (1,606) = 0.11 il, (1,605) = 0.37 Tj, (1,603) = 0.62 
T120,605) = 0.25 1120,606) = 0.00 T12(1,604) = 4.15 T12(1,606) = 0.01 1120,605) = 3.74 1120,603) = 1.01 
ý3(2) = 6.62 ý3(2) = 6.72 U2) = 2.96 E, (2) = 5.12 ý, (2) = 4.66 ý3(2) = 2.71 
1140,609) = 2.59 7140,609) = 3.64 TI, (1,609) = 0.00 T14(1,609) = 6.92 1140,608) = 10.9 T14(1,609) = 1.45 
Turnover by Volume Portfolio Classification - Bid Prices 
Smallest 2 34 5 Largest 
Tll(l, 6()I) = 0.19 
T12(1,601) = 2-66 
ý1(2) = 8.45 
Tl, (1,609) = Oý69 
Si-n, -dlest 
Tl, (1,603) = 0.06 
T120,603) = (). ()I 
11.9 
Tl, (1,609) = 5.31 
Tl, (1,603) = 0.03 
Tl, (1,603) = 0.02 
ý3(2) = 5.07 
Tl, (1,609) = 10.3 
TI, (1,604) 0.15 Tl, (1,604) = 0.64 
il, (1,604) 1.45 1120,604) = 0.95 
ý3(2) = (). 77 ý, (2) = 5.11 
TI, (1,609) = 7.16 il, (1,609) = 7.33 
il, (1,606) = 1.33 
il, (1,606) = 0.19 
ý3(2) = 2.18 
11, (1,609) = 2.84 
71, (1,605) = 2.33 
T12(1,605) = 2.79 
U2) = 6.41 
ll, (1,609) = 2.57 
Turnover by Volume Portfolio Owssification - Closing Prices 
2 3 4 S Largest 
, q, (1,603) = 0.01 
Tl, (1,603) = 0.01 
U2) = 5.26 
Tl, (1,609) = 7.46 
TI, (1,604) 0.04 TIJI, 604) = 0.64 
Tl, (1,604) 1.41 il, (1,604) = 0.96 
ý3(2) = 4.89 ý3(2) = 5.11 
TI, (1,609) = 1.04 Tl, (1,609) = 7.37 
71, (1,607) = 0.01 
T12(1,607) = 2.02 
U2) = 2.16 
Tl, (1,609) = 2.91 
TII(1,607) = 0.02 
T12(1,607) = 3.75 
U2) = 2.93 
il, (1,609) = 0.19 
Notes: TI, is at) F(,., ) distributed test for n"' order serial correlation under the. null of no serial correlation, 
T12 is a RESET test, F(,., ) distributed for functional fonn under the null of correct functional forni. 
E is aX 2( 11 ) distributed test for non-nality of the residuals under the null of non-nally distributed residuals. 
T14 is an F(,., ) distributed test for heteroscedasticity under the null of horn oscedasti city - 
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